First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference  
(Vienna, 30 April - 11 May 2007)  

Statement by the Head of the French delegation  
Cluster 2  

Mr. Chairman,  

1. The French delegation wishes to associate itself fully with the declaration made in the name of the European Union by the German presidency.  

Mr. Chairman,  

2. This first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2006-2010 NPT review cycle is taking place in a context marked by the development of several crises linked to proliferation and failure to comply with undertakings that have been given. That fact underlines the development of new threats to international peace and security.  

3. We thus find ourselves at the very core of the issues for this 2006-2010 NPT review cycle. Its success will be demonstrable if, on completion of this cycle, the States Party can together provide proof of their capacity to address this type of challenge to international security while at the same time preserving the Treaty's fundamental balances.  

4. We salute the intervention of the Security Council, which in the space of just a few months has adopted resolutions aimed at ending situations that are not acceptable.  

5. The reaction of the international community is all the more important because most analyses show that world energy needs will see strong growth in the years to come, because nuclear energy will make a major contribution to meeting those needs against the backdrop of the requirement of sustainable development, and because such development cannot occur in a context that fails to provide adequate assurances.  

6. It is therefore important to prepare the ground to ensure that international cooperation can achieve the development provided for in Article IV of the Treaty, to which France is particularly attached. The right to the benefits of nuclear energy presupposes, under the terms of Article IV, that States Party
13. With regard to the topic that is of direct concern to us here today, I shall simply point to the fact that Iran has failed to comply with its non-proliferation commitments under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement, as has been formally placed on record by the IAEA in the reports of its Director General and in the resolutions of its Board of Governors. That is why the Board of Governors decided in its resolution of 24 September 2005 to lay the matter before the Security Council.

14. We urge once again Iran to comply with Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, which require that it take the steps prescribed by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and suspend without further delay its activities linked to enrichment and reprocessing, including research and development, in addition to all work on projects related to heavy water, subject to IAEA verification.

Mr. Chairman,

15. These two grave crises demonstrate that it is necessary to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in order to address at the same time the need to meet energy needs, environment concerns and the necessity of combating proliferation.

16. The NPT is all the more essential as it institutes a safeguards regime. The conciliation of energy security and non-proliferation entails a need for the IAEA, which is doing remarkable work on non-proliferation and, more generally, international peace and security – and indeed its work was saluted by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to it at the end of 2005 – to be able to pursue its efforts to give the international community credible assurances that States Party to the Treaty are abiding by their commitment to peaceful uses. This is the condition to be met in order to build the necessary confidence for a long-term development of the use of nuclear energy.

17. In this context, the IAEA safeguards system continues to play a key role in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and we must support the Agency’s efforts to ensure that that system enjoys the utmost effectiveness and credibility.

18. The credibility of the safeguards system is founded in particular on the principles of universalisation and strengthening of the safeguards in order to achieve over time an integrated system of safeguards.

19. While the Treaty is now a virtually universal instrument, the obligation laid down by Article III on the States Party to conclude Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements has not yet been satisfied by all. To date, 31 States have no Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force, and of those, 20 States have not made any approach to the IAEA in this regard. The universalisation of the safeguards system therefore continues to be a priority and the French delegation invites all States that have not yet done so to give practical expression to their support for the non-proliferation regime by concluding a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement at the earliest possible date.
20. Additionally, the French delegation notes with satisfaction that since the NPT Review Conference in May 2005, the process of revision of the model of small quantities protocol of nuclear material (SQP) has reached completion. We consider this to be an important stage in the reinforcement of the safeguards and we call on all the States concerned to begin as soon as possible the procedures required to ensure the conformity of their protocol with the new model document approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

Mr. Chairman,

21. The international community, faced in recent years with the challenge of the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, has been obliged to react, to analyse the loopholes of the existing system and to identify means of reinforcing the effectiveness of the safeguards.

22. The adoption of a model Additional Protocol in 1997, the outcome of such efforts, was a key stage in strengthening the safeguards. Henceforth, within the framework provided by the implementation of an Additional Protocol and a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA has available to it a general overview of the nuclear programme of a given State and can draw conclusions as to the whole range of its nuclear activities.

23. It is for this reason that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement supplemented by an Additional Protocol, must be considered to constitute the standard that will allow the Agency to perform its verification mission.

24. France, like its European partners, brought its own additional protocol into force in 2004 and regularly makes its declarations to the IAEA. It is also subject to Euratom inspections that cover the entire range of civilian nuclear applications.

25. Overall, 78 States have an Additional Protocol in force at the present time and 34 others have signed such a protocol but have yet to ratify it. These figures are encouraging but not wholly satisfactory. The French delegation encourages all States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date.

26. France further encourages the international community, the IAEA and all States that have taken action at bilateral level to remain mobilised in support of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols.

27. For its part, France has always supported action to promote these instruments, within both the G8 and the European Union, as well as in its bilateral relations. Since 2005, France has conducted diplomatic demarches and provided finance for action in this domain, such as the holding of a regional seminar in Rabat in Morocco under its support programme to IAEA safeguards.

