Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Substantive recommendations by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference

The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to present its substantive inputs, as recommendations, to be considered by the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference.

- The inalienable right of the parties to the NPT, enshrined in its Article IV - namely to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy - shall not under any circumstances be restricted so long as this right is exercised for peaceful purposes and under the IAEA safeguard system. Accordingly national efforts to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with a view to fostering economic development should not be hampered by ulterior outside political considerations.

- No consideration beyond the requirements of the Treaty should preclude the implementation of the rights and obligations of the parties derived from the Treaty.

- The NPT continues to unjustly divide the States Parties to Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Any attempt to either prescribe new and unprecedented interpretation or to create new division among States Parties, amount to the amendment of the Treaty and consequently cause new source of concerns, and therefore, should be avoided. Such an attempt is not consistent with Article VIII of the Treaty that clearly specifies the procedure for the amendment of the Treaty.

- The urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly through the accession of those with nuclear capabilities and unsafeguarded facilities should be duly addressed and the Review Conference should devise practical steps in order to realize this goal.

- In line with paragraph 34 of the Article III of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and as a step in promoting universality of the Treaty and the cause of non-proliferation, all States parties should completely prohibit the transfer or sharing of any nuclear related equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources or devices or extension of scientific and technological assistance in the nuclear field to non-parties to the Treaty, without exception.
- Given the established safeguard verification mechanism of the IAEA and Principle 9 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives, the Conference should recognize the negative and unconstructive effects of unsubstantiated allegations on the credibility of the NPT regime. To this end, the Conference shall urge all parties to refrain from unilateral measures which could jeopardize the integrity of the non-proliferation regime.

- New nuclear doctrine of a certain nuclear weapon state foments nuclear arms race, lowers the threshold of resorting to nuclear weapons and dramatically increase the insecurity and vulnerability of non-nuclear weapon states. This is in violation of obligations already undertaken under the Treaty, made in the unilateral statements on negative security assurances as well as the subsequent agreements. The Review Conference, mindful of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, should take every necessary step to bar this trend.

- The Treaty and the Decision on Principle and Objectives, as an integral part of the deal which made its indefinite extension possible, are explicit in noting that "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty." The current non-transparent practice of export control regimes is in contravention of free exercise of the inalienable rights all Parties. Worse yet some new interpretations tend to further limit the access of Non-Nuclear Weapon States to material, equipment and technology for peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Review Conference, in preserving the totality and integrity of the provisions of the Treaty, should cumber any such unilateral interpretations and prescriptions thereupon.

- Israel's unsafeguarded facilities and nuclear arsenal is the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The 2005 Review Conference and its subsidiary body on the Middle East, in implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and taking into account the fact that all countries in the Middle East are parties to the NPT, should consider and adopt practical measures in order to urge Israel renounce its nuclear arsenal, unconditionally accede to the NPT and put its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA.

- Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive and horrible weapons, remain the only class of weapons of mass destruction which some Nuclear Weapon States consider themselves rightful to resort to. The 16th session of the UN General Assembly in its "Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons" (1653 (XVI)) inter alia declares that "the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations." The 2005 Review Conference should recognize the will of the international community as reflected in this declaration and exclude the possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

- The 2005 Review Conference, mindful of the provisions of Principle 20 of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives on attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, should underline the inviolability and the security of such facilities and its international consequences.