STATEMENT
by the Delegation of the Russian Federation
on Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
at the second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Geneva
April 28 – May 9, 2008
Strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and, in particular, its cornerstone – the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – has always been one of our priorities for action aimed at ensuring strategic stability and international security.

Russia views nuclear arms reductions in the context of the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty as its priority. We do not just declare that we are committed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as our ultimate goal, but take consistent practical steps to this end.

The INF Treaty was the first step on this way.

In the course of its conclusion and implementation, new norms of transparency and verification were elaborated, and prerequisites were created for a faster progress in other areas of the disarmament process. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which entered into force on December 5, 1994, is a good proof to that.

Under that Treaty the Russian Federation assumed the obligation to reduce, in seven years after its entry into force, the number of its strategic delivery vehicles to 1600 and the number of nuclear weapons attributed to them to 6000. Russia completely fulfilled its obligations arising from this Treaty.

As of the target date of December 5, 2001, the actual aggregate number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) was reduced to 1136 and the number of weapons attributed to them to 5518.

Despite the fact that Russia has fulfilled its obligations under the START Treaty, it continues to reduce its strategic offensive arms. As of January 1, 2008, the Russian side has eliminated 1470 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launchers, 3008 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 46 nuclear submarines and 66 heavy bombers. As of January 1, 2008, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4200 warheads attributed to them under the START 1 Treaty. These figures reflect the Russian Federation’s growing contribution to the fulfillment of its nuclear disarmament obligations.
The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions also constitutes a significant step towards nuclear disarmament.

This Treaty reiterates obligations, assumed by the parties under Article VI of the NPT. Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, by December 31, 2012, Russia and the US are to reduce their respective strategic nuclear weapons to the aggregate number of 1700-2200, that is approximately threefold against the threshold level envisaged under the START I Treaty.

It expires in December 2009. In 2005 Russia initiated a dialogue to develop and conclude a new full-fledged arrangement on further verified strategic offensive reductions.

We aim at maintaining stability and predictability in the strategic US-Russia relations. Hence, we propose that a new treaty should derive the best of the existing START Treaty. This new legally binding instrument could establish new lower thresholds subject to verification for both strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers), and deployed warheads.

The Russian leadership have repeatedly declared Russia’s willingness to continue reducing its strategic nuclear stockpiles.

At the same time, there can be no nuclear disarmament without taking into account the processes in strategic defensive arms. We believe that any unilateral plans to deploy global missile defence systems, given implementation of the nuclear and conventional global blitzkrieg concept, undermines strategic stability.

As we are considering the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, I would also like to address the issue of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons reduction. Russia has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapon arsenals by three quarters against the ones handed down to us by the Soviet Union. By now, all Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the territory of the former USSR to Russia and concentrated in the central storage facilities within our national territory alone. We ensure due technical safety and reliable protection. In this connection, we would like to once again draw your attention to the Russian proposal that all nuclear arms be withdrawn to the territory of nuclear-weapon States, owning them. That would build confidence in its safety and security.
As for Russia's nuclear weapons, they are kept under reliable control. Enhanced effectiveness of this control is achieved through organizational and technical measures. In particular, since 1991 the number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been cut down by four. All of the above has made it possible to relocate financial resources to ensure safety and reliable protection of the reduced number of nuclear munitions storage facilities using state-of-the-art technical means of security and physical protection. The total amount of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than fivefold over the same period.

Russia has developed and introduced a set of measures to counter terrorist actions, which envisages regular comprehensive checks of all facilities that pose nuclear and radiation risks in terms of security and readiness to prevent terrorist actions.

We should also touch upon the issue of security in the outer space. All states have the equal and unalienable right to access, explore and use outer space.

The Russian Federation has consistently opposed placing any arms in outer space.

The emergence of weapons in space would not only expand the spheres of military competition, but bring it to a quantitatively new level, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire arms control process, strategic stability and international security as a whole.

As a result, a new spiral of arms race would be possible in space, as well as on the Earth, in both the nuclear and missile sphere and other spheres, that would give a new momentum to the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means proliferation process.

At the Munich conference a year ago, the Russian President emphasised that weaponization of space could lead to unpredictable consequences for the international community, comparable to the beginning of a nuclear era.

For this reason, Russia and the People's Republic of China have officially submitted the draft International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva. We have no doubt that the draft Treaty will pave the way to reaching this goal.

I would also like to make the following points.

Along with the treaties on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, we attach special importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Since 1991, the Russian Federation has not carried out a single nuclear explosion. We hope that other nuclear states would take a similar approach.

Russia gives its full support to steady and balanced efforts to establish a verification mechanism within the framework of the CTBT.

Progress towards a nuclear-free world depends to a great extent on the insuring CTBT universality and the accession to it of all the states possessing nuclear-weapon ability, that is, on an early entry into force of the Treaty, and strict compliance with all its provisions.

It should be noted as well, that our steps toward nuclear disarmament are accompanied by relevant structural changes in the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons sector.

We have reduced by half our production capacity that is excessive for defensive purposes. The Russian Federation is working toward shutting down industrial uranium-graphite reactors for the weapon-grade plutonium production. The material produced by those facilities is not used for military purposes. Moreover, the production of uranium in Russia for manufacturing nuclear weapons was discontinued long ago.

An important measure to ensure the irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction is the disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials, which are no longer required for defense purposes. In this connection, Russia reaffirms its commitment to disposing of 34 tones of weapon-grade plutonium, which is excessive for production of nuclear weapons.

While noting certain progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, and in the fulfilment of obligations under Article VI of the Treaty, Russia believes that the complete elimination of nuclear arms can only be achieved via gradual step-by-step movement towards the ultimate goal, based on a comprehensive approach and with participation of all nuclear-weapon States.
We realise the importance of ensuring due review of the NPT for the sake of a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference.

That is why, the Russian Federation prepares to the Review Conference not just declaring its intentions, but taking substantive practical steps demonstrating Russia's contribution to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.