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STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. AKIO SUDA
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN

THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- CLUSTER II-

New York, 7 May 2009
Mr. Chairman,

The IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan attaches great importance to strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards by maximizing the authority and capability of the IAEA.

Japan reminds all States Parties that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends, among other matters, the consideration of ways and means to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

The universalization of the Model Additional Protocol is a realistic and effective way to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime. It can increase the transparency of nuclear related activities of states by providing the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability to assure not only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Japan believes that all countries that promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy should implement the highest level of the IAEA safeguards, specifically, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Model Additional Protocol. To this end, IAEA safeguards reinforced by universal adherence to the Additional Protocol should constitute the NPT safeguards standards as required by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT. On various occasions, including at IAEA seminars and the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation, Japan has shared its knowledge and experiences with other countries concerning the implementation of IAEA safeguards. Japan will continue these efforts.

Given the limited safeguards resources and ever-growing verification needs, Japan recognizes the importance of promoting the adoption of integrated safeguards with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and the efficiency of the IAEA’s safeguards activities. Japan encourages the IAEA to take necessary steps to strengthen integrated safeguards approaches. Japan reminds all States Parties that the introduction of integrated safeguards in a State requires sincere implementation of both comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol.
Moreover, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, we need to ensure the involvement of States not party to the NPT. Japan calls upon all non-parties to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. They are thus urged to place all nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and to conclude an additional protocol based on the safeguards standards outlined in the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

The role of export controls, as required by paragraph 2 of the Article III of the NPT, is crucial to achieving nuclear non-proliferation. The multinational export control regimes for nuclear related materials and equipment, the Zangger Committee, and for nuclear materials, equipment and technology, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), play a major role in this respect.

Japan urges those States Parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate effective national rules and regulations on export controls over both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, on the basis of the Zangger Committee Understandings and the NSG Guidelines.

Mr. Chairman,

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has become an important tool in support of the NPT regime. It provides the international community with a basis for responding to the growing threats posed by non-State actors that may acquire, develop, traffic in or use Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery means. Japan has taken a lead in ensuring the effective implementation of the resolution in the international community.

As the preamble of the NPT refers to “the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery”, the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons should be addressed in conjunction with the issue of proliferation of their means of delivery. In this regard, the multinational non-proliferation regime for the means of delivery of WMD, and related materials, equipment and technology, i.e., Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), play a significant role in confining the risk of proliferation of such means of delivery. Japan continues to maintain stringent non-proliferation policy as a member of the MTCR and as a subscribing State to the HCOC, to prevent the proliferation thereof.

Thank you.