STATEMENT

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Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Russia, as one of the initiators of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, is committed to strengthening and universalization of the Treaty. It is our choice and our strategic position.

Despite all the changes happening in the world, the NPT remains a major pillar of the international security system. While its goals and objectives were formulated in a totally different international environment, time has only proved their universal significance.

Recently some negative trends have been accumulating in the non-proliferation area. This manifested itself in North Korea’s statement on withdrawal from the NPT; reluctance of the countries remaining outside the NPT legal field to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states; the well-known NPT non-compliance cases; emergence of non-state, mostly terrorist, structures, whose restraint was not envisaged by the then existing agreements and international legal rules; proliferation incentives resulting from simmering regional crises; the weakness or absence of national export control measures in many countries, as well as other factors.

We are concerned over the situation with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which, in our view, is an important non-proliferation and nuclear weapon limitation measure. We hope that the CTBT that, as you know, was long ago ratified by Russia will be joined by the countries whose ratification instruments are required for the Treaty’s entry into force.

Mr. Chairman,

We are increasingly faced with fundamentally new challenges. Now we have to counter different, although no less important dangers, terrorism being the greatest. President V.Putin has repeatedly declared Russia’s commitment to the goal of preventing terrorism and those that harbor them from gaining access to the weapons of mass destruction and related materials, equipment and technologies.

Special attention should be given to the problem of the “black WMD markets”. This is the most dangerous market. Terrorists are smart and resourceful and are willing to go any length to get hold of the WMD production components in order to strike at innocent people.

At this time we are actively discussing in the UN Security Council draft resolution on non-proliferation that should motivate states to prevent falling of the WMD or proliferation-
sensitive materials into the hands of non-state actors, first of all for terrorist purposes. Development of multilateral cooperation is essential for fighting this phenomenon. And of course, this work should be based on international law and national legislation and not impede legitimate peaceful cooperation.

This year has been marked by a number of initiatives seeking to bridge the "gaps" in the non-proliferation regime. There are some rational points in them. All of these proposals should be thoroughly discussed. If we reach a consensus on them, we should decide which actions should be taken by, for example, the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or other fora. Most importantly, these initiatives should really strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime without affecting the NPT integrity or permitting loose interpretations of its articles.

What matters most is finding a systemic, comprehensive approach to the entire set of nuclear non-proliferation issues. It requires painstaking political and diplomatic efforts whereas attempts at solving the problems by force appear to be dangerous.

The positive pattern that has been established in the non-proliferation area over the past decades has to be sustained and enhanced as the basis for continued constructive and effective dialogue with a view to strengthening the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Mr. Chairman,

The principal objective of the current session of the PrepCom is to prepare recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference. The Russian delegation is ready for such work. It is important that these recommendations aim at strengthening and implementing the Treaty objectives and promote the goals of peace, security and progress.

We are to review all issues pertaining to the scope of the NPT. We are to discuss what we have been able to accomplish over the recent years, understand the causes of the problems and decide what should be done in the future.

We stand for a balanced approach to the PrepCom work. We would not like to see undue focus on some issues, although quite important, at the expense of others. After all, the review process is about reviewing the NPT in the sum total of its provisions.

Mr. Chairman,

Despite all the difficulties and growing skepticism, we should not slacken our efforts toward making the NPT truly universal. We must engage in a joint search for ways and means of bringing the states remaining outside of the Treaty scope in the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. I am referring, in particular, to expanding the IAEA verification activity in those states' territories, strengthening national legislations in the field of accounting, verification and physical protection of the nuclear materials, as well as export control measures. We expect the governments of those states to realize the great responsibility they bear for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Chairman,

The practical steps that Russia is taking demonstrate its continued commitment to strict compliance with its nuclear disarmament obligations, particularly those contained in Article VI of the Treaty.

Another significant step forward in this direction was our country's ratification of the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions calling for reciprocal cuts in the aggregate number of strategic nuclear weapons by each side down to 1700-2200 before December 31, 2012. In other words, these weapons will be reduced approximately threefold against the level envisaged under the START I Treaty.

To date, Russia has eliminated 1250 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 2580 ICBM and SLBM delivery vehicles, 43 strategic nuclear-powered submarines and 65 heavy bombers. As of January 1, 2004, Russia possessed 1031 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4978 weapons accountable under the START I Treaty.

We have practically completed our initiatives concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions, except for eliminating the Army's nuclear weapons. Elimination of nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines is pursued on the basis of technological capabilities of the nuclear weapon complex and actual financing.

Let me stress that all our nuclear weapons are stationed within the territory of the Russian Federation. We expect reciprocity. It is essential that nuclear weapons should be pulled back to national territories of the nuclear powers. This could be a major step toward enhancing international stability and providing additional favorable conditions for further nuclear arms reductions.

