Implementation of article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Norway

This report presents the steps taken by Norway in the implementation of article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The report focuses on the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Final Document, which is the most recent elaboration of the obligations embodied in article VI and the “Principles and Objectives”.

Step 1 - CTBT

Norway signed and ratified the treaty at an early stage. Universal adherence to and early entry into force of the Treaty continue to be a high priority. Norway has worked towards this goal by actively promoting signature and ratification of the CTBT, and by supporting the work of the CTBT PrepCom in Vienna in implementing the Treaty’s verification mechanism.

At the 57th UN General Assembly last Fall, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jan Petersen, signed a Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the CTBT.

Norway has expressed the view on several occasions, notably at the two Article XIV-Conferences and at the UN 14th Committee, of the crucial importance that the nuclear powers ratify the Treaty without delay, and that the remaining State parties listed in Annex II to the Treaty, do so as well. In order to accelerate the ratification process Norway has granted financial assistance to selected countries in the list of 44 states, through the Preparatory Commission in Vienna.
Step 2 - Test Moratorium
Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is important that the moratoria on tests remains. Norway advocates the view that such self-imposed moratoria cannot, however, replace the legally binding commitments represented by the signing and ratification of the CTBT.

The CTBT establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The CTBT’s verification system is thus at the core of the Treaty. The full implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) as soon as possible, and not awaiting the entry into force of the treaty, would represent a significant confidence and security-building measure. Six monitoring stations comprising altogether 119 field instruments is located on Norwegian territory as part of the IMS. With the ratification of the CTBT in 1999, NORSAR has been established as the Norwegian National Data Center for Treaty verification.

Step 3 - FMCT
Norway considers it as a top priority for the CD to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty is the next logical step on the multilateral arms control agenda and essential if we are to advance nuclear non-proliferation.

As long as the deadlock in the CD remains, Norway welcomes the ongoing parallel process to identify and assess particular and technical aspects of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It is necessary to deal with the entire field of weapons-usable material in a comprehensive manner. All nuclear-weapons states should conclude and implement arrangements to place fissile material that is no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime. Norway advocates the principle of irreversible disposition in order to ensure that excess stockpiles of fissile material remain outside the military cycle. To that end IAEA monitoring is required.

Step 4 - Nuclear disarmament in the CD
Norway has expressed concern about the continued deadlock in the CD and supported efforts to agree on a programme of work, including the cross-regional initiative as well as its revised version. This proposal calls for the early commencement of consideration of nuclear disarmament.

Step 5 - Irreversibility
Norway has repeatedly expressed support for the principle of irreversibility in arms control and nuclear disarmament. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles are effective non-proliferation efforts.

Step 7 - Strategic arms agreements
Norway welcomes the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. Reductions in the numbers of operationally deployed strategic warheads will be an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions of the 2000 NPT Review
national Plan of Action Norway has since 1995 allocated USD 130 millions, mainly to Russia. This Plan of Action concentrates on four main areas, nuclear safety, safety of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, monitoring of radioactive contamination and weapons related environmental problems. The idea behind this assistance has been to facilitate and speed up the ongoing program on dismantling decommissioned nuclear powered submarines with nuclear fuel on board.

**Step 12 - Reporting**
Norway believes that national reports by State parties should contain regular, systematic and detailed information to the other State parties with the goal to improve the functioning of NPT’s strengthened review process. In submitting its national report, Norway shares the view that reporting should be done by all State parties. It should be obligatory rather than optional.

**Step 13 - Development of verification**
Norway supports the further development and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control-, disarmament- and non-proliferation agreements, including the above mentioned International Monitoring System for the CTBT.

Norway also supports the verification regimes of the IAEA. Our agreement with the IAEA on Comprehensive Safeguards was signed in 1972, while our agreement on the Additional Protocol entered into force in 2000. The IAEA has conducted several inspections under the framework of the Additional Protocol. The measures contained in the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol are important for the Agency’s efforts to enhance nuclear non-proliferation and as a new verification standard. It strengthens the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system. Norway has on a number of occasions spoken in favour of making the Additional Protocol mandatory.

The IAEA conceptual framework for integrated safeguards represents a more comprehensive, more flexible and efficient system for verification. Norway has qualified for integrated safeguards, and these are being implemented in Norway.