In cluster 2, I would like to address Japan’s position on strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, integrated safeguards, export controls and nuclear weapon free zones.

1. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

Assuring nuclear non-proliferation through the application of an effective IAEA safeguards system is a key and essential component of the NPT regime. Therefore, the universalization of an impartial and effective safeguards system by the IAEA represents a significant contribution to the non-proliferation regime. I would like to take this opportunity to express Japan’s deep gratitude to Director General ElBaradei and his staff for their contribution to promoting non-proliferation.

The cases of Iraq and the DPRK in the early 1990s clearly demonstrated that verification through safeguards only on declared activities and materials did not provide a sufficient basis of assurance. It became apparent that verification also on undeclared nuclear materials and activities is essential to ensure non-proliferation effectively. Thus, the additional protocol was introduced to complement the safeguards agreement.

In the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference it was recommended that the IAEA and its Member States consider ways and means, including a plan of action, to promote and facilitate the
conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Japan, as the first country with a major nuclear cycle programme to bring into force an additional protocol, has been actively supporting the efforts by the IAEA to develop and implement the plan of action. Japan has taken various initiatives aimed at encouraging universal adherence to the additional protocol by making both financial and personnel contributions.

Mr. Chairman,

In particular, I would like to stress the important outcomes of the International Conference on the Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards, which was held in Tokyo, in cooperation with the IAEA, in December 2002.

After reviewing the outcomes of a series of regional conferences and the lessons learned, the Conference identified areas on the future focus and innovative approaches.

In order to raise political momentum, the possibility of issuing a joint ministerial statement was suggested. It was agreed that measures should be taken to help with overcoming the technical and administrative difficulties encountered by many developing countries towards the conclusion of the additional protocol. Following the suggestion by the Tokyo Conference, an informal Friends of the Additional Protocol was launched in Vienna last year. This group consists of representatives from Member States concerned, including states that hosted a series of regional seminars. The Group meets regularly to support the Agency's action plan and coordinate the necessary approaches to promote and accelerate the momentum towards the universalization of the additional protocol. Japan attaches a high foreign policy priority to this issue and continues to play an active role by supporting a series of outreach activities.

As a result of these activities, we have noted heightened attention and momentum towards the universalization of the additional protocol. In the course of last year, many African countries signed or ratified the additional protocol. The recent signing of additional protocols by Iran, Libya, Mexico and Seychelles was a most welcome development. The ratification of additional protocol by the Republic of Korea, the approval of ratification by the U.S. Senate, and the expected entry into force of additional protocols by the EU countries will contribute to enhancing the political momentum towards its universalization.

The recent serious challenges to the NPT regime have once again highlighted the vital role played by a strengthened safeguards system. Such challenges derive from undeclared nuclear activities and also from illicit trafficking of nuclear technology, equipment and materials.
The additional protocol can play such a vital role in increasing the transparency of States' nuclear activities by providing the IAEA with enhanced verification ability and additional information on nuclear related research and development and export and import. We believe, therefore, that universalization of the additional protocol remains the most feasible and effective means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Chairman,

Japan urges all NPT parties to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and also an additional protocol. We are concerned that 44 states still have yet to fulfill their obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Japan supports the initiative by the Agency to work closely with those countries with a view to achieving wider adherence. At the same time, I would like to emphasize in particular the responsibility of states with significant nuclear activities to enhance the transparency of their activities. We believe that the more advanced a state's nuclear technology, the greater its responsibility towards ensuring both the peaceful use of nuclear technology and transparency of its nuclear activities. Japan calls upon, in particular, all countries with significant nuclear activities to discharge their responsibility and take prompt action to complete the ratification procedure.

The IAEA is able to perform its mandate of verification effectively only when it is provided with the necessary legal basis and technical tools. Therefore, Japan proposes that a strong message on the importance and urgency of wider adherence by all countries to a strengthened safeguards system including the additional protocol be issued through the NPT 2005 review process.

2. Integrated Safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

Safeguards measures must be continuously reviewed in order to take into account technological developments. These reviews are important, not only for maintaining and ensuring the effectiveness of the safeguards system, but, given the recent increase in the need for verification activities worldwide, also for improving the efficiency and seeking the possible rationalization of safeguards.

The establishment and implementation of integrated safeguards play a fundamental role in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards through the application of additional protocols. In implementing integrated safeguards, we should avoid mechanistic applications and pursue a flexibility that enables the adoption of safeguards approaches that take into account state-specific features and
characteristics, while maintaining the effectiveness of safeguards.

It is also important to demonstrate the positive benefits and efficiency of integrated safeguards by implementing them so as to provide an incentive to states to conclude an additional protocol. From this viewpoint, it is important for the Agency to continue to make efforts to draw conclusions and to move on the implementation of integrated safeguards as efficiently as possible.

3. Nuclear weapon States and safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

Even though it is not an obligation under the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States should make efforts to expand, as broadly as possible, the application of safeguards to nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes. In this regard, Japan hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will promptly bring their respective IAEA additional protocols into force.

In order to provide a reliable assurance of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, Japan hopes that the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia and the IAEA will be completed and implemented, and that adequate monitoring and inspections will be put in place.

4. Export Controls

Mr. Chairman,

Ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology while at the same time, preventing nuclear proliferation, is an important responsibility for the international community to fulfill. Export controls for nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology are one of the most effective tools for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, Japan greatly appreciates the role played by international nuclear-related export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. Given the recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is necessary to strengthen the effectiveness of international cooperation in these export control regimes. Japan strongly supports making the ratification of the IAEA additional protocol a condition of supply for nuclear materials, equipment and technology for civilian nuclear programs. We believe that such a decision would be the most effective way to meet the important responsibility to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology while preventing nuclear proliferation. At the same time, such a decision would also promote the universalisation of the additional protocol which I believe a realistic and most effective way to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Japan fully agrees with the idea that it is necessary to close the loopholes of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and constraining transfer of uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to states with nuclear proliferation concern is of utmost significance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan will continue to participate actively in the discussions on the ways to strengthen the effectiveness of export control regimes, such as the NSG and Zangger Committee. Furthermore, Japan is pleased to contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through its role as Point of Contact for the NSG, a role it has played since 1992, and will continue to make such positive efforts.

Japan has also been promoting a better understanding of the importance of export controls in Asia (ASTOP). Through hosting an export control seminar and pursuing various outreach programs, Japan has made efforts to encourage other Asian countries to strengthen their domestic export control systems.

Japan recognizes that an effective international export control system can be realized through implementing these activities in their entirety. We will continue to make positive efforts towards strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

5. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Mr. Chairman,

Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones contributes to regional stability and security. In this regard, lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT.

Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region in order to contribute to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Japan hopes that an agreement satisfactory to all states concerned will be reached on this issue and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.