Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Substantive issues in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States in the Middle East to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which it signed in 1968. It did so out of the conviction that for any State, non-governmental entity or terrorist group to possess or have access to such weapons would create a source of concern and pose a threat to peace and security not only for the States and peoples of the Middle East, but for the entire world.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic will continue to honour the pledges it has made under the Treaty and believes firmly that international instrument remains the foundation of global efforts to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament, and is the internationally legitimate basis for the right of States parties to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful applications.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses concern over the failure to implement the provisions of the Treaty. That failure is due in the first place to an imbalance in the treatment of its two basic objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament, which the Syrian Arab Republic believes are equal in importance and complementary, and in the second place to the continued application of a double standard with respect to the third basic objective of upholding the right of States parties to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
Universalization of the Treaty

4. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that even though all the Arab States have become Parties, the continuing failure to universalize the Treaty in the Middle East, which is due to the refusal of Israel to accede or announce its intention to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreement, creates an extremely dangerous situation. Responsibility for this rests with influential States Members of the Security Council, in particular the United States of America, that do not treat this issue seriously, thereby threatening universalization of the Treaty and casting doubt on its ability to bring peace and security not only to the States of the Middle East, but to the entire region and the world.

5. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses its concern over international indifference when it comes to bringing pressure to bear on Israel to implement relevant international resolutions.

6. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses the danger stemming from the fact that Israel alone possesses nuclear military capabilities outside any international supervision framework. Numerous international resolutions have mentioned Israel’s nuclear capabilities. The first was United Nations Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which explicitly noted that Israel had not adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and called on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and after which IAEA scientific assistance to Israel was suspended. The most recent was General Assembly resolution 63/84, which reaffirms the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. The international community has demanded that serious efforts be made to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede the Treaty unconditionally and without delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place all its nuclear facilities under an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Nuclear disarmament

7. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the guiding principles of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular its 13 practical steps, are an important benchmark for nuclear disarmament, which it expects the nuclear-weapon States to take seriously and implement systematically and gradually in accordance with a specific phased timetable with the ultimate goal of complete renunciation of all their nuclear weapons under strict and effective international supervision.

8. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that it is important to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as an essential step towards achieving full nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In anticipation of that treaty, all States should declare and observe a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

9. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that one of the basic goals of the Treaty and of the Statute of the IAEA is to support the use of nuclear technology for peaceful applications, and that access to expertise, equipment, materials and scientific and technological services is an inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty.

10. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses the need for all States parties to the Treaty, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, to implement its article IV in a balanced and non-discriminatory way, and the need for serious and effective measures to realize the goals of the Treaty without exploiting it by turning it into a discriminatory regime that places restrictions on certain States for the benefit of others.

11. The Syrian Arab Republic places great importance on the need to deepen the essential role played by IAEA in promoting and facilitating the transfer of nuclear science and technology in accordance with its Statute and in a way that strikes a balance between the Agency’s monitoring activities and its activities related to the dissemination of nuclear science and technology for peaceful applications.

12. The Syrian Arab Republic, like other States members of IAEA and in particular those that are developing States, pays great attention to technical cooperation activities because they support the progress of development. It expects the Agency to fulfil its function as the international organization charged with making provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power.

IAEA comprehensive safeguards

13. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that it complies fully with the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement concluded with IAEA in 1992. Ratified by Act No. 5 of 1992, the Agreement established a national system for accounting for and monitoring nuclear material as well as the groundwork and facilities required to ensure that IAEA inspectors can engage effectively in their duties under the Agreement.

14. The Syrian Arab Republic appreciates the role played by IAEA as the only body authorized to follow up questions of verification and compliance through its comprehensive safeguards system, which is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The Syrian Arab Republic demands that IAEA work to apply that regime to all States without exception or discrimination and assist developing States, which have complied with the Treaty, in the development of nuclear energy and related research for use in various peaceful endeavours.

15. The Syrian Arab Republic urges all States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards and not impose additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which have truly complied with non-proliferation standards and chosen not to possess nuclear weapons. The Syrian Arab Republic also calls upon all States parties to refrain from imposing any restrictions on the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to States parties that have
concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and to refrain from imposing further restrictions on the use of such technology in a manner that contradicts the spirit and the letter of the Treaty.

16. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between legal obligations and voluntary measures aimed at ensuring transparency and building confidence. Were such measures to exceed the technical stipulations of the Statute of IAEA, such measures could undermine the credibility of the Agency’s safeguards regime.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that comprehensive improvement of the safeguards system requires complete implementation of the resolutions and decisions of the General Conference of IAEA concerning international safeguards and verification. It also emphasizes that IAEA should hold information related to safeguards in complete secrecy, as required by the Agency’s Statute.

Withdrawal from the Treaty

18. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the legal and sovereign right of a State party to withdraw from the Treaty should it believe that extraordinary events might jeopardize its supreme national interests.

National legislation to prohibit illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material

19. The competent authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic maintain strict border control of land, sea and air entry points in accordance with national legislation and regulations in force, with a view to combating illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material.

