STATEMENT

by

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Cluster III

(CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY)
Mr. Chairman,

Sweden fully supports and endorses the statement made by the Irish Presidency on behalf of the European Union. I would like to take this opportunity to expand on the issue of control of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr. Chairman,

In the current international debate on measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, increased international attention has been directed to the nuclear fuel cycle. Under the NPT countries can — perfectly legally — build up a capacity to produce nuclear weapon-grade material. The central problem however, is that countries can then withdraw from the NPT and start making nuclear weapons.

In response to this possibility it has been proposed, inter alia

- that the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium — should be limited to facilities under multinational control;
- that multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste be developed, and;
- that nuclear energy-systems that do not use materials directly suitable for making nuclear weapons be deployed.

These ideas have already been extensively studied and researched in the 1970s and the 1980s. When the IAEA is now setting up an independent expert group, its mandate is to revisit previous proposals in order to develop ideas on how to move forward.

Sweden believes that there are a number of elements to consider when developing measures to control the fuel cycle.

- The approach should be broad-based, aiming at strengthening multinational control and limiting the existing global inventory of material directly usable in nuclear weapons and the capacity to produce the same.
- A non-discriminatory approach to assuring supply of nuclear fuel and material for peaceful purposes should be developed. This approach should aim at maintaining enrichment and reprocessing capacity globally at a level sufficient to meet international demand and ensure commercial competitiveness.
- Another element should be to halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons through a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
- Existing frameworks for the disposal of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be maintained and expanded.
- A central element would be the Additional Protocol, as the new verification standard, in order to enhance transparency and to facilitate a non-discriminatory system for assured supply of nuclear material for legitimate civil use.
Finally, Sweden considers Comprehensive Safeguards together with Additional Protocols to be the verification standard of today. From this follows that we also consider that this standard should be the mandatory safeguard arrangement under NPT’s Article III.1. A decision to this effect by the 2005 Review Conference would greatly enhance the confidence necessary for a more vital international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.