STATEMENT BY DR. DESRA PERCAYA
DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AT THE 2ND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

ON CLUSTER 1 ISSUES

Geneva, 30 April 2008

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Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, my delegation associates itself with the statement made on behalf of the Group of the NAM States Parties to the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

The emergence of new challenges and threats to international security has reinforced the importance of States adhering to their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. The unilateral and non-compliant measures as well as proliferation of nuclear weapons have posed serious challenges to the noble principles and objectives of the Treaty.

Similarly, the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use has been and will remain our major concern and posed serious threat to international peace and security. This also constitutes a threat to all humanity and their use would have catastrophic consequences for human beings, and includes the gravity of the danger in the event that these weapons will one day be used, be it by design or accident. In the face of these threats, there can be no doubt that the only solution to proliferation is the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons and a concerted agreement by all countries not to produce, use, threaten to use, deploy, transfer or even exploit any weapons of mass destruction.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals is the only absolute guarantee against the transfer, control over, or inducement of others to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. By the same token, this elimination will also forestall the arms race. We are convinced that as long as nuclear weapons exist, so also will the risk of their proliferation and possible use remain. Progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects is therefore essential and mutually reinforcing in strengthening international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman,

In the context of NPT implementation, there is a widely shared perception that the NWS have attempted to evade from implementing the legal obligations and commitments under Article VI of the NPT. Agreements reached in 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences were seen as being abandoned. The non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) generally share the view that the NWS disregard their obligations and commitments, and instead, are retaining their arsenals indefinitely or even developing new type of nuclear weapons.

Some states have made clear that the most Article VI problems today lie with the threat of emerging nuclear arsenals in some present or former NPT NNWS. Some have stated that the effort to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons is simply a utopian dream. But in our view, it is clear that nuclear disarmament is possible, achievable and realistic. It can be achieved through careful, sensible and practical measures. But to achieve this, a leadership role by NWS is called for and their
intensive coordinated work is required. Concertedly the international community can turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint effort.

The NPT constitutes an essential legal instrument for nuclear disarmament and its Article VI remains valid. It is an integral part of the NPT bargain and should not to be treated as a peripheral issue by the NWS. The consensus political agreements of 1995 and 2000 must be implemented in an incremental, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The NWS must address the disarmament issues more directly than they have in the past. Most critically, the issue of nuclear disarmament must be taken more seriously. There is a compelling need to take appropriate steps towards the priority objective of the total elimination of such weapons. Yet, this objective of permanently abolishing these horrific weapons requires the political will of all Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS).

Mr. Chairman,

In many disarmament forums, we have reiterated our call for a full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the NWS at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. In the next NPT review process, we should not retreat from our past commitments, and we must reaffirm our common nuclear disarmament goals, examine how to achieve them, and agree to resume progress on further specific measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. For this ideal course, the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference sets a good opportunity.

Despite the apparent regression of the non-proliferation regime, this PrepCom provides us with another opportunity to evaluate the implementation of undertakings of the States parties, particularly the NWS, under the Treaty, and how best to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and of the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

We also want to make it clear that the indefinite extension of the NPT as a quid pro quo with the nuclear weapon-states is to be bound with their commitments at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

Furthermore, it is also essential to make renewed efforts to foster an international atmosphere conducive to advancing and achieving the overall disarmament objectives.

In view of Indonesia's strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, we emphasize the need to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, and establishing their destruction leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.

In addition, Indonesia will continue to underscore the obligations of States Parties to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" as concluded by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on Article VI of Treaty. We therefore urge the nuclear weapon-States to abide by their commitments established under that Article.

Mr. Chairman,

Finally, allow me to take this opportunity to express our admiration to the representative of youth who have delivered their statement yesterday. In their words "these youth are well informed, far sighted, and determined to make a difference". Indeed, the non-proliferation and disarmament education is important to raise awareness of the people including our future generation of the danger of this horrendous weapon and to reach our goal to abolish nuclear weapons. In this vein, Indonesia supports General Assembly Resolution on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education.

Thank you.
- Mr. Chairman, I am speaking on behalf of Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Austria.

- Mr. Chairman, I have taken the floor to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

- The unilateral, but reciprocal, initiatives of the US and Soviet, later Russian Presidents in 1991/1992 were very important, even groundbreaking steps in nuclear disarmament and arms control. They had a significant influence on the environment for nuclear disarmament and beyond.

- After more than 15 years we consider it justified to call for enhanced focus on and interest in the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT Review Process and in the bilateral US - Russian nuclear arms reduction talks. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are an integral part of the discussion on fulfilment of the goals set forward in Article VI of the NPT. No nuclear weapon system should be considered immune from treaty-based and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

- There are indications that non-strategic nuclear weapons are being considered as battlefield weapons to counter or complement to conventional forces. There are also indications of plans to develop new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such a development would go against commitments made in the NPT framework including in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

- Although the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) were an important step forward, much has been left unfulfilled and should be addressed before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The PNIs were not codified as binding legal instruments, they lack a formal verification system, they are not irreversible, implementation has not been fully transparently disclosed or monitored and, first and foremost, the PNIs have not removed the category of land-based non-strategic nuclear weapons from operational nuclear doctrine. The time has come to strengthen the commitments on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to codify them in the Post-START context as a demonstration of fulfilment of the objectives of Article VI of the NPT and of the rule of law. A first step towards their reduction and elimination could be consolidation and withdrawal to central storage.

- The 1991/1992 PNIs were by definition a bilateral undertaking by the US and the Russian Federation. Developments since call for a broader approach, also reflected by the proposal to impart a global character to the INF regime. The NPT Review Process provides a framework to move these two issues forward, but first steps by codifying the bilateral US/RF 1991/1992 PNIs would set an important example and precedent.

- We welcome the recent increased focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons, as expressed in two influential Wall Street Journal articles by four esteemed American statesmen and as reflected in the Chairman's Summary by Ambassador Amano of Japan of the 1st NPT Prepcom last year, and as embodied in recommendation 21 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We believe that this Prepcom should convey a clear message of the importance of treaty-bound disarmament measures regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons.