Report submitted by Spain on the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in line with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (13 steps), to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (section 12, paragraph 15), the Government of the Kingdom of Spain is reporting below on measures it has taken to implement article VI, in relation to paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

**Step 1: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)**

Spain fully endorses the objectives of the CTBT, having been one of the first States to ratify that Treaty, and actively supports the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Both individually and within the context of the European Union, Spain has been taking a number of diplomatic initiatives with third States to promote the universality and entry into force of the CTBT. One of the stations of the international monitoring system administered by the interim technical secretariat of the Preparatory Commission is located in Spain, which defrays part of the operating costs.

**Step 2: Moratoriums on nuclear testing**

Pending the achievement of universal ratification and the entry into force of the CTBT, moratoriums on nuclear testing or any other type of nuclear explosion constitute a significant contribution to international peace and security. Spain advocates that nuclear-weapon States should maintain and strengthen existing commitments to moratoriums on nuclear testing.
Step 3: Negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the manufacture of fissionable material

Spain has supported various initiatives aimed at adopting a work programme in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and feels that negotiations should resume as soon as possible at that Conference to produce an international treaty that would set limits and controls on the manufacture of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. More specifically, the issue of prohibiting the future manufacture of fissionable materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons should be raised during those negotiations. Pending such agreement and although moratoriums are an inadequate measure, Spain appreciates the moratoriums on the manufacture of fissionable materials declared unilaterally by States in possession of nuclear weapons (or of nuclear technology in general). In addition, at the appropriate time, another related issue, namely the disposal of existing stockpiles of fissionable materials, should also be addressed. Spain has supported the holding of workshops to discuss these issues organized informally in Geneva by the delegation of the Netherlands, and has participated in those workshops.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament within the context of the Conference on Disarmament

Without any doubt, one of the priority issues that the Conference on Disarmament should be able to discuss is nuclear disarmament. Spain believes it would be reasonable to establish an ad hoc body to pay this issue the attention it deserves.

Step 5: Irreversibility

In Spain’s understanding, the principle of irreversibility should be considered an essential aspect of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms limitation rests specifically on the degree to which they are irreversible. Spain invites nuclear-weapon States to incorporate the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 6: Unequivocal commitment

Commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as reflected in article VI of the NPT and in the documents of the 2000 Review Conference, is an extremely important objective. Spain welcomes those nuclear stockpile reduction measures which have been adopted, and encourages all nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts to comply with this commitment.

Step 7: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

The international community can neither ignore the disarmament and arms control initiatives being taken bilaterally nor disregard the future potential of those initiatives. Bilateral disarmament and arms limitation constitute major contributions to international peace and security. Both within a bilateral and within a multilateral framework, transparency, irreversibility and verification are important factors. Spain has taken note of the denunciation by the United States of America of the ABM Treaty and the establishment between the United States and the Russian Federation
of a new strategic framework under the Moscow Agreement, and hopes that progress will be made both in terms of stockpile reduction and in terms of verification, transparency and irreversibility.

**Step 8: Trilateral Initiative**

Spain urges the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue and intensify their negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Trilateral Initiative, with a view to reaching, as soon as possible, agreement among the three parties on the IAEA system for verifying declared surpluses of fissionable material, including their irreversible elimination.

**Step 9: Measures to be taken by nuclear-weapon States**

Along with the great majority of countries that make up the international community, Spain considers that nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to comply with their commitment to maintaining international peace and security. In that context, the importance, stressed earlier, of transparency, verification and irreversibility, will bear highlighting. It would also be desirable for nuclear-weapon States to report regularly on their stockpiles, delivery systems, fissionable material reserves and exports of military technology. While it must be recognized that some nuclear-weapon States have demonstrated a significant degree of transparency, the fact still remains that the confidence-building measures and the advances made in this area have all assumed special importance and urgency. Because there can be no discounting the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist groups, non-nuclear-weapon States also have major responsibilities to assume in terms of verification and transparency. It is also essential, inter alia, to strengthen the role of IAEA. All States should participate in the IAEA system of safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, and more proactively, in the new concept of integrated safeguards or other developments of the system.

Spain also considers that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be reduced transparently and irreversibly.

**Step 10: Arrangements by nuclear-weapon States concerning fissionable materials**

Spain invites the nuclear-weapon States to adopt or expand unilateral measures for the reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, and to take appropriate action concerning declared surpluses of militarily usable fissionable material, especially their elimination under appropriate verification systems.

**Step 11: General and complete disarmament**

Spain participates actively in all international disarmament and non-proliferation forums and agreements relating to conventional stockpiles and weapons of mass destruction, and fully honours its political, legal and financial commitments. Spain is also a member of the export control regime: the close international cooperation in such export control systems is a fully legitimate and necessary complement to the general system of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Step 12: Reporting

Spain firmly supports the principle of periodic country reporting as part of the NPT review process.

Step 13: Development of verification capabilities

Spain considers that agreements and verification systems form an essential part of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Broadly speaking, measures that make for transparency, verification and confidence-building are key to the efforts that the international community is making towards the objective of “the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world”.

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