ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5,
ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7: PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Working Paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden ("the Vienna Group of Ten")

1. The Vienna Group of Ten (hereafter "the Vienna Group") notes that Article III of the
Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and
technology. This relates to not only diversion at the State level, but also diversion to individuals
or sub-national groups. The group notes in this regard that physical protection and measures to
combat illicit trafficking are parts of a national system of nuclear security, the existence of which
should be made a precondition for transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or
technology.

2. The Vienna Group emphasizes the important role of the IAEA in the global efforts to
improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation. In continuing
and strengthening this function, the IAEA should take an active role to facilitate effective
cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels. The group welcomes the
IAEA's stated intention to establish a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines and
recommendations - as called for by the "International Conference on Nuclear Security, Global
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Directions for the Future", held in London in March 2005 - and the work currently being undertaken by the IAEA in issuing the Nuclear Security Series. The group acknowledges the IAEA’s important contribution in assisting States to meet appropriate security standards and calls on States to take full advantage of the Agency’s advisory services in that regard, including the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP).

3. The Vienna Group underlines the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection. The group calls on all States to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date. The group would welcome the revision of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) to harmonise it with the 8 July 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and other recent international nuclear security commitments, including the Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

4. The Vienna Group welcomes new accessions to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, noting that Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) calls on all States to accede to the Convention. The group welcomes the adoption by consensus, at the Conference held in July 2005 in Vienna, of an important amendment to the Convention, which substantially strengthens the Convention, extending its scope to cover the physical protection of nuclear facilities and the domestic transport, storage and use of nuclear material, thereby strengthening the global nuclear security framework. The amendment requires States Parties to have effective and appropriate domestic security regimes for nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, including to protect against sabotage. It provides for the mitigation of the radiological consequences of sabotage, and expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material. The group calls on all States Party to the Convention to ratify the amendment as soon as possible, and encourages them to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The group calls on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and
adopt the amendment as soon as possible. The group notes that continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

5. The Vienna Group welcomes the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and supports the subsequent adoption by the Board of a comprehensive Action Plan for its implementation. The group welcomes the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and recalls that the IAEA General Conference has encouraged States to act in accordance with the Guidance on a harmonized basis. The group calls upon all States Party to make a political commitment to the Code and the Guidance. The group welcomes the open-ended meeting of technical and legal experts for the "Sharing of Information as to States’ Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources", held by the IAEA at its Headquarters in Vienna from 25 to 29 June 2007, and notes that the IAEA will hold an "Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Lessons Learned from Implementing the Supplementary Guidance on Import and Export Controls", at its Headquarters in Vienna from 26 to 28 May 2008.

6. The Vienna Group recognizes the non-proliferation and security benefits of the minimisation of the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications, including the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU). In this connection, the group takes note of the international symposium on the minimization of the use of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector hosted by the Government of Norway in cooperation with the IAEA in Oslo in June 2006. The group welcomes the efforts of the IAEA to assist countries which, on a voluntary basis, have chosen to take steps to minimise the use of HEU in civilian nuclear applications.

7. The Vienna Group notes with serious concern the revelations that emerged in 2004 about illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology, brought to the attention of IAEA Member States by the Director General’s reports to the Board of Governors. The group fully endorses the Director General’s call for full cooperation from all IAEA Member States in
identifying the supply routes and sources of the technology, related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. The group recognizes the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control mechanisms.

8. The Vienna Group welcomes the IAEA’s work in support of efforts of States Party to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. The Vienna Group welcomes the IAEA’s efforts to assist IAEA Member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including the Agency’s International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices. The group also welcomes the IAEA’s activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information, including the continued maintenance of its illicit trafficking database. The group recognizes the need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. In this regard, the group welcomes the “International Conference on Illicit Trafficking: Collective Experience and the Way Forward”, held by the IAEA in Edinburgh, 19 to 22 November 2007.

9. The Vienna Group notes that continued efforts to enhance the prevention of terrorist acts, as well as the physical protection and accountability of nuclear and other radioactive material in nuclear and non-nuclear use, and in storage and transport, throughout their life cycle, in a comprehensive and coherent manner, should be priorities for strengthening nuclear security. The group calls for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response.

10. The Vienna Group expresses its deep satisfaction at the entry into force on 7 July 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as the 13th multilateral legal instrument dealing with terrorism and urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention as soon as possible, noting that the Convention is an important addition to international defences against nuclear terrorism.

11. The Vienna Group notes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) requires all States to establish appropriate effective controls over materials related to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and to this end to establish appropriate effective physical protection measures,
and appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts, to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking and brokering in nuclear weapon related materials. The requirements of Security Council resolution 1540 are reiterated in Security Council resolution 1673 of 17 April 2006, which emphasises the importance of all States fully implementing resolution 1540.

12. The Vienna Group welcomes the continued contributions made by the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material in the former Soviet Union.

13. The Vienna Group welcomes the establishment of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and welcomes the outcomes of its Partners Conference held in Vienna in September 2004 with the purpose of building international support for national programmes on nuclear and radiological threat reduction.

14. The Vienna Group welcomes the establishment of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with obligations under relevant international legal frameworks, e.g. the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005. The group welcomes the IAEA’s participation as an observer in the Initiative and encourages the IAEA to continue to play a constructive role in this and other international nuclear security related initiatives.