Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Non-proliferation

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Today, non-proliferation, like the other two pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, faces serious challenges mostly originating from the non-compliance of some nuclear-weapon States with their obligations under articles I and VI of the Treaty. Some nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of their commitments under article VI, by continuing to resort to nuclear deterrence as their defence and security doctrines instead of taking practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, have accelerated the nuclear arms race. By maintaining their nuclear arsenals and their horizontal proliferation through transfer of nuclear technologies and weapon-grade materials to non-parties, these nuclear-weapon States have also contributed to the emergence of new possessors of nuclear weapons. This is in clear violation of their obligations under article I.

2. A few countries have wrongly attempted to imply that proliferation concerns are in response to the activity of non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, through false and misleading propaganda, they similarly try to portray nuclear energy as being synonymous with nuclear weapons — this, while all nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and while those parties have already forgone the nuclear option, thus posing no threat to others.

3. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and its Preparatory Committee cannot easily overlook the fact that certain nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of their legal responsibilities, promote the role and status of nuclear weapons in their defence and security doctrines and effect the spread of these weapons to others. Non-implementation of article I by some nuclear-weapon States and lack of any guarantee for verification of the obligations of such violators have created serious challenges as regards implementing the principles and purposes of the Treaty. Those States have undertaken under the Treaty to eliminate their nuclear arsenals — not to develop and transfer them to others. Over the long term, the maintenance of these weapons of inhumanity and the threat to use them have weakened and jeopardized international security.
4. In recent years, efforts have been made to review the principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to transform it into a single-goal Treaty. In this context, unfortunately, nuclear disarmament obligations have been totally overlooked and access to peaceful nuclear materials and technologies has been denied. At the same time, obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding non-proliferation have been overemphasized. Such an approach has at its aim the attempt to impose deeper and more extreme restrictions on access to peaceful nuclear technology, and to monopolize this technology for use only by nuclear-weapon States and a few staunch allies, even if they are non-parties to the Treaty. Additionally, those countries that have themselves developed nuclear weapons, have imposed restrictions on those States parties that believe nuclear energy should not be turned into weapons. This might appear strange but it is unfortunately a fact that the belief does prevail in the international arena. The expansion of United States-Israeli nuclear cooperation and the recent decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have shown that being a non-party to the Treaty is more privileged and can even lead to being rewarded by Western countries.

5. The unprecedented decision of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, an exclusive and non-transparent group that claims to have been established to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, has severely damaged the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The decision of this Group is in clear violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, which stipulates that the cooperation of each State party to the Treaty in providing equipment or material for peaceful purposes is not possible “unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by” the Treaty. The aforementioned decision which was taken under pressure exerted by the United States is also in violation of the commitment of nuclear-weapon States under the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of 1995 and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to promote the universality of the Treaty. The decision of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group is in contravention of the obligation to promote the universality of the Treaty and has seriously jeopardized the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. Such a decision is another manifestation of double standards and discrimination in implementing the provisions of the Treaty. We will ask the upcoming Review Conference to seriously consider this issue.

6. Furthermore, it seems that clandestine development of nuclear weapons by those outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is wrongly justified. And worse, such nuclear programmes are supported through cooperation and the transferring of nuclear technology, materials and equipment. It is a matter of great concern that such an approach has been applied to the nuclear-weapon programme of Israel, which is a staunch ally of the United States, thus permitting it to produce nuclear weapons with impunity. Under the current trend, the emergence of the nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime, whose existence was publicly acknowledged by its Prime Minister, could predictably be greeted with recognition and even rewards.

7. The Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their Preparatory Committees should address the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States in a clear-cut manner so as to demonstrate that the current approach of these States has created a dangerous future for the international community. It is essential that cases of
proliferation involving certain nuclear-weapons States be identified and examined. Non-nuclear-weapons States cannot ignore that allies and partners of these States acquire nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will endure and will be widely supported by States parties only if nuclear-weapons States fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

8. The current challenges of the non-proliferation regime require establishing new arrangements and a new strategy to prevent the taking of arbitrary measures by some nuclear-weapons States in respect of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is indispensable for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to adopt a new approach towards non-proliferation and to emphasize its basic and primary paradigms. Full realization of non-proliferation requires implementation of article I of the Treaty by nuclear-weapons States; therefore, the issue of establishing a strong mechanism for verifying the implementation of article I by nuclear-weapons States should be addressed. Furthermore, the Review Conferences should call upon the nuclear-weapons States to fully implement their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

9. In this regard, the new strategy of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, based on the full implementation of the obligations of the nuclear-weapons States in respect of non-proliferation, should be designed in such a way as to cover the following key considerations, namely, that:

- The risk of proliferation posed by certain nuclear-weapons States is the most essential and immediate danger threatening the non-proliferation regime
- The legal status of article I of the Treaty and its implementation by nuclear-weapons States should be defined. In this context, establishing a verification mechanism similar to that one under article III of the Treaty is essential
- The old concept that the risks of proliferation come from non-nuclear-weapons States should be revisited and the new strategy of the Review Conference should be focused on proliferation risks posed by nuclear-weapons States
- It is essential that all cases for proliferation made by certain nuclear-weapons States be examined
- In order to take measures to strengthen non-proliferation, the nuclear-weapons States must also refrain from cooperating with non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and undertake not to transfer any nuclear material, equipment, information, knowledge, or technology to them
- The only means of eliminating concerns involving proliferation and threats of the use of nuclear weapons is by totally rejecting nuclear deterrence, through a universal nuclear disarmament treaty
- In the current circumstances, IAEA should, more than before, demonstrate its commitment and dedication not only to the implementation of the safeguards, but also to facilitating development of nuclear energy as its main and primary purpose