STATEMENT BY THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION
AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
ON SPECIFIC ISSUES
(NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ASSURANCES)

Mr. Chairman,

Indonesia believes that nuclear weapons remain potentially the most destructive weapons that continue to threaten the global peace and security. Following the end of the Cold War, many were optimistic that international tension has eased, particularly between the East and the West. Despite the fundamental changes in the global security landscape, NWS frequently invoke deterrence as a rationale for retaining their nuclear weapons. However, with the recent Joint Statement made by the US and Russia, they are ready to move beyond the Cold War mentalities. Therefore, the relevance of nuclear deterrence has become increasingly questioned and sharply diminished.

Indonesia also believes that nuclear disarmament is possible and achievable. But to achieve this, an intensive coordinated work by NWS is required to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint effort. Nuclear disarmament also means both as a “process” and as a “goal”. As long as there is a strong commitment from the NWS, an approach to nuclear disarmament through an incremental manner with a clear timetable toward achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is workable.

Mr. Chairman,

We have heard at this Prepcom that many delegations underscore the need to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The question is how we would achieve this goal? One of the ways, at least for the short term, is we have to move forward to achieve systematic and progressive steps toward nuclear disarmament. In this context, we would like to underline the following points:

1. While we have seen that the US and Russia have shown their leadership to begin negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons to replace START I, we will closely observe that hopefully the result of the negotiations in July would be an agreement that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible. We also hope that this will lead to an incremental approach for the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

2. Under the 2002 Moscow Treaty (SORT), the US and Russia agreed to reduce the deployment of their strategic nuclear weapons down to levels of 1,700 up to 2,200 by 2012. While recognizing the positive downward trend in deployment of their nuclear arsenals, unfortunately this Treaty does not cover any destruction of warheads, as they will simply be put in storage, and not equipped with verification measures.
Under this Treaty, basically deployments change but the weapons remain. Therefore, it is timely now that the IAEA needs to be involved in verifying nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Moscow Treaty and the future successor of START I.

3. Indonesia welcomes the US intention to immediately and aggressively pursue the CTBT ratification. If the US fulfill its commitment to push for ratification of and to seek the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, it will significantly give positive impact to other remaining states under Annex II to follow suit. However, in the interim, the NWS should declare, unilaterally or jointly, moratorium on nuclear testing.

4. We are encouraged to hear the US statement that negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is its top priority at the CD. The new shift of US policy, which is in favor of a verifiable FMCT negotiation, would hopefully provide a good momentum to reach a consensus on the programme of work in the CD. Consequently, the 1995 Shannon Mandate would remain valid as the basis for resuming negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), pending the agreement on the overall CD’s programme of work. It is also obvious that majority of states are ready to start negotiation for a verifiable FMCT which covers both the existing stockpile as well as future production.

5. While we look forward to the progress in concrete terms on the follow up of START I, the CTBT and the FMCT, in the interim, we urge the NWS to jointly declare a policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons, to significantly reduce the alert levels of their nuclear arsenals (de-alerting) and systematically diminish their reliance on nuclear weapons in their military doctrines.

Mr. Chairman,

It is true that negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament may take some time. In the longer-term, we must render our efforts toward the completion of Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC). While the NWC can serve as an additional instrument that would build upon the NPT and other relevant non-proliferation instruments, NWC could also provide the opportunity for non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel) to join negotiation on NWC.

However, a comprehensive approach toward NWC is required in order to overcome the obstacles that have prevented step-by-step process from making any progress in the last decade. Indeed, such an approach will need commitment and the investment of time and resources.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.