Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Nuclear disarmament forms one of the fundamental pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty, an integrated and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place their facilities under the safeguards agreements. In return, the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover, all States parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States parties to peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner. In addition, universality of the Treaty has been assumed as a common international commitment of all States parties.

2. Since 1978, when the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in the disarmament agenda, the international community has had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long-sought goal, as contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 2005 Review Conference was a sad setback in this direction. As reaffirmed in the agreed Action Plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference still constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

3. With the adoption of the practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty, hopes for the implementation of the disarmament pillar of the Treaty were renewed. The implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty has become instrumental towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. In its Action Plan, the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to
implement practical steps to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the final document of
the 2000 Review Conference.

4. The 2015 Review Conference shall consider national reports of the nuclear-
weapon States, to be furnished in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010
Review Conference’s Action Plan, with respect to their obligations to implement
article VI of the Treaty, including measures adopted by them to implement the
13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI
of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

5. The continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads
by the nuclear-weapon States still threaten international peace and security. Despite
the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by the
nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and their
unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal
adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as their commitment made at the
2010 Review Conference to accelerate progress on the steps leading to nuclear
disarmament, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been
promising.

6. The non-entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (START II) and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
are among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the agreements of the 2000
Review Conference. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty and the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) do not go
beyond merely decommissioning nuclear weapons, and their parties do not have any
obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons covered under those treaties. They
therefore do not abide by the principle of irreversibility, which was agreed by the
nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed in action 2 of
the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan.

7. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed
themselves to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on
unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament
process. In actions 3 and 5 of the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan, the
nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed their commitment to this end. In spite of that
commitment, no practical steps by the nuclear-weapon States have been taken to
reduce tactical nuclear weapons.

8. Moreover, in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached
regarding the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, and in order to assure
the international community of the real reduction of nuclear weapons and their
elimination, the 2015 Review Conference should establish a standing committee to
ensure the implementation of the commitments made with regard to article VI
obligations.

9. It should also be highlighted that any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether
strategic or non-strategic, should be conducted in a transparent, irreversible and
internationally verifiable manner. Needless to say, such reduction in nuclear
weapons can never be a substitute for the main obligation of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As a first step, a real change is needed regarding the aggressive Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and a removal of the emphasis on the old doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

10. The international community rightly expects that statements on the reduction of nuclear weapons will be materialized and implemented in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite these pledges, a review of the new developments in the nuclear policy of the United States shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis of the new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy, the plan to spend an estimated $700 billion on the modernization of American nuclear arsenals, the construction of a new facility for the production of new nuclear weapons, the lack of movement towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the raising of new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review are clear indications of the continued policy of this State to evade its nuclear disarmament obligation.

11. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and the Trident plan of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which provide for the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the targeting of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, are in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its indefinite extension. More worrisome are announcements by France. It has recently announced the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals. The President of that country was quoted as saying, “French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security”. It appears that this country, in defiance of its international obligations, is seeking new roles for its nuclear forces in order to justify their continued retention. In so doing, it even resorts to irresponsible methods such as the manipulation of intelligence and frightening people to promote programmes that their people would otherwise not support. It is regrettable that, despite the high expectations of the international community regarding the realization of the pledges of the United States on nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, a new extraordinary budget of tens of billions of dollars has been allocated to modernize American nuclear arsenals. The bill was a blow to all hopes created by the rhetoric of the new Administration and a big setback to the Treaty. The Nuclear Posture Review provides for using conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile systems by the United States, while this country has been claiming for a long time that the ballistic missile has no use other than as a means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

12. The Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference have the task of addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of alleviating these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nuclear weapons, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries.
13. Moreover, real concerns of the international community remain over the horizontal proliferation of nuclear-weapons transfers to other countries and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the danger of using such inhumane weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Ironically, not only do some nuclear-weapon States not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals and give no real and unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, but they also threaten to use their weapons against States parties to the Treaty.

