Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Hungary

1. The Republic of Hungary recognizes the importance of reporting for the strengthened review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference remains to be the basis for continued reporting. However, Hungary believes that, in order to assure a high number of submissions, a more general and comprehensive approach could prove to be more effective than the one outlined in Step 12. The Hungarian implementation report submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2003 (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/2) was prepared with this goal in mind and Hungary’s report to the third session follows a similar pattern, reporting on activities related not only to Article VI of the Treaty or to regional issues.

2. Hungary becomes a full-fledged member of the European Union on 1 May 2004. As an acceding country, Hungary took part in the work leading up to the adoption of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2003. Hungary fully subscribes to the principles and objectives enshrined in the Strategy. The Strategy states that “the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be preserved in its integrity”, a goal that Hungary shares, in view of the numerous challenges that the NPT regime has to face.

3. In light of the unprecedented challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Hungary studies carefully the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and non-discriminatory framework. Hungary looks forward to a substantive and productive discussion of these issues at the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2005 Review Conference.

4. The recent revelation of a global black market network, which provided nuclear technology, materials, and equipment to States ready to pay for them, is cause for deep concern for the whole international community. It highlights the importance of strict and effective export control measures.
and of proposals to reinforce existing instruments and practices. Hungary supports all useful initiatives to tackle this serious challenge. In this context, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by U.S. President George W. Bush in Kraków on 31 May 2003, is an important contribution. The initiative’s main goal is to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials and technologies, through the interdiction of weapons-related air or sea cargo. Hungary has lent full political support to this initiative since its launching. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the PSI framework (e.g. in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary’s participation in the co-operation activities within the PSI framework.

5. Hungary considers the IAEA safeguard system as an indispensable mechanism to verify compliance with the NPT and to ensure nuclear transparency. Such a system promotes confidence essential for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Hungary believes that the Model Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguard agreement, now represents the verification standard and lends its full support to making the Additional Protocol mandatory under Article III of the Treaty. Such a decision should be taken at the 2005 Review Conference.

6. Hungary attaches great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The efforts to achieve the Treaty’s entry into force must be upheld. Hungary participated at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2003, which adopted a Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the CTBT. In implementing these measures and also in furthering the goals of the Treaty, many important and challenging tasks remain to be tackled by States parties to the CTBT and by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat. Hungary, also in its capacity as Chair of Working Group A of the Preparatory Commission, will continue to do its utmost to bring about the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT.

7. Disarmament, as stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty and in various commitments made in 1955 and 2000, remains a pivotal goal of the NPT-process. In this context, Hungary welcomes the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty on 1 June 2003.

8. Hungary continues to support the efforts to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament affairs at the disposal of the international community, remains to be the right instance for such negotiations. Hungary will support initiatives whose aim is to find a way out of the current deadlock situation and to induce Member States to take up work on the substantive issues at hand, including the FMCT and nuclear disarmament. The current informal discussions on the CD’s agenda items could lead to a more positive climate conducive for a consensus on a program of work.

9. Hungary co-sponsored a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training at the second session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/ PC.II/WP.18). Education and training should receive more attention in the international community’s efforts to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. Hungary therefore decided to