28. Indeed, the French support programme to IAEA safeguards celebrates its twenty-fifth year of existence this year. France will be pursuing its efforts to support the Agency by making its skills and expertise available to the
organisation and by fostering the development of technologies for the detection of possible clandestine nuclear activities.

29. And to conclude on this, in order strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system, the IAEA must be encouraged to continue its work to put in place new approaches to inspection, to modernise the equipment it uses and to move toward a new information management system in the safeguards domain.

Mr. Chairman,

30. The entry into force of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol does more than provide the IAEA with an overview of a State’s nuclear activities, it also allows the Agency, through the implementation of an integrated system of safeguards, to perform its verification mission more effectively. This is so because integrated safeguards offer an optimum combination of the whole range of safeguard measures. Their implementation will make it possible to optimise resource use and to define as effectively as possible the inspections that must be conducted in new facilities over the coming years.

31. The work done by the IAEA which is still continuing with the aim of defining in detail and implementing a strengthening and integration of safeguards is worthy of encouragement. France actively supports the efforts made by the Agency.

Mr. Chairman,

32. The French delegation also supports all the steps taken by the Agency involving the putting in place of new safeguards approaches, the modernisation of the equipment used by it, and movement toward a new information management system in the safeguards domain. These changes will enable the Agency to meet forthcoming challenges.

33. France has also taken part in the work done by the Consultative Committee on Safeguards and Verification (CSV) formed in June 2005 by the Board of Governors. This work follows the same logic aimed at strengthening safeguards and improving the system’s effectiveness and efficiency.

34. The above actions must be encouraged and all concerned must be aware of the importance of the implementation of a strengthened safeguards system.

Mr. Chairman,

35. Past investigations by the IAEA have revealed the existence of a vast international network for trafficking in sensitive technologies. Much work remains to be done before all is known about such trafficking. It is essential that all States give their active assistance to the Agency for this work. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime is a priority that must involve a strengthening of international cooperation.
36. Strict export controls are an essential condition to be met for the development of nuclear trade. It is increasingly necessary, given the growing number of States with industrial capabilities in the nuclear sector, to put in place a common discipline for the management of exports of the most sensitive goods.

The Zangger Committee, whose role is acknowledged in the implementation of the provisions of Article III-2 of the NPT, must continue its work toward the universalisation of the general principles of export control. While the rules for export controls must be strict and must match the difficulties encountered, they must also be in strict coherence with the other obligations laid down by the Treaty. This constant concern guides France in its action within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which we see as an indispensable instrument for the promotion of a credible and balanced approach to export controls.

37. Regarding the most sensitive technologies, especially those relating to enrichment and reprocessing: any transfer of these should be assessed on the basis of a set of criteria matching the objectives of the Treaty, for the benefit of countries that actually need them and have demonstrated their commitment to the non-proliferation regime over the long term.

38. Alongside this, States that do not develop a complete fuel cycle should receive guarantees of long-term access to the enrichment and reprocessing markets. The international initiatives that have been proposed in recent years are intended to meet this need. Indeed, France has been an active proponent of those initiatives with several partners. It will continue to provide input to the reflections now under way in order to find pragmatic solutions to provide assurances for the international community that conform to the most stringent safety requirements.

39. And lastly, access to non-sensitive technology should be more flexible and the relevant rules re-examined accordingly, especially for developing countries.

40. The non-proliferation regime is indispensable if the international community is to be provided with the assurances necessary for the exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy. In this regard, France supports all initiatives and action that will enable the regime to be made stronger and to meet present and future challenges. Among such initiatives and actions we note the contributions of the United Nations Security Council, the G8, the European Union, initiatives in the nuclear security domain, international conventions, and the suppliers groups. The aim must be to foster peaceful applications while at the same time avoiding the risk of dissemination of the most sensitive technologies, and to respond effectively to any situation of non-compliance.

41. In this regard, the role of the Security Council should be underlined. It is the body in which the procedures for reaction to such situations and their rectification must be implemented.

42. In addition to the legal provisions for controlling transfers of nuclear technologies, France supports the initiatives taken by the IAEA with the aim of putting in place within the Department of Safeguards a unit for the analysis of information on trade in nuclear technologies (NUTRAN). This approach
contributes to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the French delegation welcomes the work done up to the present time by that unit. France will continue to support the efforts begun by the Agency in this area.

43. I wish to conclude by referring to the continuing concern of the international community with regard to the risks of proliferation that may result from withdrawal from the Treaty and to recall the position of the French delegation on this subject.

44. The French delegation considers it unacceptable for any State, after having benefited from the arrangements and cooperation for which Article IV provides in order to acquire nuclear materials, facilities and technologies, subsequently to withdraw from the Treaty and use them for military purposes.

45. It is essential to continue to reflect upon the conditions that must legitimately be attached to the use of technologies acquired in a legally defined context. Specifically, it should be affirmed that any State withdrawing from the Treaty must freeze, under IAEA control, and subsequently dismantle or return, all nuclear goods acquired for peaceful uses from third countries prior to withdrawal. It would also be necessary to enter into an agreement covering each facility – along the lines of INFCIRC/66 – while awaiting such dismantling or return.

46. The French delegation wishes to draw the attention of the other delegations on the working paper the European Union has submitted on the issue of withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.