Paper presented on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Introduction: the current situation in the Middle East

The meetings of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being held against a backdrop of conditions that are difficult and complicated, both internationally and in many regions of the world, in particular the Middle East.

The Arab States feel quite certain that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one of the most important treaties ever concluded. It has proved its effectiveness in combating and limiting nuclear proliferation for more than a quarter of a century and the accession of most of the countries of the world to the Treaty bears witness to States’ belief in its significance in warding off the spectre of nuclear war. What has largely contributed to this worldwide acceptance of the NPT is the Review Conferences, which have imparted to it strength and newness, thus enabling it constantly to keep up with a changing world. Indeed, it has come to be known as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

The NPT has not yet gained universality in the Middle East region owing to one State that has yet to accede to it, i.e., Israel. At a time when we observe some States hastening to eliminate the perils of nuclear proliferation both within and outside the region, those same States become slack when it comes to dealing with the question of achieving universality for the NPT in the Middle East, and this is something unacceptable.
The Arab States' position concerning the resolution on the Middle East

In becoming parties to the NPT, all the Arab States have taken the decision to reject the non-nuclear option, believing that the resolution on the Middle East region adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons might bring regional security through the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, in exchange for acceptance by the Arab States parties to the NPT of its indefinite extension.

The Arab States remind the States parties to the Treaty that that resolution constitutes an inseparable part of the NPT. It cannot be overlooked or disregarded until it achieves its purpose, as set out in the final report of the 2000 Review Conference. Consequently, the resolution must be accorded due attention and sufficient time for discussion and the submission of recommendations regarding it to the 2005 Review Conference, in order that it may be implemented.

For these reasons, the Arab States call upon all States Parties to the NPT to show their sense of responsibility, according priority to pressuring Israel to accede to the Treaty and subject all its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They further call on those States to refrain from entering into any agreement with that country in the nuclear field, with a view to the implementation of the provisions of the NPT, and to submit to the 2005 Review Conference reports on the steps taken by them for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

Disarmament

The NPT is predicated on a balance between rights and obligations. That goal has not been realized, due to the fact that there are those who refuse to become parties to the Treaty while others withdraw or threaten to withdraw from it or think their national disarmament commitments of which poses a threat to the effectiveness and very subsistence of the Treaty.

The erosion of the non-proliferation regime, first and foremost the Non-Proliferation Treaty, being witnessed by the international community has come to be an obstacle in the attempt to build confidence among the non-nuclear-weapon States and led them to have doubts about the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

The fact that the five nuclear-weapon States have changed and further developed their nuclear arsenals is a threat not merely to the credibility of the NPT, but to international security and peace as well as to the future generations which, through our presence here, we seek to protect from destruction. For indeed, those States' clinging to their nuclear weapons fills us with the conviction that they may one day resort to the use or threat of use of those weapons.

The fact that some powers have promoted new nuclear security strategies and permit themselves the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is a violation of the NPT. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to emphasize the need for the five nuclear-weapon States to make a bona fide start at holding consultations followed by concrete, realistic steps towards nuclear disarmament. Until that is achieved, the focus on nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines must