STATEMENT
by the Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
on Cluster II Issues (Non-Proliferation)

New York, May 2009
Mr. Chairman,

The IAEA safeguards system plays an important role in ensuring the efficiency of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime. This safeguards system in its entirety is not only an important non-proliferation verification mechanism reinforcing the confidence that all parties comply with the NPT but also a considerable confidence-building measure.

It is no exaggeration to say that today the IAEA is the only international organization which has a unique technical capacity and expertise to verify the states' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Russia has consistently supported the IAEA’s safeguards activities and relies upon the Agency's authority and technical competence in the application of safeguards, as well as its conclusions with regard to the nature of states’ nuclear activities. We expect that the Agency will continue to work in a constructive manner based on credible evidence and avoid politicizing.

Universalization of the safeguards system will enable the Agency to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear materials for manufacturing nuclear explosive devices or for other unknown purposes at the global level. In this context we would like to stress that the NPT requires the states to conclude Safeguards Agreements. We call upon those states that have not yet done so, to conclude such Agreements as soon as possible. It is our firm belief that the more universal the safeguards regime is, the more predictable is the world and the more reliable are the conditions for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

At the same time, we believe it necessary to continue efforts to improve IAEA verification activities, primarily based on the universalization of Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements. This document considerably increases the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared activities and nuclear materials and provides credible assurance of their absence. We strongly believe that in the future, Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols to them should become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of states parties to the NPT with their non-proliferation obligations and an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.

Russia ratified the Additional Protocol on 2 October 2007. We call upon all states that have yet to bring the Additional Protocols into force, primarily those who carry out significant nuclear activities or possess significant amounts of nuclear material, to do this as soon as possible. We contend that the 2010 NPT Review Conference could adopt a relevant recommendation.
Mr. Chairman,

As nuclear energy plays an increasing role in the world, and new nuclear production and energy facilities are put into operation, the scope of the IAEA’s verification activities will also expand. In this context, it is high time to consider the issue of adjusting the Agency’s technical verification capacity to the increasing number of facilities placed under its safeguards. For this reason, we welcome the efforts made by the Agency's Secretariat in order to apply the concept of integrated safeguards in the Agency’s safeguards activities; these safeguards are already applied in a number of states.

Developing proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems provides another opportunity to optimize the IAEA safeguards mechanism. This is a key element of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), launched by the Agency in 2000 and initiated by Russia. Its further implementation is equally important for both the development of nuclear energy and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards system. We believe that this work should be continued, including in cooperation with the Generation IV International Forum.

Russia has been actively cooperating with the Agency for 27 years in providing technical support to the safeguards through the implementation of the relevant national programme. We assist the Agency in testing environmental samples in Russian laboratories, training the IAEA safeguards inspectors, training personnel on accounting and control of nuclear materials in specialized Russian institutions, developing new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and analyzing publicly available information.

Mr. Chairman,

Being aware of the fact that application of safeguards places a certain financial burden on national budgets, we would like to note that such expenses pay off very well. Political confidence in the countries which strictly abide by their non-proliferation obligations is strengthened, which promotes international cooperation in atomic energy and other spheres, and all this finally helps to their economic growth. On the contrary, the difficulties in applying the safeguards are fraught with tensions in international relations, and prevent the countries from benefiting from international nuclear trade and exchange and can have a negative impact on regional stability.

Mr. Chairman,

We believe it necessary to further strengthen multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms: the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We believe that they have proven in practice that it is possible to establish a coordinated and non-discriminatory nuclear export control procedure without prejudice to international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We would like to stress the importance of the NPT Article III paragraph 2 in this context. It can only be implemented if there are efficient national systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials, as well as export control procedures.

Russia has been updating its national export control legislation on a timely basis. Bilateral and multilateral consultations on export controls contribute to increasing the transparency of such controls, exchange of experience and establishing a dialogue with the countries not participating in any multilateral export control regimes. We also believe it necessary to develop cooperation with the countries that are not parties to the NPT in order to get them involved in the efforts to strengthen the export control regimes.

Mr. Chairman,

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is an efficient measure strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. Such zones are designed to facilitate nuclear disarmament and build a nuclear-weapon-free world, while achieving a larger objective of general and complete disarmament under close and efficient international control.

We would like to emphasize that establishing NWFZs is also important due to the fact that signing the protocols to the agreements establishing such zones, nuclear-weapon states assume legally binding obligations to provide the states parties with security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

We reaffirm our support to the Treaty establishing the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and call upon all nuclear-weapon states to uphold it. We are prepared to further search for ways to settle the outstanding issues related to the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Mr. Chairman,

Such factors as gaps in the systems of accounting, controls and physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technologies, the lack of effectiveness of export control measures in a number of cases increase the risks of terrorists getting access to nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear weapons.

Much has been done to establish an efficient international "safety net" to prevent nuclear weapons and nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. The UN Security Council resolution 1540 sponsored by Russia makes significant contribution to addressing this issue. It is essential to ensure unconditional adherence to it.

The Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism put forward by the Presidents of Russia and the US is a good example of cooperation in this field. It is aimed at enhancing national capabilities to suppress the acts of nuclear terrorism, strengthening international cooperation and providing necessary assistance in this sphere to the states that request it. What is meant here, are primarily the obligations under the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Initiative has already been joined by 75 states, with their number still growing. This Global Initiative is a positive example of how we can work together in today's world to counter new challenges and threats. The Global Initiative is open for accession by all states that share its common goals and are committed to combating nuclear terrorism.

In the context of countering the nuclear terrorism threat, one should note the important role of the IAEA and the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan that provides for specific steps in this regard. We are referring, first of all, to improving national systems of nuclear materials physical protection, accounting and control. We will further support the Agency's efforts in this area. We suggest that this point should be included in the final documents of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. I would also like to note that Russia has decided to make considerable financial contribution, starting from 2010, to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

On 30 July 2008, Russia ratified the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the adoption of which will considerably enhance the regime of nuclear security and countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. We expect that the states which have not done so yet accede to this amendment and to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

To reduce the risk of proliferation and to prevent the threat of highly enriched material falling into the hands of terrorists, Russia and the US, with the IAEA joined in, cooperate to return fresh and spent HEU fuel from foreign research reactors of the Russian origin. Fresh fuel has already been exported from Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, Uzbekistan, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Germany and Hungary, and spent fuel from Uzbekistan, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Besides, Kazakhstan has sent the first shipment of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. We are grateful to the IAEA for its active assistance to this programme.

We support the IAEA programme intended to reduce the enrichment of nuclear fuel of research reactors in third countries to the level lower than 20 percent. In recent years the enrichment reduction programme has achieved certain results, with many reactors have been converted from HEU to LEU. At the same time, the highest-capacity research reactors consuming the largest quantities of HEU have not been converted yet.

At the moment, many countries are actively developing high-density uranium fuel the use of which can allow the conversion of all research reactors to LEU. The work is to be completed by the middle of the next decade. We believe that this will enable us to considerably reduce the risk of proliferation and of highly-enriched uranium falling into the hands of terrorists.
Mr. Chairman,

Only a systemic approach of the parties to the NPT to fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations will make it possible for us to be sure that their national nuclear programmes have exclusively peaceful purposes, and to adequately respond to new challenges and threats and prevent undeclared nuclear activities. In the current context, taking into consideration new challenges and threats facing the international community, the IAEA plays an increasing role as the only international organization ensuring the balance between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the abidance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.