Chairperson,

One of the three pillars of the NPT is to prevent proliferation. We must redouble our efforts to ensure full compliance with this key pillar in response to the serious challenges facing the Treaty.

Concerning safeguards, Canada continues to be concerned that 31 non-nuclear weapon States Parties have yet to bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and that Additional Protocols are only in force in 78 States. The Preparatory Committee should call on all countries that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol. In addition, the Preparatory Committee should recognize that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol represents the current verification standard.

Canada has both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol and we are pleased to note that in September 2005 the IAEA reached the broad conclusion for Canada on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. We expect no less from all other non-nuclear weapon State Parties.

The Preparatory Committee should also encourage the continued development and implementation by the IAEA of State-level integrated safeguards. These efforts are necessary in order to achieve a system of verification that is more comprehensive, adaptable and effective than traditional approaches.

Just as threats and capabilities evolve, so must efforts to strengthen safeguards. In this regard, we welcome the new arrangements agreed to last year at the IAEA on the Small Quantities Protocol. The Preparatory Committee should encourage all states with a SQP which have not already done so to take the steps necessary to adopt the revised SQP without delay. Consideration of safeguards requirements early in the design stage of new facilities is also important to enhance safeguards effectiveness and efficiency.

Chairperson,

Concerning export controls, no State Party should transfer any nuclear-related items to any recipient whatsoever unless the recipient country is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and the other provisions of this Treaty. Now that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol represents the verification standard for NPT safeguards, the Preparatory Committee should adopt this standard as a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee should require that transfers only take place if the recipient State has
in place an effective system of nuclear security, adequate physical protection, measures to combat illicit trafficking, and controls on retransfers.

Multilateral export control regimes play a crucial role in facilitating legitimate nuclear trade among States while respecting non-proliferation commitments. Canada continues to value the importance of the Zangger Committee and the Preparatory Committee should encourage all States to adopt its Understandings. Canada also places great value on other efforts to coordinate national export control policies and practices, and we believe the Nuclear Suppliers Group continues to play a particularly useful role in this regard.

Transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear equipment and technology used for enrichment and reprocessing must continue to receive special attention. Canada remains of the view that the development of a set of stringent internationally-agreed criteria for such transfers is the best approach.

Chairperson,

Concerning physical protection and illicit trafficking, Canada underlines the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and welcomes the adoption in July 2005 of an important amendment which substantially strengthens the Convention. The Preparatory Committee should urge all States Party that have not yet done so to sign, ratify and implement both the CPPNM and the amendment thereto. The Preparatory Committee should also call on all States to apply, as appropriate, other international standards and instruments relevant to physical protection and nuclear security. Canada is doing so.

The Preparatory Committee should encourage all States Parties to act in accordance with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its accompanying Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada is implementing both and, in accordance with these standards, has recently taken a number of other steps to substantially strengthen controls on radiological sources.

In support of the many efforts underway by various stakeholders, the Preparatory Committee should also encourage enhanced coordination among States Parties and among international organizations to prevent, detect and respond to the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Chairperson,

With regard to cooperative threat reduction, Canada underlines the important contribution of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Canada has committed up to C$1 billion over ten years to this initiative. The IAEA plays a particularly important role in this area and Canada is a strong support of its efforts, having contributed over $8 million to the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund. The Preparatory Committee should call on all States Parties to make a substantial contribution to nuclear security.

Chairperson,

Concerning recourse to the UNSC, Canada reiterates the important role that the
UNSC must continue to play to reinforce the integrity and credibility of the NPT and its key instruments, including the IAEA, as it has done most recently concerning the DPRK and Iran. In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA must continue to have access to the UNSC, particularly though not exclusively in cases of non-compliance. In this regard, the Preparatory Committee should encourage State Parties to endorse the proposal made by the former UN Secretary General to regularly invite the IAEA Director General to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and other relevant verification processes.

Chairperson,

In concluding, I would like to address nuclear weapons free zones. The Conference should recognize the importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and the contribution they can make to regional and global security in the absence of universal adherence to the NPT. Canada strongly supports the role that the various regional treaties are playing in this regard. In this light, this Preparatory Committee should encourage the development of new Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in South Asia and the Middle East.

Chairperson,

Further elaboration of Canada’s views on these issues can be found in Working Paper 40.

Thank you and happy birthday!