SPECIAL TIME STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
BY AMBASSADOR LUIS ALFONSO DE ALBA
ON BEHALF OF THE NEW AGENDA COALITION
AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
OF THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

New York, 30 April 2004

Original version: English
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and Mexico. We have already stated our position on a more general basis. Let me now elaborate on what constitutes our main concern: nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

1. We have carefully listened to the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in the general debate, and while we recognized certain nuances in them, we tolerate an unbalanced approach with which they addressed the NPT challenges.

2. As we have stated before, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progresses in both fronts. Having listened to general statements that made a very detailed exposition about the non-proliferation challenges, while barely referring to nuclear disarmament, gives us reason to be troubled. We are convinced that the consideration of the NPT challenges needs to be brought back to a more balanced approach.

3. Similarly, we noted that some States have simply ignored the importance of working towards the universality of the Treaty. We recall the need of all the States Parties to actively work towards this goal.

4. We also remain concerned by the overall lack of transparency. We call on all nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency measures. Similarly as with article II, we are convinced that we must be in a position to verify rigorously full compliance with article VI.

5. The New Agenda remains gravely concerned that the existence and the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represent a continued threat for humanity and that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons anywhere is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again.

6. The unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and the practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference by the nuclear-weapon States represents the solemn reaffirmation of their obligations under Article VI.

7. We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the NPT, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and in this context to uphold their commitments to irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping
then in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment, and by closing and dismantling their nuclear test sites.

8. We continue to be disappointed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), an essential element of the NPT regime has not yet entered into force. We call on those States whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty to ratify it as soon as possible. We call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT. Any moves by nuclear-weapon States towards the resumption of nuclear testing would be a step backwards for international peace and security.

9. We consider it essential to maintain the momentum in building the verification regime, which will be unprecedented in its global reach after the entry into force of the treaty and will thereby ensure confidence that States are maintaining their treaty commitments. In this context, we will continue to provide the support required to enable the preparatory commission for the CTBT Organization to complete its task in the most efficient and cost-effective way.

10. We express our deep concern that the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has not been able to agree on a Programme of Work. We urge it to adopt it immediately, in order to resume negotiations. We call for the establishment, without delay, of an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Such a body could, inter alia, deal with the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

11. The CD should also resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, we call for the upholding and maintenance of a moratorium on fissile material production for military purposes, and the establishment of a regime for transparency and accountability and an appropriate experts group.

12. Similarly, the CD should establish a subsidiary body to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space that could identify and examine without limitation, any specific topics or proposals, including the possibility of negotiating a relevant international legal instrument.
13. We express our deep concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on Earth and in outer space.

14. The New Agenda calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out promptly the verification requirements for the implementation of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

15. We call for further efforts by nuclear-weapon States to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, and to formalize their unilateral declarations into legal instruments including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility.

16. In the general debate, we referred to the Treaty of Moscow and called on the United States and Russia to make it transparent, verifiable and irreversible and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure. During that debate, we also listened to some very basic information on the implementation of this Treaty, the New Agenda looks forward to receive more detailed information about its implementation and the specific steps that will follow.

17. We call for action to be taken to increase the transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures.

18. The New Agenda believes that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard we welcome the reductions that have been achieved so far within the framework of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives, and call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to finalize its implementation promptly, and to formalize the initiatives in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner so that negotiations on further reductions of such weapons can be initiated. Pending the conclusions of such negotiations, we urge these two, as well as the other nuclear-weapon States, to increase confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons.

19. Nuclear-weapon States should take further measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.

20. In regard to vertical proliferation, we recall that the nuclear-weapon States agreed to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.
Recent trends question to what extent this agreement is being respected. Any plans or intentions to develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalization for their use stand in marked contradiction with the NPT, and undermine the international community’s efforts towards improving the security of all States.

21. We call upon all five nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

22. We stress the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the NPT, and consider that regular reports by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision be presented to each session of the Preparatory Committee and to the Review Conference. These reports should address policies, intentions and developments, and should cover issues and principles addressed by the practical steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps.

23. Much of our considerations are contained as recommendations that we suggest to be forwarded to the Review Conference. We ask all delegations to have a serious look at them.