Let me also make some other important points. In our view, general and complete nuclear disarmament is a goal to which we should move in a phased manner, on the basis of a comprehensive approach and without putting forward unrealistic goals or targets. Nuclear disarmament, including non-strategic nuclear arms reductions, may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world and
Europe, in particular, the present situation with international stability and evolution of the existing military–political alliances and their enlargement, etc.

All actions in this area must be based on the principles of equal security, joint responsibility of all states and cooperation among them. I believe that the relevant provision of the Final Document of the previous Review Conference is worth mentioning, namely, that nuclear disarmament steps should be pursued "in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of diminished security for all".

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to reiterate our position regarding the earliest possible beginning, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effective internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We also support establishing an Ad Hoc Committee within the CD framework to deal with the issues of nuclear disarmament. It is indeed regrettable that these two recommendations by the 2008 Review Conference have not as yet been implemented.

Mr. Chairman,

One of the key issues of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is that of enhancing the effectiveness of the IAEA verification activity. We believe that the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement is a reliable instrument of ensuring transparency of national nuclear programs. What is important is that more and more countries are engaged in the process of acceding to this document. What matters most is not the mere fact of its signature, but a start of practical application of the procedures provided for by the Protocol. For its part, Russia expects an early ratification of the Additional Protocol.

Active work of the IAEA, in cooperation with the NPT member states, has made it possible to largely remove the doubts occurring in connection with the safeguards agreement compliance by some states. Russia will continue to provide every possible assistance to the Agency in this effort.

Thus, to prevent the risk of leaks of dangerous nuclear materials, Russia and the United States, together with the IAEA, have removed highly enriched nuclear fuel from the research reactors in Bulgaria, Libya, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The Initiative on safety and security of radioactive sources is being implemented in the same format. Over the past year 15 missions have been carried out in the CIS countries for the purpose of the sources inventory.
Mr. Chairman,

Allow me to make several comments concerning regional issues. Despite continued tensions around the North Korea’s nuclear problem, we are convinced that this situation can be resolved solely by political and diplomatic means. We continue to believe that North Korea’s return to the NPT is not only necessary but realistically possible.

Of course, we are seriously concerned over the very fact of Libya’s violation of its NPT obligations. In this context, we positively assess Tripoli’s renunciation of its WMD programs and the measures taken by Libya together with some states and the IAEA to terminate its work in this area.

The situation with the Iranian nuclear program is not as easy one, although some progress is in evidence. We hope that more active cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, as well as the signing by Iran of the Additional Protocol and acting in accordance with its provisions, will make it possible to close the “Iranian file” in the nearest future and put it on a more routine track.

Mr. Chairman,

Today, as never before, the issue of close interrelationship and balance between the commitments and the rights of the NPT member states is becoming all-important. This is fully true as to expanding international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Pursuant to the NPT provisions, Russia is taking an active part in relevant technical assistance and cooperation programs.

I would like to call once again your attention to the initiative proposed by President V. Putin at the Millennium Summit to develop nuclear technologies resistant to proliferation. The first phase of this project has already been successfully implemented within the INPRO project under the IAEA auspices. We urge all the interested countries to join this project. We believe that joint efforts within the framework of the INPRO and other similar projects, above all the “International Forum – Generation IV” will help achieve an agreed vision of the nuclear energy prospects.

Mr. Chairman,

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones is an effective measure of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The states engaged in creating such zones thus help to enhance regional and international security, increasing the level of mutual trust and agreement.
We are concerned over the lack of progress in establishing such a zone in the Middle East. Yet we hope that recent adjustments in the positions of some countries of that region in non-proliferation matters will help change the situation.

We are pleased to note that the work to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is close to completion and that little remains to be done to bring this project to fruition.

We support non-nuclear NPT member countries' desire to obtain legally binding security assurances. Russia has already provided such assurances to more than 100 states that joined the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements. We are also in favor of developing a global negative security assurances agreement provided it contains reservations concerning cases in which nuclear weapons may be used. It is time to restore the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances within the CD framework with a negotiating mandate.

Mr. Chairman,

Preventing an arms race in outer space is also essential in the NPT context. Russia continues to believe that preserving outer space free of weapons of any kind is an important guarantee of sustained international stability. Furthermore, we believe that placing weapons in space could be an incentive to potential proliferators of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. As President V. Putin stated in his address to the 58th GA session, "we stand for preparing a comprehensive agreement on this problem and invite all countries possessing space potential to join this initiative of ours".

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to assure you that the Russian delegation looks forward to constructive work at this session and stands ready to cooperate on the basis of equality and partnership in order to contribute toward strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Thank you.