20. The Syrian Arab Republic scrupulously abides by all of its relevant international obligations, participates effectively in the review of various relevant international instruments and continually strives to strengthen its domestic legislative framework in that regard. It has also implemented the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and participated effectively in a number of meetings aimed at developing guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources.

A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

21. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones is one of the most significant nuclear disarmament measures that can be taken. The establishment of such zones also strengthens regional and international peace and security and reinforces the non-proliferation regime.

22. The Syrian Arab Republic has worked since 1987 to make the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. In April 2003, on behalf of the Arab Group, Syria proposed an initiative to the Security Council in New York to rid the Middle East region of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. At the time, Syria declared to the international community that, along with its Arab brothers and the peace-loving States of the world, it would contribute actively to transforming the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, the positions of certain influential States in the Security Council at the time did not favour the success of that
initiative. In December 2003, the Syrian Arab Republic resubmitted that same initiative to the Security Council and now awaits more favourable international conditions for its adoption.

23. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses again its grave concern over Israel’s manifest indifference and intransigence and its refusal to accede, or even to express its intention to accede, to the Treaty and submit all its nuclear installations to the comprehensive safeguards of IAEA, which presents a grave threat to international and regional peace and security, and could lead to a dangerous and destructive nuclear arms race in the region.

24. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that, until a nuclear-weapon-free zone is established in the Middle East, all States should refrain from developing, producing, testing or possessing, in any manner, nuclear weapons. They should also not allow such weapons in their territories or territories under their control. The Syrian Arab Republic also believes that all countries in the region should refrain from taking any action that contradicts either the letter or spirit of the Treaty or the international resolutions and documents on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which was General Assembly resolution 63/38 of 2 December 2008.

25. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that all States parties, and in particular the States that adopted the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as an integral part of a comprehensive package, must comply fully with the set of decisions issued by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, entitled “Strengthening the review process of the Treaty”, “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. They must also comply with the resolution on the Middle East, which has played a positive role in inducing all of the Arab States to become parties to the Treaty.

26. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that in addition to the foregoing, all States parties must comply with the provisions of the final document of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Conference declared that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the international community, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to shoulder their responsibilities and do their utmost to determine practical steps to ensure that the resolution on the Middle East is fully implemented and that its objectives are attained. Fourteen years have passed since the adoption of the resolution, but not a single practical step has been taken to implement it.

Security guarantees

28. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that only the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons can provide an absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The unilateral or bilateral security guarantees given by nuclear States to non-nuclear States parties are conditional and non-binding, and have not been negotiated in an international forum. Such guarantees therefore do not respond to all of the needs, concerns and requirements of non-nuclear States. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses the importance of implementing the decision on principles
and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Its implementation would make it a priority to initiate serious negotiations towards an unconditional, non-discriminatory, legally binding international instrument addressing the issue of security guarantees.

29. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that nuclear-weapon States should provide comprehensive negotiated security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The terms for such guarantees should be defined by an international instrument. Nuclear-weapon States should pledge, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force against non-nuclear States, and should commit to implementing the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Cooperation between States and international organizations should continue to be promoted in order to prohibit, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever it is committed and whoever is the perpetrator.

Proposed practical steps towards non-proliferation

30. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the Treaty and completely eliminate all nuclear weapons, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should make the following recommendations:

(a) It is important that the international community recognize the grave concern of the States of the Middle East over Israel’s nuclear capability, which has been developing and expanding in the absence of any international control. Nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their responsibilities in order to encourage universal accession to the Treaty;

(b) The international community should make it a priority to put pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty without conditions or reservations as a non-nuclear State. Israel should open all of its installations to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. This would constitute an essential step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

(c) Action should be taken to establish a subsidiary organization under Main Committee II to examine the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Specific practical steps should be taken to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In the same way, specific practical steps should be taken to implement the provisions of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, which reaffirms that resolution;

(d) In accordance with the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate the genuine political will to take practical, effective steps to renounce all of their nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and dispose of them under strict international control;

(e) It is imperative for nuclear-weapon States to stop placing technical and commercial restrictions and obstacles in the way of non-nuclear-weapon States. In accordance with the aims of IAEA, and pursuant to article IV of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States should be allowed the opportunity to benefit from the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
(f) The international community should assert the authority of IAEA and maintain its role in addressing nuclear proliferation issues. States should show transparency in their activities and in their interaction with IAEA, so that the latter can fulfil its obligations and take action on the three main pillars of its mission, namely preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, working towards an effective nuclear disarmament programme and promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;

(g) The Conference on Disarmament should be given the opportunity to adopt an agenda stressing nuclear disarmament as the foremost priority;

(h) The international community should give the necessary impetus to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The United Nations disarmament mechanisms should be promoted, including the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission;

(i) It is imperative that the international community recognize the importance of article III of the Treaty and its implications for issues concerning the safety and security of nuclear programmes and verification. The international community must ensure that nuclear-weapon States in particular refrain from using such issues as a pretext to limit or restrict the transfer of nuclear technology to other States parties, especially those that have submitted to the IAEA Safeguards System.