2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the Review Conference 2010 of the States Parties to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(General Debate)

Statement by

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Permanent Representative of Switzerland
to the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva, 28 April 2008
Mr President,

I would like to begin by saying on behalf of my delegation how pleased I am that you are chairing this 2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Your country's experience in nuclear questions and particularly its commitment to nuclear disarmament will undoubtedly be a major factor in the success of our work. My delegation wishes to assure you of its full cooperation.

Mr President,

Before entering into the substantive issues relating to the 2010 Review Conference, my delegation would like to look briefly at the causes which led to the disappointing outcomes of the previous cycle and of the 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007.

As in 2005, 2007 saw a repetition of the scenario in which delegations accused each other of failing to meet their obligations with regard to the NPT. They were unable to agree on an approach that would have taken into account the various concerns expressed by each one of the States parties. Some were worried about the slowness of nuclear disarmament, some were concerned about the risks of proliferation, while others wished to obtain access to nuclear technologies in order to meet their growing energy needs.

Mr President,

Since the 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee, there have been various developments in each of the pillars of the NPT, which we would like to summarise in three points:

1. There is no doubt that the contrasting developments in the Iranian nuclear dossier – and to a lesser extent in the Korean peninsula – dominated this period. This development led to an exclusive focus on the proliferation aspect of the nuclear problem, thus masking the slowness of nuclear disarmament and indiscriminately fuelling fears about the development of civil nuclear programmes throughout the world.
2. As for nuclear disarmament, several public statements have shown that this aspect is increasingly subject to discussion in certain Nuclear-Weapon States. Nevertheless, despite these encouraging signs, it has to be said that there have been no substantive developments in nuclear disarmament since last year's Preparatory Committee. Moreover, certain Nuclear-Weapon States are currently modernising their nuclear arsenals – which is against the spirit of Article VI of the NPT – while the situation concerning the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes remains unchanged.

3. As for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it is clear that the production of energy from nuclear fuel has become the goal of an increasing number of States. To deal with this development that brings potential proliferation risks with it, various initiatives have been proposed, mainly in the framework of the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr President,

Since its entry into force and up to the present, the NPT has been characterised by compromise:

▪ the compromise of 1968, in which Non-Nuclear-Weapon States agreed not to acquire such weapons in return for a commitment by Nuclear-Weapon States to take measures towards nuclear disarmament.

▪ the compromise of 1995, in which Non-Nuclear-Weapon States agreed on the indefinite extension of the NPT in exchange notably for the adoption of the "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament."

This philosophy of compromise today seems to be reaching its limits. Too many States parties are now expressing their frustration because, in their view, the promises made during key phases of the history of the NPT have not been kept in each of the three pillars of the Treaty.

While many of these frustrations are understandable, my delegation remains convinced that at this stage the NPT remains the best instrument for dealing with issues of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Moreover, the implementation as soon as possible of the acquis of previous review conferences on nuclear disarmament and the compliance with all the provisions of the NPT remain the best safeguards against the risks of proliferation. We should also use this session to deal in greater depth with the various proposals that have already been put forward with a view to institutional strengthening of the NPT.

Mr President,

Forty years after it was signed, the NPT faces challenges which will increase to the extent that the political will to find a compromise referred to above diminishes. We must reverse this tendency! My delegation hopes that we can rediscover as soon as possible a spirit of dialogue, as this is the only approach capable of achieving this objective and hence of satisfying the security needs of all.

Mr President, thank you for your attention.