United Kingdom
Permanent Representation
to the
Conference on Disarmament

UK Cluster II Statement
to the 2009 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee

by
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Mr Chairman,

The United Kingdom fully associates itself with and endorses the statement made by the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union. I would now like to make some additional remarks.

As I noted in the United Kingdom’s general statement, the nuclear question is central to four great and inter-connected challenges of our global society. Yet it transcends security, vital though that is. It goes beyond nuclear power and the important role that we believe it must play in overcoming the challenges of climate change, of ensuring sustainable development and of defeating poverty.

The nuclear question and our work in this forum, raises fundamental issues about the values of the global society that we are trying to build. It is about the foundations on which we build our shared security and a sustainable and safe future for our planet. In the face of this challenge, the concept of “haves” and “have-nots” fades. We need a multilateralism founded on the principle of international co-operation and which rejects old stereotypes and confrontation.

Just as we have a unique opportunity to strive boldly and purposefully for the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, we also face the looming shadow of dangerous era of new nuclear-armed states and even of nuclear-armed non-state actors.

The risk is real. The threat is imminent. And the necessity for a determined, effective and unified response by the international community, by those countries sat in this room, is urgent. No one wins from nuclear proliferation. There are only losers. For the regions concerned and for international security, the cost could be very high.
The challenge to our shared security and the need for international co-operation are starkly illustrated in the nuclear dossiers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran. The United Kingdom wishes to see both countries return to the international mainstream, build modern economies and contribute to the security and prosperity of their respective regions.

However their current nuclear programmes and flouting of UN Security Council Resolutions are unacceptable. We urge both will take advantage of the international community's willingness to negotiate rather than face further isolation, further sanctions and regional instability.

Mr Chairman, Colleagues,

The key to preventing nuclear proliferation – and this is a lesson that we can draw from the current serious proliferation dossiers before the United Nations Security Council – is to ensure that a country that breaches its non-proliferation obligations faces certainty of detection, and certainty of serious consequences. In renewing and refreshing the three pillars of the NPT, the international community must ensure that it has robust and effective mechanisms and the institutional capacity to be able to respond flexibly and promptly to the challenges of the 21st Century.

The international community must be completely confident that there are appropriate mechanisms for multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle, for ensuring the security of fissile material, and for preventing proliferation with clear, tough and immediate sanctions for those who break the rules.

Mr Chairman, Colleagues

We believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency must play an enlarged and reformed role, and that its safeguards
regime needs to be further strengthened. This means as a baseline the implementation of the highest level of safeguards possible, such as the Additional Protocol, to give the IAEA the power to ensure that there is no indication of activity to turn peaceful nuclear energy programmes into nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom believes the safeguards regime should be continuously reviewed to ensure it is fit for purpose. The Agency must have access to, and make effective use of, the resources and tools necessary to ensure that the safeguards agreements are robustly verified. An effective and efficient safeguards system, properly policed, is an essential element of the international non-proliferation architecture.

The United Kingdom strongly supports the argument that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol represent today’s verification standard. We believe the universal adoption of integrated safeguards, particularly in states with significant nuclear activities, would make a major contribution to strengthening the IAEA’s safeguards regime and international confidence and transparency. The conclusion of an additional protocol considerably enhances the effectiveness of the safeguards system. It enables the IAEA to verify that all nuclear material in a state is in peaceful use and enables the proper implementation of integrated safeguards.

Beyond this, we need to look at the development of next generation safeguards to introduce even greater levels of assurance. Material failure to co-operate with inspections, and any material breach or withdrawal from the NPT, should lead to reference to the UN Security Council and it should be assumed that sanctions will be imposed for anything other than the most minor of breaches.

It is vital that terrorists cannot get their hands on nuclear material. This requires revised, stronger, universally implemented international standards for the protection of fissile
material. For its part, the United Kingdom has spent more than £70 million on improving security at our Sellafield site alone, and we are committed to spending a further £220 million on the construction of a state of the art storage facility. The Prime Minister Gordon Brown has also committed a further £36 million annually to the United Kingdom’s Global Threat Reduction Programme for the foreseeable future.

If we want to enhance our institutional capacity to respond flexibly and effectively to the challenges, it is our view that we need to develop a common understanding of the consequences of withdrawal from the NPT. The United Kingdom strongly supports the European Union paper on Article X of the Treaty, which it tabled during this review cycle to address this issue. We re-affirm our belief that, without in any way reopening the Treaty, we need to set out clear measures that make plain the extreme gravity of withdrawal and raise the cost for any State Party thinking of pulling out of the NPT.

Mr Chairman, Colleagues,

Let me state unequivocally our commitment to the universalisation of the NPT and call on those states, India, Israel and Pakistan, that have not signed to do so as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The United Kingdom also calls on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to full participation in the NPT and compliance with its obligations.

Mr Chairman,

The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for the principle and practice of nuclear weapon-free zones and underlines its willingness to play an active and constructive role in their development. We have signed and ratified protocols to the Treaties, which cover Africa, the South Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.
The United Kingdom hopes that the Nuclear Weapon States and the Association of South East Asian Nations will be able to resume consultations in the framework of United Nations Development Commission’s 1999 Guidelines so that the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok can be agreed and ratified. We remain disappointed that the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia was signed on 8 September 2006 without conclusion of consultations over the text of the Treaty, and in the full knowledge that serious issues would preclude ratification of the Protocol by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom strongly supports the principle of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Central Asia and reaffirms its willingness in the light of the recent entry into force of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk to resume consultations under the UNDC’s 1999 Guidelines.

The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction as set out in the Middle East Resolution at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. I shall return to this issue in the debate on Regional Issues.

Thank you.