Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany

Statement by H.E. Ambassador Volker Heinsberg
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to the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations
Geneva

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State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Cluster 1 -
"Nuclear Disarmament"

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Mister Chairman,

As Germany is taking the floor for the first time during this session of the Preparatory Committee I would like – at the outset of my remarks – assure you of my delegation’s full support and cooperation in the exercise of your important task. We are convinced that under your able chairmanship we will be able to set the stage for a successful 2005 Review Conference.

The Irish Presidency already spoke on Monday (and also today) on behalf of the European Union. Germany fully endorses these statements. Let me today also in light of the discussions so far make a few remarks regarding the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Mister Chairman,

the security situation has dramatically changed after the end of the Cold War. The bipolar world order is gone. Are we now faced with an increasing risk of world disorder? In any event, the security situation is in many ways more complex today. Not only has the conflict potential at a regional level increased. Also the threats posed by the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has become more pronounced. Against this backdrop the need for a rules-based international order has become more apparent than ever.

The multilateral treaty system is of key importance to this new world order. It provides the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under Art VI. It is worth repeating this well-known phrase describing the essence of the NPT and highlighting the firm relationship which was established by the treaty between non-proliferation and disarmament, and vice versa. These two goals can only effectively be pursued jointly and not at each others expense. It is particularly important to recall this in view of rising concerns not only regarding continuing proliferation and non-compliance with the non-proliferation obligations but also regarding the slow progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and indications of a “renaissance” of nuclear weapons. In addition the impression that the de facto nuclear weapon states outside the NPT are increasingly tolerated and might
Even benefit politically from their status as de facto nuclear weapon states is liable to undermine the NPT.

Considering this situation, maintaining the authority and integrity of the NPT should be the leitmotif of the current review process. Clearly, there is no room for complacency. On the contrary, a constructive and open-minded approach by all parties to the NPT is called for. We need to honour the basic bargain underpinning the NPT. Only this way will we be able to ensure the success of the Review Conference next year.

Mister Chairman,

Some will say that my remarks so far only represent foregone conclusions. Having listened to some interventions over the past few days, however, I am not so sure that this is really the case. We must avoid pursuing only limited or one-sided agendas. Rather, we should jointly strive to strengthen the NPT regime as a whole and thereby fortify it against the risk of erosion. Whilst a lot of focus is now being placed on compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT, we should also in parallel ensure that the nuclear disarmament obligations are continued to be fulfilled.

After the end of the Cold War there are new opportunities for nuclear disarmament. These opportunities need to be seized. As we argued in a written contribution to the first session of the Preparatory Committee, setting out the conditions for achieving a nuclear weapon-free world, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can only be achieved by way of an incremental approach. Such an approach also underlines the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of art. VI adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. These 13 steps remain the performance benchmark for the disarmament process. As such, they should not be called at the question.

Looking at the progress achieved so far in the implementation of the 13 steps, there is generally no reason for complacency. While the significant progress made in nuclear disarmament should not be discounted, we hold the view that the continuation of disarmament is necessary. The Review Conference should also be used by the nuclear weapon states to renew their commitment to nuclear disarmament and to demonstrate the readiness to be held accountable and to make tangible progress towards irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament. A new momentum must be instilled into the disarmament process with a view to maintaining its
credibility. The immediate implementation of the following steps would provide new impetus to nuclear disarmament:

1. The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament should be overcome and the existing linkages between subjects on the agenda of the conference be abandoned. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) should start immediately. For this purpose the CD should establish an ad-hoc committee on a FMCT on the basis of the mandate agreed in 1998. Responding to other legitimate concerns the CD should also without further delay – and filibustering – resume work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and nuclear disarmament. As matters stand, ad hoc committees on the latter two subjects should at first only be established with a deliberative mandate.

2. First steps should be discussed to address in a concrete manner the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. As part of the overall nuclear disarmament process non-strategic nuclear weapons must be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. However, their elimination will not be possible in one leap. Rather an incremental approach is called for which might start with rather modest measures designed to build confidence. In a written contribution to the first Precom in 2002 we set out an illustrative list of such measures. As a first step we could imagine the United States of America and the Russian Federation to reaffirm the 1991/1992 presidential nuclear initiatives. We would also welcome a voluntary exchange of information by all nuclear weapons states on existing holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such an exchange could and should take account of the need to protect confidential information. However, it would already be useful in a first step to get information on the overall numbers of non-strategic nuclear warheads and the numbers and characteristics of delivery vehicles.

3. An understanding on the basic requirements for reporting would have a positive impact on the review process by in particular enhancing confidence in the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to accountability and transparency. We particularly welcome the useful work done by Canada on this issue. We hope that on that basis it will be possible to adopt a decision at the 2005 Review Conference which provides guidelines regarding the scope and format of reporting in fulfillment of the requirement as forth in 2000.
Mister Chairman,

it was not my intention to provide an exhaustive statement on the issue of nuclear disarmament. On the contrary I have just addressed a few aspects with a view to offer a possible approach to intensify the process of nuclear disarmament. I would welcome a discussion on the suggestions that I made today to this end. Likewise Germany stands ready to also address other aspects on the nuclear disarmament agenda. There is no reason to mark time. We need to act now. As we said last year: The costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of effective action now.