Working paper on disarmament submitted by the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. Although numerous States have made efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and ensure that nuclear States comply with their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear States’ official positions continue to give nuclear weapons a prominent place in their defence strategies. Those States continue to grant themselves the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, thereby contravening their individual declarations of April 1995 concerning negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty, as well as Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

2. The Arab States are concerned at the continued stagnation of the United Nations disarmament mechanisms, particularly the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole international forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues. The Arab States call for all Member States to consider rapid steps and positive positions to revive the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly its substantive component.

3. The Arab States affirm that the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the practical steps concerning the Middle East set forth in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, would constitute an important step towards realizing regional and international security, contributing to the prevention of nuclear war and upholding the non-proliferation regime.

4. The Arab States welcome the efforts made towards the voluntary reduction of the number of nuclear warheads, particularly the recent Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. At the same time, they emphasize that a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads should not be
confused with nuclear disarmament efforts; a reduction does not necessarily entail progress towards nuclear disarmament.

5. The Arab States are concerned that certain nuclear States are endeavouring to modernize their nuclear arsenal and develop new nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security. The articles and spirit of the Treaty must be respected until there is a comprehensive and definitive end to such weapons. In that regard, the Arab States emphasize General Assembly resolution 66/21, entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament”, adopted on 2 December 2011.

6. The Arab States recall the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996, which found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal and violated international humanitarian law.

7. The Arab States affirm that the aims and objectives of the Treaty can be realized only once it has gained universal accession. The delay in achieving that objective remains a stumbling block in promoting the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

8. The Arab States recall that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference provides for the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”.


10. The Arab States further recall the statement issued at the 16th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Bali, Indonesia from 28 to 30 May 2011, regarding the convening of a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date, with a specified framework of time, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

11. The Arab States affirm that the credibility of the Treaty depends on the balanced functioning of its three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and on working both to implement those pillars with an equal focus and to achieve the universality of the Treaty.

12. The Arab States therefore propose that the 2015 Review Conference should consider the following recommendations:

(a) Nuclear States should be encouraged to take genuine measures in order rapidly to finalize the implementation of the agreed practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, some of which were reaffirmed as action 5 in the section on disarmament of nuclear weapons in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, as follows:
• Rapidly move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3. That should be done according to a short-term time frame of no later than 2017 and a long-term time frame of no later than 2025, under international monitoring;

• Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;

• Further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

• Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;

• Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

• Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and

• Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

(b) The attention of the Conference on Disarmament should be drawn to the importance of establishing a subcommittee responsible for the immediate commencement of negotiations on the formulation of a nuclear disarmament treaty, with a view to gradually eliminating nuclear weapons. That treaty will outlaw the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons and provide for their destruction, and ensure that removal is complete, non-discriminatory and verifiable.

(c) Discussion in the pertinent forums should begin forthwith of the international arrangements for formulating a draft international instrument that is legally binding and will provide non-nuclear States Parties with unconditional security guarantees that they will not be subject to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them by the five nuclear Powers, until such time as nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated. The draft instrument should be submitted to the forthcoming Review Conference for consideration and adoption.

(d) The nuclear States should declare that they are not modernizing their nuclear arsenals or developing new types of nuclear weapons, until such time as their elimination in a transparent manner may be verified.

(e) The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should be urged to devise, in accordance with the request of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, a programme of work that will include the initiation of negotiations over a non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and any future production thereof. The treaty should also include a commitment to eliminate stockpiles of fissile materials, as stipulated in the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator (CD 1299) and the mandate contained therein.

(f) Support for the early convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament should be emphasized, given the concern felt by the Arab States regarding the lack of consensus over the formulation of a disarmament plan.
(g) It should be re-emphasized that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and action should be taken to ensure its universality.

(h) The States Parties and, in particular, the Nuclear States, should exert greater efforts to ensure the universality of the Treaty. Such efforts should include the performance of their undertakings under the Treaty and the outcomes of the Review Conferences, including the imposition of a comprehensive ban on the transfer of all nuclear materials and related technology to States non-Parties to the Treaty until such time as they accede thereto. Any attempt to give the stamp of legitimacy to the nuclear status of States non-Parties to the Treaty should be decisively rejected, given that it would hasten the complete breakdown of the non-proliferation regime.