Negative Security Assurances (NSA)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

My delegation strongly believes that the non-proliferation regime will work most effectively when the root causes of proliferation are adequately addressed. Insecurity, real or perceived, is likely to be one of the key motives or excuses for the development of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this vein, it is quite natural that the international community should seek ways to alleviate these security concerns in order not to give certain states, either States Parties or non-States Parties to the NPT, any motive or excuse for the pursuit of nuclear weapons programs.

The Republic of Korea supports the concept of negative security assurances as part of a practical means of reducing this sense of insecurity. As stated on previous occasions and at other international fora, my delegation believes that nuclear weapon states should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguards obligations.

Security assurances provided by nuclear weapon states will further strengthen the non-proliferation regime per se as they would further dissuade states from acquiring nuclear weapons and be conducive to building confidence among States Parties. In this regard, we take note of UNSC Resolutions 255 and 984 and related elements in the 1995 and 2000 Final Documents. Furthermore, it would also be
desirable to provide enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those states that voluntarily accept additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

Considering the evolving nature of the current international political environment and the divergence of views on NSAs, we believe it would be more realistic to take a pragmatic and step-by-step approach to the issue.

In this connection, my delegation would like to underline the unique value of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) as a practical means of obtaining security guarantees from the nuclear weapon states. NWFZs have become an essential part of global non-proliferation efforts by prohibiting the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession and control of any nuclear explosive devices within the zone, while also providing negative security assurances by the nuclear weapon states to the acceding parties. Believing that the creation of NWFZs should be further encouraged, my delegation calls upon the nuclear weapon states to ratify the relevant protocols to ensure that more of the existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones can come into full effect.

Mr. Chairman,

We sincerely hope that the discussions here at the first PrepCom will provide us with yet another valuable opportunity for serious contemplation on the issue of NSAs.

Thank you.