STATEMENT

by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly ANTONOV,
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at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva, April 28, 2008
Mr. Chairman,

During these two weeks we are to discuss the key issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. Our major task is to ensure further viability of the Treaty.

One cannot see the ways to address this issue without assessing the global trends, first of all, in the field of security. The growing interdependence between the States and the strengthening multipolar world order pave the way for expanding international cooperation aimed at making full use of scientific achievements and advanced technologies for the benefit of all countries. At the same time, the emergence of new global threats and the aggravation of the existing ones, such as terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, call for a concerted response on the part of the international community.

The only reasonable option is to ensure security through joint efforts. No country can perform this task on its own, neither can a limited group of States. The way international relations develop today proves inefficiency of unilateral and alliance schemes, particularly forcible ones. They just undermine stability making other States take their own steps to ensure their security. It often prejudices strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The NPT is the cornerstone of today’s international security. The Treaty has allowed for making consistent steps towards nuclear disarmament. We are convinced that the emerging nuclear non-proliferation challenges and problems must be addressed first of all within the NPT framework.

Our common goal is to keep making efforts to render the NPT universal, more efficient and viable, as well as to reinforce it. We stand for finding ways to bring the States that are not legally bound by the NPT under the Treaty regime, including through improving national systems of accounting, verification and physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as export control.
Mr. Chairman,

We believe that one of the priorities in the ongoing review process should be providing conditions allowing all Parties to the NPT to fully and freely benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also important that it not result in weakening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We can see today that countries are increasingly interested in developing nuclear energy as a reliable resource ensuring their energy security. This is a natural process. It gives ample opportunities for international cooperation. First of all, those should be taken to supply countries developing their own atomic energy with nuclear fuel in a reliable and assured manner.

One way is that every country can establish its own facilities to enrich uranium, produce fuel and further reprocess it. Yet, it is a very complicated process not only in terms of funds, but also in terms of intellectual, scientific, physical and technical resources. Is moving along this path justified when the world market is capable of meeting both current and future needs in this area? It is unlikely so. Moreover, such an option would delay for many years implementation of national atomic energy projects given the time needed to build such facilities. It would be appropriate to remind here the opinion voiced by Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that there are no reasons at the moment to build new facilities for uranium enrichment or irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing.

In response one can often hear that a country cannot completely depend on the situation in the market or on the political will of some States. These are legitimate fears. We think they can be allayed on the basis of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, intended to provide an economically reasonable and feasible alternative to establishing all its elements at a national level. And we do not question the unalienable right of the Parties to the NPT to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is up to each country to decide on its own how to exercise this sovereign right. Yet, we believe that conditions should be
created allowing for the best options both in terms of national interests and non-proliferation.

No doubt, it is the IAEA that is to play the central role in advancing multilateral approaches, and Russia actively supports the Agency in this area.

In recent years, many initiatives have been put forward in this field. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, suggested we work together to develop global nuclear energy infrastructure and to set up multinational centers to provide nuclear fuel cycle services. Our first step was to establish the International Uranium Enrichment Center on the basis of the enrichment plant in Angarsk. Kazakhstan takes part in it, with Armenia finalizing its accession procedures. Those participating in the Center will have a guaranteed access to enrichment services to meet their nuclear fuel needs without developing their own production facilities.

Moreover, Russia has proposed to stockpile low-enriched uranium in the Center under the IAEA management. Materials from this stockpile are to be supplied to third countries by the decision of the Agency if they are denied fuel for political reasons. Any country honouring its non-proliferation obligations can take advantage of this guaranteed stockpile.

We are prepared to work with all interested countries to specify and combine, if possible, all initiatives in developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. It is important now to focus on their implementation. The Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: Joint Actions, signed by Presidents of Russia and the US on July 3, 2007, pursues this particular objective.

Mr. Chairman,

Improving the efficiency of IAEA’s verification activities is an important aspect of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement is an efficient instrument to provide more opportunities to the Agency in this area. Its application allows to timely prevent and eliminate emerging non-proliferation concerns. In the future, the Additional Protocol should become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of
States with their NPT non-proliferation obligations and an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.

Russia ratified the Additional Protocol last October. It hopes that all countries that have not yet acceded to this important document and first of all those carrying out major nuclear activities or having considerable stocks of nuclear materials will do so as soon as possible. We are of the opinion that the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons could adopt a relevant recommendation.

Mr. Chairman,

Russia has been consistent in its view that non-proliferation and disarmament processes are intrinsically interconnected, therefore, it is imperative to continue the nuclear disarmament efforts and break the stalemate in this field. At the same time, it should be clear to everyone that complete elimination of nuclear arms can only be achieved through a gradual, phased movement towards the ultimate objective on the basis of equality and a comprehensive approach, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, in conditions of sustained strategic stability and with full respect for the principle of equal security for all States.

