Canada – statement on regional issues
2007 NPT PrepCom, Vienna

The NPT has helped to keep nuclear proliferation in check over nearly four decades. Unfortunately, three states have yet to be convinced that their own security objectives can be met by the multilateral assurances the Treaty offers. A fourth state did join the NPT, but has subsequently announced its departure from the Treaty, declared its possession of nuclear weapons, and tested a nuclear explosive device.

CTBT
The detection and accurate assessment of the DPRK’s test of a nuclear explosive device last October demonstrated the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization and its International Monitoring System. Unfortunately, the CTBT itself has still not entered into force. Canada continues to call on all ten remaining Annex II states to sign and ratify, but also recalls the suggestion that the remaining states in the Middle East and/or in South Asia commit to coordinated ratification of the CTBT. Such steps would not only build confidence in the respective regions, but would strengthen a vital disarmament and non-proliferation norm. The CTBT entry-into-force conference (or Article XIV Conference), to be held here in Vienna in September, would be a logical opportunity to make such an announcement.

South Asia
Turning to South Asia, there are deeply-felt security concerns on the parts of both India and Pakistan that must be addressed. While we continue to oppose any special status within the Treaty that would legitimize the development and possession of nuclear weapons by either of these states, we welcome India’s willingness to accept additional non-proliferation obligations and we are closely following developments as India seeks to expand its nuclear cooperation with NPT States. We will want to ensure that any developments in this regard do not weaken the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and recall the positions already taken by the NPT membership regarding conditions of supply to non-nuclear weapon states.

In addition to signing and ratifying the CTBT, perhaps simultaneously, there are other steps that would reaffirm both India and Pakistan’s stated commitments to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We urge both states to place their respective fuel cycles under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and both states, but especially Pakistan, to reinforce and strengthen respective national export control programs as an impediment to secondary proliferation. We also urge both States to support the P6 proposal at the Conference on Disarmament, and pending launch of FMCT negotiations, to agree to moratoria on fissile material production. Such actions would respect the expressed will of the international community and build on the success of recent confidence-building measures between the two states.

Middle East
In the Middle East region, Canada continues to appeal for full adherence to and compliance with the NPT by all States in the region. As a practical measure towards
achieving this, Canada also fully supports establishment of efforts by the IAEA to convene a forum on the experience of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions that might be relevant to the region of the Middle East. We also call for the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements in the region and encourage the development of confidence building measures.

Returning to a theme noted in our opening statement, Iran’s two-decade-long record of non-compliance cannot be overcome by the less than full cooperation that Iran has offered IAEA inspectors. Significant confidence-building measures, including suspension of proliferation-sensitive activities, as well as full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA are required from Iran to overcome the doubts arising from its history of concealment and non-compliance.

**Korean Peninsula**
The possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK poses an unprecedented challenge for the Treaty, as well as for regional and global security. The DPRK joined the NPT and accepted IAEA safeguards, and then went on covertly to develop nuclear weapons. Its test of a nuclear weapon in October 2006 confirmed long-held suspicions that the DPRK was abusing the privileges offered by the NPT.

This PrepCom must make a strong statement against this behaviour, which not only brings into question past commitments by the DPRK, but also any commitments it might make in the future. This Committee should reaffirm UNSC resolution 1718 by calling upon the DPRK to meet its Six Party Joint Statement commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons and should encourage the DPRK to do so in a complete and verifiable manner.

We should also call on the DPRK to recommit itself to the NPT. In view of the history of the issue, this Committee should also call for the DPRK to offer such transparency and access measures as might be required by the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues and restore confidence. Such measures would almost certainly extend beyond those available under comprehensive safeguards and an additional protocol. We believe it would be useful to further discuss conditions under which the DPRK would eventually return to this forum.

**Conclusion**
In conclusion, the NPT embodies a norm that stems from the determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to eliminate nuclear arsenals entirely. Canada continues to believe that regional and global security concerns associated with nuclear proliferation are best addressed through multilateral processes and, in this regard, continues to call for universal adherence to the NPT, including full implementation of the safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

It is crucial that the Conference make a clear statement on the importance of the Treaty’s universalization. Canada, for one, is committed to continue working towards this goal.