STATEMENT BY
THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION
AT THE 2ND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

ON CLUSTER 2 ISSUES

Geneva, 5 May 2008

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

The IAEA safeguards system is essential in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and my delegation reaffirms the importance of the Agency as the sole competent authority responsible for nuclear verification in accordance with its Statute and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with States' obligation under Article III.1 of the NPT.

We recognize the extensive efforts made by the Agency in strengthening the safeguards and verification system, and we are convinced that the IAEA has the ability to effectively face up to challenges on the issues of safeguards and verification. While recognizing the need to enhance the technical capabilities of the IAEA and the use of advanced technologies in safeguards related activities, my delegation is of the view that the IAEA should do its utmost to make full use of the Agency's existing technical capabilities. We stress that any measures aimed at enhancing the safeguards system should not hamper technical cooperation or restrict the inalienable right of States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such activities should not in any way detract from the established priorities of the programme of the Agency.

My delegation notes with interest on the statement made by representative of the IAEA last Monday on the possible role and contribution of the IAEA in accordance with its Statute to conduct the verification of nuclear disarmament. We are of the view that discussion and exchange of views among States Parties should take place to increase understanding related to this issue.

Mr. Chairman,

Indonesia, which has signed and ratified the NPT, and has the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) in force, is committed to the three pillars of the NPT and supports all measures aimed at strengthening and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system as a contribution
to global non-proliferation objectives. The conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and APs are essential for effective verification. Indonesia welcomes the developments in connection with the increased application of safeguards agreement and AP. We note that CSAs are now in force in 163 States, and 87 States with AP in force among these are four NWS. However, more than 100 States have yet to bring into force APs, and 30 States party to the NPT have yet to bring into force their required CSA with the Agency.

We are of the view that building stronger verification regime through bringing the AP into force, more importantly, should be applied equally, both to NWS and NNWS. Since not all NWS have brought the AP into force, efforts by the international community to further encourage States Parties to the NPT to conclude and bring into force the AP would also be limited. In this regard, "leadership by example" is needed.

We call on all States that have not yet done so to conclude and implement the CSA and AP. We also call on every efforts to provide assistance to States willing to conclude CSA and AP in order to make progress towards wider adherence by States to these instruments. We continue to support activities of the Agency to strengthen safeguards by organizing outreach activities such as seminars, workshops, legislative assistance and training courses. In this context, we also appreciate the effort of the IAEA in arranging the briefing for State parties about conclusions of such agreements in the margins of this PrepCom.

Mr. Chairman,

We may recall that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT RevCon reaffirms that implementing the AP in combination of CSA provides "a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities". In that regard, IAEA and a number of States consider ways to facilitate agreements and promote the earliest date of bringing into force the CSA and AP. Some countries propose to make AP as a mandatory component of Article III, while others are trying to make the AP as a condition of supply for nuclear exports. Considering that the AP is voluntary in nature, we are of the view that what more important to understand is that international efforts towards universality of the CSA and the AP should not burden with more restriction on NNWS and should not to be taken at the expense of the IAEA's mandate to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also important to take into account the principle of making distinction between legal obligations and voluntary measures in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations.

Mr. Chairman,

Indonesia recognizes the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone as a positive step and tangible measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It leads to the enhancement of regional and international peace and security, and also provides as an effective means for preventing nuclear testing from being conducted in a region.
We welcome the establishment of NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia. All five NWFZ treaties cover large inhabited areas and are designed to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from the territories of the States party to them; they provide for the IAEA verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material and for the establishment of regional mechanisms to deal with compliance problems; and they contain a protocol providing for the NWS to commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any NNWS party to the NWFZ treaty. It is essential that NWS provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against all States of the Zone.

NWFZ can play an important role in helping to foster broader regional cooperation and promoting confidence building among countries in the region. Therefore we welcome the signing of Central Asia NWFZ last year as a positive step to achieve the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. We need to accentuate the success and examples set by the Tlatelolco Treaty, and it is crucial to further our endeavours to assure the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. We support and reaffirm the necessity for the early establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The five established NWFZ treaties are of relevance to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East region, including a verification regime for a future Middle East NWFZ.

We may recall that in 1995 and 2000, the parties to the NPT reaffirmed their conviction that the development of NWFZs, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. In view of the importance of the early establishment of a Middle East NWFZ, we urge Israel to place all its nuclear installation under the IAEA safeguards and to accede to the NPT without delay.

Mr. Chairman,

In Southeast Asia, the Bangkok Treaty which signified the establishment of South East Asia NWFZ has not been supported yet by the NWS, since none of them had signed the Protocols pledging to respect this NWFZ. We encourage countries in the region continue their efforts to work in consultation with NWS to resolve some pending issues so that the SEANWFZ could be implemented as soon as possible. For its part, Indonesia has been actively engaged in the development of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region and in the subsequent pursuit of an agreement on the Treaty on SEANWFZ. We are pleased to inform that Indonesia with other ASEAN Member States submitted resolution entitled "Treaty on the South Asia NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty) and it was adopted in the 62nd Session of the UNGA with overwhelming supports from large majority of the Member States.

Thank you.