Verification

Working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance of and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements, in conducting verification activities.
5. In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties that comply with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.
11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.