Mr Chair,

in the Norwegian statement under Cluster I issues, my delegation affirmed that a credible and robust non-proliferation regime is a precondition for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It is evident that all states parties to the NPT have a responsibility to contribute to this end.

It is the ambition of my delegation that the 2010 NPT Review Conference should adopt a programme of work to achieve credible non-proliferation architecture. Implementation of such a programme of work should be followed closely by the states parties in the next Review Cycle.

The prime challenge today is to resolve politically outstanding proliferation matters through negotiations. To this end, Norway urges countries concerned to heed the calls of the international community, expressed through the UN Security Council and the IAEA.

In the pursuit of a non-proliferation architecture, we must put safeguards at the centre our efforts. Safeguards are essential to ensure that all nuclear activities are devoted exclusively to peaceful activities. For this reason, Norway reaffirms that the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification norm.

We are worried that only 90 countries have implemented the Model Additional Protocol, 12 years after the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Additional Protocol. It is also highly unsatisfactory that 18 countries have not even implemented the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Norway remains convinced that it is in the interest of each country to conclude the necessary safeguards arrangements, and thus be better positioned to take part in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

(Check against delivery)
It is now high time to fully universalise the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. We must empower the IAEA, politically and financially, to carry out its crucial verification task. In order to make even better use of available resources, states parties should be encouraged to do their utmost in order to qualify for integrated safeguards.

A credible architecture should recognise that export control is important to sustain the global non-proliferation norm. That is the intention of the NSG and the Zangger Committee. Norway urges all states parties to adopt and enforce adequate national export control legislation, as also called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

National measures are also vital in the field of physical security and safety of nuclear material. Norway is in the process of ratifying various legally binding instruments such as the Convention to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Norway urges other countries to follow suit.

Norway has for some years maintained that minimising the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector will further strengthen our overall non-proliferation efforts, not least by preventing non-state actors from acquiring material which may be used in a crude nuclear device. We are convinced that it is possible from both a technological and financial perspective to convert most of the existing civilian nuclear installations to use low enriched uranium.

A credible non-proliferation architecture must clearly reconcile our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and material with peaceful applications of the atom. Norway remains convinced that enhanced multilateral cooperation in fuel cycle approaches would serve all the three pillars of the NPT.

Norway has allocated USD 5 million for the establishment of a fuel bank under IAEA auspices. The fuel bank represents one of several contributions to a number of different approaches to promote cooperation on the production of nuclear fuel and on managing nuclear waste. My delegation expects that the next review cycle will look more actively into the field of nuclear fuel cycle approaches with a view to finding solutions that accommodate our non-proliferation concerns, while at the same time facilitating peaceful uses.

To conclude, a credible non-proliferation architecture will require commitment and ownership from all states parties. The IAEA will of course have to play a key role. But we need a broader partnership involving the nuclear industry. The valuable contributions by other important initiatives such as the Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership and the PSI are also appreciated.

Thank you, Mr. Chair