Statement by
the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia
to the United Nations
on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to
the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
at the
Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
on Specific issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances

New York, 7 May 2009
Mr. Chairman,

I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the issues of nuclear disarmament and security assurances.

NAM States parties to the Treaty reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the only guarantee against the devastation of the use of nuclear weapons, be it deliberate or accidental.

For non-nuclear-weapon States, Mr. Chairman, the NPT is anchored on the premise that the achievement of nuclear disarmament is the ultimate objective. Based on that fact, non-nuclear-weapon States have accepted the commitment to renounce the military nuclear option and to benefit from their inalienable right to peaceful nuclear applications, in the context of the delicate balance between the three main pillars of the Treaty expecting balanced and full implementation of such pillars by all.

NAM States parties to the Treaty believe that the status of nuclear-weapon States provided for under the Treaty is indeed, transitional. Commitments undertaken under Article VI are ones that require full implementation. Such requirements earn an even greater sense of urgency after the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, and the identification of the road map to nuclear disarmament represented by the 13 practical steps identified and agreed by consensus in 2000.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty thus by no means implies the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals. In that regard, any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

The announcement made by some Nuclear Weapon States to work towards implementation of Article VI is a welcomed gesture. Despite these promising signals, achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament still has a long way to go. We urge NWS to take urgent and concrete actions to achieve the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

With respect to nuclear disarmament, Mr. Chairman, the NAM States Parties suggests the following recommendations to be considered by the PrepCom:

1. **To call** for the full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament commitments under the Treaty, including those agreed by
consensus at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

2. **To accelerate** the process of negotiations that should be undertaken, in accordance with Article VI, as well as the implementation of the 13 practical steps, without further delay, in order to advance towards a nuclear weapon free world.

3. **To launch** the negotiation process of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, without delay.

4. **To agree** on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.

5. **To establish** as a matter of priority, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of the fulfillment of the obligations under Article VI and further practical measures required to achieve progress in this regard.

Mr. Chairman,

The only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We support the objective of the CTBT, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In order to realize the objectives of the CTBT, the commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament is essential. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.
With regard to nuclear testing, Mr. Chairman, the Preparatory Committee should consider the following recommendations, [as reflected in the NAM States Parties Working Paper]:

1. **To stress** the significance of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT, requiring its ratification by the remaining Annex 2 States, including in particular by two nuclear weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.

2. **To ratify** the CTBT by nuclear states with all expediency. Positive decisions by nuclear-weapon-States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the CTBT. Nuclear-weapon-States have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the CTBT. These actions would encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

With respect to topic of **security assurances**, we further reaffirm that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively and unconditionally assured by nuclear-weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this regard, we recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, the States parties to the Treaty had agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Group stress that it is the legitimate right of States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive security assurances.

We further wish to reiterate that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some nuclear weapon States, including a certain State’s nuclear posture review, contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear weapon States and violate the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT.

With respect to the issue of security assurances, the Group recommends the adoption of the following recommendations (reflected in the NAM States Parties Working Paper):
1. **To call** for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reiterates that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States remain essential and should be pursued as a matter of priority, and without further delay.

2. **To seek** the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear weapon States. We underline that legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

Thank you.