1st Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)

(General debate)

Statement delivered by

Ambassador Jürg Streuli

Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament
Vienna, 30 April 2007
Mr President,

First of all, I would like to say on behalf of my delegation that it is a pleasure to see you as President of the 1\textsuperscript{st} session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT. Your country’s commitment to the full range of nuclear issues will without doubt be an important factor for the success of our efforts. My delegation also wishes to assure you of its full co-operation in the exercise of your functions.

Mr President,

As we begin a new cycle which will lead us up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, my delegation considers it important to recall the causes of the disappointing result of the previous cycle as no consensus was found on a substantial final document. There can be no doubt that this failure is to be attributed to the stubborn defence of a number of narrow national visions, which not only prompted the delegations gathered in New York at the time to accuse each other of non-fulfilment of their NPT obligations, but also prevented them from seeing the issues from a broader perspective and from considering the security interests of all.

These security interests are dominated by different factors, as follows:

- the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, which is perceived by some as an incentive to proliferate;
- the risk of proliferation, which undermines confidence between States and weakens the multilateral system;
- the concerns about the growing use of nuclear energy, as the desire to control proliferation hinders access to nuclear technologies for States with large energy needs.

Mr President,

Since the failure of 2005, the NPT has seen various developments in all its three pillars - nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. I would like briefly to summarise these developments as follows:

1. In the field of nuclear disarmament, Switzerland would first of all like to recall that it has always considered substantial progress in this area as the best guarantee of nuclear non-proliferation. Unfortunately, we are obliged to note that since 2005 there have been no substantial developments in nuclear disarmament. This situation has been exacerbated by the fact that all nuclear weapons states are currently pursuing programmes to develop
or replace their existing nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. Indeed, it seems that some of them no longer recognise the provisions contained in the documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

In our view, such attitudes not only run counter to the spirit of article IV of the NPT but also give increased importance to nuclear weapons and render even more difficult efforts to lessen the attraction of nuclear weapons for those states trying to acquire them.

In addition to this not very encouraging picture, we must also recall that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force as well as we must point to the uncertain development concerning the start of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

2. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the situations in Iran and on the Korean Peninsula take top priority. Since 2005, Iran has been the object of three UN Security Council resolutions, of which the last two, 1737 and 1747, have been backed up with sanctions. At the same time, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has improved with the adoption, on 13 February 2007 in Beijing, of the plan of "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" of 2005.

Switzerland remains convinced that only through diplomatic methods – favouring the multilateral instruments, in particular the IAEA – will it be possible to resolve these two issues in the interests of all parties concerned. My delegation therefore encourages Iran to comply with the requirements of the IAEA and the Security Council to enable the crisis to be resolved peacefully. In addition, Switzerland encourages the States Parties to the "Six-Party Talks" not to spare any effort to bring the discussions to a successful conclusion, and it calls on the DPRK to facilitate the work of the IAEA and to rejoin the NPT.

Still in the context of non-proliferation, Switzerland takes the view that the project of cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy between India and the USA will not be without consequences for the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. If this project is carried out it will call into question the validity of the compromise which enabled a consensus to be found on the extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference.

3. In the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it must be noted that, for some years, the production of electricity from nuclear energy has become the goal of a growing
number of developing countries, and that it has recently gained importance in several industrialised countries which had for a period distanced themselves from this means of energy production. This development will inevitably lead to a growing number of nuclear programmes and a subsequent increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation, even of nuclear terrorism.

Switzerland is aware of the risks of this development, and it considers that initiatives should be taken to satisfy both the concern about non-proliferation and that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. My country takes the firm view that a state's access to the full range of sensitive nuclear technology must be conditional upon its adhesion to the NPT and to compliance with all the Treaty's provisions, in particular the link between article IV and articles I, II and III.

Mr President,

From the time it entered into force until today, the NPT has been characterised by compromise: compromise in 1968, which saw the non-nuclear weapons states renounce the right to acquire them in exchange for a commitment by the nuclear weapons states of the time to take measures to proceed with disarmament; compromise in 1995, which saw the nuclear have-nots accept an indefinite extension of the NPT in exchange in particular for the adoption of the "Principles and objectives for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament".

This philosophy of compromise is now reaching its limits because too many commitments have not been kept. As a result, the NPT no longer seems capable of meeting the many challenges mentioned above.

However, Switzerland continues to hold the view that the NPT is still the only legally binding instrument with global scope able to respond to the issues of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The NPT is therefore an essential instrument for achieving international peace and stability. For this reason, my country considers it to be essential that the agreements reached in earlier Review Conferences be preserved and implemented as soon as possible. Specifically, we refer to the "Principles and objectives for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and the "13 practical steps" adopted by the 2000 Review Conference. Of the "13 practical steps", my delegation takes the view that priority must now be given to making every effort to maintain the current momentum with regard to the mandate to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as soon as it resumes activities in 10 days' time.
Mr President,

In conclusion, my delegation expresses the wish that it will be possible to find again the spirit of compromise and the political will to enable the new cycle - which is just beginning, and which will be pursued in Geneva in 2008 - to overcome the current challenges of the NPT and satisfy the security needs of everyone.

Thank you for your attention.