NON-PROLIFERATION

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Today, non-proliferation like the other two pillars of the NPT faces serious challenges mostly originated from the non-compliance of some Nuclear Weapon States with their obligations under article I and VI of the NPT. Some NWSs in contravention to their commitments under Article VI, by continuing to resort to nuclear deterrence as their defense and security doctrine, instead of taking practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, have accelerated the nuclear arms race. By maintaining their nuclear arsenals and their horizontal proliferation through transfer of nuclear technologies and weapon grade materials to non-parties, these NWSs have also contributed to the emergence of new nuclear weapons possessors. It is in clear violation of their obligations under Article I.

2. A few countries have attempted to wrongly induce that proliferation concerns are arisen from non-nuclear weapon States. Furthermore, through a false and misleading propaganda, they similarly try to describe nuclear energy as the synonym of nuclear weapons. This is while all nuclear activities of the NNWSs parties to the NPT are under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA and they have already forgone nuclear option, thus pose no threat to the others.

3. The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees cannot easily overlook that certain NWSs, in contravention to their legal undertakings, promote the role and status of nuclear weapons in their defense and security doctrines and spread these weapons to the others.
implementation of Article I by NWSs and lack of any guarantee for verification of obligations of such violators have created serious challenges towards principles and purposes of the Treaty. These States have undertaken under the NPT to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and not to develop and transfer it to others. In long term, the maintenance of these inhuman weapons and the threat to use them, have weakened and jeopardized the international security.

4. In recent years, efforts have been made to review principles of the NPT in order to change it to a single-goal Treaty. In this context, unfortunately the nuclear disarmament obligations have been totally overlooked and access to peaceful nuclear materials and technologies has been denied. At the same time, obligations of the NNWSs on non-proliferation have been overemphasized. A revisionist approach has tried to impose more extreme and deeper restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear technology. This revisionist approach towards non-proliferation, has sought to monopolize nuclear technology only to NWSs and a few stanch allies. Additionally, these countries, who themselves have developed nuclear weapons, imposed restrictions on the NPT States Parties that believe nuclear energy should not be turned to weapons. Such an approach would only send a wrong message. It means that in order to receive the permission to enter into the nuclear club, a State must have incorrectly the following conditions:

(a) To have a sustained and firm position on maintaining nuclear weapons and oppose to nuclear disarmament,

(b) To institutionalize the reliance on nuclear weapons as a means to preserve security and plan to use them against real and virtual targets,

(c) To deny non-proliferation obligations and pursue systematically production and stockpiling nuclear weapons.

This might be strange but it is unfortunately a prevailed fact in the international arena.

5. Furthermore, it seems that clandestine development of nuclear weapons by those outside the NPT is justifiable. And worse, such nuclear program is supported through cooperation and transferring nuclear technology, materials and equipments. It is a matter of great concern that such an approach has been applied to Israeli nuclear weapon program which is a stanch ally of
the US. Thus, permitting it to produce nuclear weapons with impunity. Under current trend, it is quite predictable that nuclear weapons of Israeli regime, which was publicly acknowledged by its Prime Minister, be emerged, recognized and even awarded.

6. The Review Conference and its PrepComs should address the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by NWS in a clear-cut manner to demonstrate that the current approach of these states has created a dangerous future for international community. It is essential that all proliferation cases occurred by certain NWSs to be identified and examined. NNWS can not ignore that allies and partners of these states acquire nuclear weapons. The NPT could only last and be widely supported by States Parties, as long as nuclear weapon States fulfill their obligations under the Treaty.

7. The current challenges of the non-proliferation regime require establishing new arrangements and a new strategy to prevent the arbitrary measures of some NWSs in proliferating nuclear weapons. It is indispensable for the Review Conference to adopt a new approach towards nonproliferation and emphasize on its basic and primary paradigms. Full materialization of non-proliferation requires implementation of Article I of the NPT by NWSs, hence establishing a strong mechanism to verify the implementation of Article I by NWSs should be addressed. Furthermore, the Review Conferences should call upon the NWSs to fully implement their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty.

8. In this line, the new strategy of the 2010 NPT Review Conference based on the full implementation of the NWSs' obligations on non-proliferation should be designed in a way to cover the following key issues:

(a) The non-proliferation by certain NWSs is the most immediate and essential danger threatening the non-proliferation regime.

(b) The legal status of Article I of the Treaty and its implementation by NWSs should be defined. In this context, establishing a verification mechanism similar to that one under Article III of the Treaty is essential.
(c) The old concept that the risks of non-proliferation comes from NNWSs should be revisited and the new strategy of the Review Conference should be focused on proliferation risks of NWSs.

(d) It is essential that all proliferation cases made by certain NWSs be examined.

(e) In order to take measures to strengthen non-proliferation, the NWSs must also refrain to cooperate with non-parties to the NPT and undertake not to transfer any nuclear material, equipment, information, knowledge, and technology to them.

(f) The only solution to remove concerns originated from non-proliferation and threats of the use of nuclear weapons is the total rejection of nuclear deterrence through a universal nuclear disarmament Treaty.

(g) In the current circumstances, the IAEA should demonstrate, more than before, its commitment and dedication not only to the implementation of the Safeguards, but also to facilitate development of nuclear energy as its main and primary purpose.