14. In accordance with article I of the Treaty, each nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries, and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States has clearly confessed such violations, namely, the deployment of American nuclear weapons in the territories of the European Union, and the Review Conference must seriously address this case of non-compliance. In the same context, the nuclear-sharing between the nuclear-weapon States and between the nuclear-weapon States and non-parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for States parties to the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance.

15. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its article III (2), states that all States are to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

16. Accordingly, the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty, without exception and with particular regard to the Israeli regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security. The United States is a non-compliant Party in its undertakings under the provisions of the Treaty by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime of Israel and by strongly supporting this regime by keeping silent in respect of the acknowledgement by the former Prime Minister of Israel of its nuclear arsenal. The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States regarding the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

17. The agreement signed by the Director of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and the Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States, enabling the Zionist regime to access most of the available nuclear data and technology of the United States, is another example of non-compliance by the United States with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It seems that the United States is not shy about supporting that regime’s nuclear weapon
programme, and the disclosed “top secret document dated 23 August 1974” clearly shows the role of the United States in equipping the Zionist regime with nuclear weapons.

18. Although the moratorium on nuclear testing (but not testing using simulations) has been maintained since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, some efforts had been under way in the United States to allocate millions of dollars to the goal of reducing to 18 months the time necessary to resume a nuclear test. This puts into question its commitment to the so-called moratorium. The international community has high expectations that the United States, as a major nuclear-weapon State, will implement its commitments under the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and the agreed Action Plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as one of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.

19. While new issues such as terrorism, threats to non-proliferation and the possible role of terrorist groups in proliferation should be duly dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of preserving nuclear weapons and ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations by certain nuclear-weapon States. Specific threats may not be resolved by resorting to more dangerous weapons that would have catastrophic consequences well beyond any other threats in scope and effects. The main responsibility for nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorist groups from having access to the nuclear weapons or materials within the territory of a nuclear-weapon State or under its jurisdiction or control rests entirely with that State. Pending the total elimination of such weapons, they should take necessary measures to protect their arsenals from any theft and incident.

20. The Treaty review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and it must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and the Action Plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

21. The parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should engage in good faith in the substantive work of the 2015 Review Conference for the prompt and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty, including article VI, and the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

22. The international community cannot wait forever to witness the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI, namely 2025, as proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

23. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran is also of the firm belief that early negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention should be started in the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all, of the possession, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country.
and provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons. Until the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and refrain from any kind of development of and research on nuclear weapons; any threat of the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty; any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities; the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries; and maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

24. Continued lack of transparency regarding the nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States is a matter of serious concern to the States parties to the Treaty. The few pieces of news on submarine accidents leaked to the media show the scale of the dangers to international peace and security, as well as the great challenges created by the existing nuclear arsenals to the survival of mankind and the environment. Since 2000, the collisions and failures of nuclear submarines of the United Kingdom, including HMS Superb in May 2008, have been a great source of concern for the international community and posed an immense risk to the marine environment. During this period, HMS Triumph, HMS Trafalgar and HMS Tireless had similar catastrophic incidents. In particular, in February 2009, the incident between the British nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard and the French nuclear submarine Le Triomphant in the Atlantic Ocean was of serious concern to the international community. Such cases of accidents involving nuclear weapons proved once more the righteousness of the international calls for the immediate realization of a world free from nuclear arsenals through the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

25. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the Treaty. The final document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed, in the second paragraph of its section on article VII, the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding and unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the Review Conference. In the light of that agreement, the 2015 Review Conference should prepare recommendations on unqualified negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

26. The failure of past Review Conferences to produce recommendations on the security assurances necessitates a concrete measure to be taken by the 2015 Review Conference to revitalize international efforts in this regard.

27. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to firmly believe that the Review Conference should establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

28. As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use or threat of use and negative security assurances, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that, as suggested by the non-governmental organization community, the Review Conference should adopt a decision by which the Conference decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty shall be prohibited.
29. The General Assembly, at its sixty-sixth session, adopted resolution 66/28, entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in which it called for, inter alia, practical steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promoted international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

These required measures by the international community could be considered as a basis for the Review Conference for further elaboration.

30. In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that maintaining the established delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital to preserving the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States.