Statement

by

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to the United Nations

at

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Cluster II Issues

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Export Control

Nevertheless, recent revelations of covert weapons programs and a nuclear black market have proven that the IAEA safeguards system is not a panacea in deterring and detecting proliferation activities. These threats have highlighted the utility of effective national and international export controls in complementing the imperfections of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this connection, we emphasize the leading role that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been playing. As the chair of the NSG since last May, the Republic of Korea is strongly committed to the objectives of the Group. We believe that the NSG guidelines will set a new global standard for export controls which will meet the needs of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risk of proliferation.

NWFZs

The Republic of Korea recognizes the importance of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) in enhancing global and regional peace and security. We regard them as an effective and practical supplement to the NPT in that they provide for more rigorous and additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the NPT obligations.

The Republic of Korea fully supports the guidelines and principles on the establishment of NWFZs, which were adopted by consensus by the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission. To ensure the effective implementation of a NWFZ Treaty, however, it is necessary to establish a credible verification mechanism as well. The cooperation of Nuclear-Weapon States is also essential in maintaining the integrity and viability of the zone.

The Republic of Korea supports the efforts to establish and expand NWFZs wherever practicable as provided for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In this regard, we welcome the progress made to establish a Central Asian NWFZ and look forward to its early conclusion and entry into force. When NWFZs expand to encompass the entire globe, our collective vision of a world free of nuclear weapons will become a reality.
IAEA Safeguards

The IAEA's safeguards system is a fundamental underpinning of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its institutional and technical capabilities to deter and detect non-compliance make it the first line of defense against proliferation. As such, it fosters confidence in the compliance of Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties with their non-proliferation obligations, which is a prerequisite for unimpeded international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Given the current international security environment and the unprecedented challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the importance of a strong, effective and efficient IAEA safeguards system cannot be overemphasized.

The IAEA safeguards system has continuously evolved and been strengthened as new methods and techniques are introduced in response to emerging situations. But much more still needs to be done to confront the emerging challenges posed by potential linkages between terrorism and proliferators as well as illicit trafficking in sensitive technologies and items through the sophisticated nuclear black market.

It is therefore vital that the strengthened IAEA safeguards system backed by the Additional Protocol, be adopted and implemented by all States Parties to the Treaty. The Additional Protocol is designed to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, particularly by enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We welcome the fact that 12 more States have signed the Additional Protocol since the Second Preparatory Committee last year. We call on all States Parties that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

Concerning the relationship between the Additional Protocol and the safeguards agreement, the 2009 NPT Review Conference reiterated the interpretation provided by the IAEA Secretariat that, once concluded, the two agreements must be read and interpreted as one. In this regard, we would like to stress that comprehensive safeguards agreements in combination with the Additional Protocol should be the new verification standard.