The Russian Federation has consistently and in good faith implemented all its obligations to reduce its nuclear-weapon stockpiles. All strategic offensive reductions provided for in the START Treaty were completed as early as seven years ago. However, the reduction of strategic delivery means and the related warheads has continued. As of January 1, 2008 the Russian Federation possessed not more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4,200 warheads assigned to them in accordance with the START Treaty. We keep fulfilling obligations under the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions which cuts the number of strategic nuclear weapons down to 1700-2000 by each side before December 31, 2012.

We deem it necessary to make the process of strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation predictable, transparent, irreversible and accountable. In this context, it
is essential that in the US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration issued in Sochi on April 6, 2008 Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush expressed their intention to develop a legally-binding arrangement following expiration of the START Treaty as a next step to implement the obligations of the two countries under Article VI of the NPT.

The Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles has remained an important factor strengthening strategic stability. Russia has strictly abided by its provisions. In October 2007 the President of the Russian Federation launched an initiative to make obligations set forth in this Treaty truly global. The US supported it. In February 2008 the Russian delegation at the Conference on Disarmament circulated the main elements of a possible multilateral agreement in this field. We believe that such an arrangement could be an efficient measure of missile and nuclear disarmament and curbing of proliferation of WMD missile delivery means.

Mr. Chairman,

We would like to stress that strategic offensive and defensive arms are intrinsically intertwined. Hasty deployment of the Global Anti-Ballistic Missiles Defense without due consideration of other States’ security interests may provoke them into building up their own missile armaments and thus propel their spread throughout the world, as well as affect the process of nuclear disarmament in general.

Mr. Chairman,

We advocate further efforts towards laying ground for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a crucial instrument strengthening international nuclear non-proliferation and limitation regime. Observing the moratorium on nuclear testing is a significant measure but it can neither ensure due predictability nor substitute for legal obligations arising from the CTBT. Therefore, we urge all States whose accession to the CTBT will bring it into force to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. In this context we welcome the recent ratification of the CTBT by Colombia.
Another measure to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime could be elaboration of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). We reaffirm our support for this idea.

Furthermore, we believe that strengthening security assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States is still a topical issue. We advocate working out a global agreement on providing non-nuclear-weapon States with security assurances that would exclude use or threat of use of nuclear weapons taking into account cases stipulated in defense doctrines of the nuclear weapon States.

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) contributes greatly to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. Among the recent developments in this field we note the 2006 treaty signed by five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. We call upon all the nuclear-weapon States to support it.

We still find our initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of the nuclear-weapon States very relevant. Implementing it would enable us to expand to the utmost the territories completely free from nuclear weapons.

We reaffirm our commitment to the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference. We are prepared to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all the interested countries and discuss constructive proposals aimed at implementation of the Resolution and elaboration of specific recommendations in this respect by the 2010 Conference. As a member of the “quartet” of international mediators involved in the Middle East settlement, Russia has been consistently supporting the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in this region.

Mr. Chairman,

It is troubling that in recent years “violations”, “non-compliance” and other loopholes of the nuclear non-proliferation regime have been revealed. These problems have often emerged in the regions where the possibility of a conflict is high. In such cases, a proactive response of the international community is required.
In this respect, we would like to commend the professional work of the IAEA whose actions are always consistent with the NPT. However, the Agency’s efforts only, are not enough. Support is required on the part of all those who are sincerely interested in strengthening the Treaty in order to find, through political consultations, solutions to emerging non-proliferation concerns.

The situation with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme remains complicated. Despite the progress in the implementation of the arrangement reached between Tehran and the IAEA in order to clarify the outstanding issues related to its past nuclear activities, more steps are necessary on the part of Iran to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme as set forth in the relevant resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UNSC. We still believe that the situation should be settled exclusively through political and diplomatic means. We advocate further efforts to search for ways to start a negotiation process. This stand was reiterated in the Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the six countries adopted along with the UNSC Resolution 1803.

We note positive developments in settling the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula. The first stage of denuclearization has been successfully completed, and there are reasons to expect that the second stage goals will be achieved in the near future. We advocate further proactive diplomatic efforts within the six-party framework with the view to finding mutually acceptable solutions, advancing towards comprehensive settlement of the problem, ensuring a nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula and return of the DPRK to the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

Today, the essential factor of ensuring the security of each and every state and of the international community in general is the ability to counter the nuclear terrorist threat in an efficient and timely manner.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced by the Presidents of the United States and Russia two years ago promotes solving this task. It has been successfully implemented and has proven its relevance. Today, the
Initiative becomes truly global. About 70 States have already joined it, with their number growing. This is a positive example of how to work together in today’s world addressing new challenges and threats. The Russian Federation will continue to pay due attention to implementation of the Global Initiative, which is open for accession by all States sharing its goals and committed to combating nuclear terrorism.

We are calling on all States to unconditionally implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540, to comply with the highest security standards in the nuclear field, to put into practice the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The IAEA has been doing a lot in this area. It is essential to further maintain these efforts made by the Agency.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to assure you that the Russian delegation looks forward to constructive and effective work at this session. We are prepared to cooperate with you and all other delegations to provide favorable conditions for the sake of success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Thank you for your attention.