NPT Review Process 2010
PrepCom I
Cluster II
Statement by Norway

Mr. Chair.

Nuclear non-proliferation is essential for maintaining international peace and stability. We must intensify our efforts to prevent further proliferation to make our vision of a world free of nuclear weapons a reality.

Verification and confidence-building are fundamental norms to authority and integrity of NPT. Given new and current proliferation risks, strengthening the non-proliferation dimension of the NPT must be a prime task for this Review Process.

During this Review Cycle we must also address current proliferation challenges. Norway remains deeply concerned about the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We urge Iran to comply with the international demands by the UN Security Council, and thus facilitate negotiations with a view to reaching a political solution.

Likewise, Norway has consistently underlined the need for solving the DPRK proliferation challenge through the Six Party Negotiations in Beijing. We hope that the momentum in these talks from last year will be revived. In this respect it is of greatest importance that the DPRK provides full transparency of its nuclear activities. We urge the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear programme under IAEA supervision.

Mr. Chair.

Despite substantive achievements, there are still loopholes in the international non-proliferation regime. This allowed the illicit A. Q. Khan network to operate and flourish. It is of vital importance to prevent such networks from emerging. Those involved in such illicit activities must be prosecuted.

Mr. Chair.

The IAEA plays a crucial role in administering international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty fulfil their non-proliferation commitment under the NPT. The international community must give the IAEA the necessary political and financial support to carry out its task.

We must enable the IAEA to better collect relevant data, be better equipped with advanced technologies and further advance its network of cooperation with qualified laboratories.

Safeguards and verification is at the heart of a credible non-proliferation regime. Norway remains convinced that a robust regime can be best achieved through universal adherence to Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol.

Nearly ten years after the Most Additional Protocol was adopted, it is in force in only 46 states. That represents only a slight increase from last year. We could have done better.
Norway calls upon those countries which have not done so to ratify and implement the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional protocol without delay.

It is the view of this delegation that the Additional Protocol should become the norm and thus be regarded as a pre-condition for taking part in peaceful nuclear co-operation. We hope this Review Process will forge a consensus on the need to universalise this crucial safeguards instrument.

My delegation would again stress the importance of the benefits derived from integrated safeguards. This approach is both cost effective and confidence-building.Integrated safeguards is a crucial mechanism, assuring that civilian nuclear programmes are for peaceful purposes only. We hope to see more countries making use of this mechanism in the coming years.

Mr. Chair,

Security Council resolution 1540 calls on all UN Member States to put effective measures in place to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. This resolution serves our collective security. It is important that all NPT States Parties implement this resolution.

Norway has supported the UN in promoting implementation by providing financial support and organising international and regional workshops. Indeed, we need enhanced partnerships between donors and countries in need of assistance to put in place appropriate national legislation as well as enforcement. We will continue to support such efforts.

Export controls are crucial. Export controls should not be considered constraints but rather as a facilitator for peaceful nuclear co-operation.

This Review Process should foster a common understanding that nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and effective means of implementing States’ Parties obligations under Article III of the Treaty.

We must, on a regular basis, consider the relevance of the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation in light of technological developments, proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices. Likewise, we see a need for enhanced voluntary co-operation among states on guidelines regarding their nuclear-related exports.

My delegation would like to stress the important contribution by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in supporting and further strengthening the NPT norm.

Mr. Chair,

A key objective of Security Council resolution 1540 is to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, nuclear materials as well as relevant technologies. Nuclear terrorism represents a fundamental security threat.

Several international instruments have been established to meet the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is vital that the Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is fully
universalised. This also applies to the revised Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

The Norwegian Government has in recent years focused on improving legislation on terrorism and acts of terrorism. Norway has signed, and will soon ratify, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and in February 2008 the Norwegian Parliament passed amendments to the penal legislation, which will enter into force as part of overall reform of the Criminal Code.

We strongly support implementation of all relevant IAEA codes of conduct and guidelines. It is important that IAEAs activities in nuclear security receive sustained and predictable funding.

Norway is in particular pleased with IAEA activities to assist countries which are converting their civilian nuclear research reactors from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). Indeed, large quantities of fissile materials pose significant proliferation risks. The emerging threat of nuclear terrorism makes it even more imperative to address the challenges posed by civilian use of HEU.

In addition to global instruments, we are also witnessing emerging partnerships to address the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Norway takes part in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Norway is contributing with considerable funds to the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass destruction. We support the Global Threat Reduction Initiative as well as the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. We welcome the new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Mr. Chair,

Norway considers the CTBT and a future FMCT as integral parts of a credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear weapon-free zones are also serving this purpose. We are also convinced that negative security assurances will reduce the attractiveness of acquiring nuclear weapons and hence contribute in consolidating the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Chair,

To conclude: The measure of success for this Review Cycle is that we have moved a step closer towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Strengthening the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT is crucial in order to make this vision a reality.