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Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (export controls)

Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)

Draft recommendations

The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee agree on the following draft recommendations to be submitted to the Review Conference:

1. Underline that nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism;

2. Reconfirm paragraph 12 of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissile material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissile material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

3. Decide that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissile material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissile material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of an additional protocol based on the protocol model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected);
4. **Recommend** that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty;

5. **Endorse** the importance of the Zangger Committee in providing guidance to States parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and invite all States to adopt the Understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with engagement in any nuclear cooperation.
Working paper: Export controls

1. The Vienna Group of Ten (hereinafter referred to as “the Vienna Group”) reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by article III of the Treaty.

2. The Vienna Group underlines the responsibility that all States parties have and, in this regard, urges them to ensure that their nuclear-related exports to non-nuclear-weapon States do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group reiterates that no State party should transfer any nuclear-related items to any recipient whatsoever unless the transfer is in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly in articles I, II, III and IV thereof. In this context, the Group emphasizes the need to promote understanding among all States parties that nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism.

3. In this regard, the Vienna Group notes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), adopted on 28 April 2004, whose provisions were reiterated in Council resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), requires all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including by establishing and maintaining appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over nuclear weapon-related items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export.

4. The Vienna Group recognizes that revelations in recent years about extensive covert networks related to the procurement and supply of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology have underlined the need for all States to exercise vigilance in countering proliferation, including through their nuclear export controls.

5. The Vienna Group underlines that effective export controls are also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation. In this respect, the Group notes the clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations as set out in articles I, II and III and the objectives in regard to peaceful uses as set out in article IV of the Treaty. In this context, the Group reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The Group notes the complementary and important role of national export control mechanisms in giving effect to obligations of States parties, under articles I, II and III, not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and recognizes that such controls are intended to provide an environment of confidence for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Group notes similarly that
recipient States have an obligation to exercise appropriately stringent controls to prevent proliferation.

6. The Vienna Group notes that a number of States parties meet regularly in an informal group known as the Zangger Committee in order to coordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty related to the supply of nuclear material and equipment. To this end, these States parties have adopted certain Understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended. The Zangger Committee’s Understandings also relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty insofar as the recipient State should recognize the items on the trigger list as well as the procedures and criteria under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as a basis for its own export control decisions, including re-exports.

7. The Vienna Group emphasizes the importance of the Zangger Committee in providing guidance to States parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and invites all States to adopt the Understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation.

8. The Vienna Group recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, be reviewed from time to time so as to take into account advances in technology, proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices.

9. The Vienna Group notes that a number of States parties have informed IAEA that they cooperate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports (INFCIRC/254, as amended). The Group notes the important and useful role that the Nuclear Suppliers Group can play in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies.

10. The Vienna Group recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty.

11. The Vienna Group notes the decision taken in September 2008 by a number of States parties participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to grant an India-specific exception to the full-scope safeguards requirement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control guidelines, based on certain non-proliferation commitments and actions of India (as outlined in IAEA document INFCIRC/734). The commitments of India related, inter alia, to signing and adhering to an additional protocol, exercising restraint in respect of enrichment and reprocessing transfers, strengthening export controls, continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, and continuing to demonstrate its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty. The Vienna Group expects India to honour these commitments in full, noting that Governments participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group have agreed to consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India. The Vienna Group reiterates the importance it attaches to universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its hope that India will join the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
12. Notwithstanding that decision, the Vienna Group reaffirms that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group urges those supplier States that have not yet done so to require the fulfilment of such conditions without delay.

13. Noting that all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legal obligation under article III to accept safeguards stipulated under the Treaty, and noting also that a Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)), together with an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), now represents the verification standard for Treaty safeguards, the Group confirms that this verification standard should be a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group recognizes the importance of the provisions of the Additional Protocol related to reporting to IAEA on the export and import of nuclear-related equipment.

14. The Vienna Group notes that article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates to diversion not only at the State level but also to individuals or subnational groups. The Group affirms, therefore, that transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology should take place only if the recipient State has in place an effective and adequate national system of nuclear security. This system comprises Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons-related IAEA safeguards, an adequate system of physical protection, a minimum set of measures to combat illicit trafficking, and rules and regulations for appropriate export controls in case of re-transfers.

15. While the responsibility for establishing and implementing such a system rests with the concerned State, supplying States parties have the responsibility for seeking assurance that such a system is in place in the recipient State as a necessary precondition for their receiving nuclear supplies.