Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The first atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945 had a destructive power 10,000 times larger than previous explosive devices. Since then, thermonuclear bombs, which are a thousand times more destructive than fission bombs, have been designed and built. The continued existence of thousands of such bombs in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States and the allocation of billions of dollars to modernize them has kept the fate of civilization and of humanity itself under horror and panic. Even with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, humankind has continued to live under the shadow of the possible use of the world’s most destructive mass-terror weapons. Therefore, the provision of unconditional security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been and still is an important and vital issue.

2. In the early 1980s, all five nuclear-weapon States, in response to the international demands for an unconditional and legally binding treaty on negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as a first limited step accepted some qualified and conditional undertakings not to use such weapons against States parties to the Treaty and those that had renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons. In early April 1995, this pledge was reaffirmed through unilateral statements by the nuclear-weapon States, and on 11 April 1995, just days before the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Security Council adopted resolution 984 (1995), which took note of these unilateral statements and recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive assurances. The Security Council was also very explicit in considering that the resolution constituted a step in that direction.

3. The unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council resolution were duly taken note of in a package of decisions by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)). Paragraph 8 of decision 2 on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament stipulated that further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that these steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

4. Moreover, the new doctrines such as the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, the development of easy-to-use mini-nuclear weapons and a recent increase in the number of cases in which some high officials of certain nuclear-weapon States have threatened non-nuclear-weapon States, such as the threats made by the United States and the President of France, all have put the non-nuclear-weapon States more than ever under the real threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons.

5. The United States, by developing new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons and, recently, allocating billions of dollars to modernize its nuclear arsenal, constructing a new facility for production of nuclear weapons and naming non-nuclear-weapon States as targets of such inhumane weaponry, is acting in contravention of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, and is clearly violating its obligations under article VI of the Treaty and putting its commitment to its unilateral statement of 1995 under serious question. Hundreds of millions of dollars have already been allocated to nuclear weapon development projects such as those of the Trident programme of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or the mini-nuclear weapons of the United States and, recently, the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to French nuclear arsenals. The international community should not await the deployment or even threat of use of such weapons to react. Such policies and practices seem to show that no lessons have been learned from the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is abhorrent that the threats and dangerous doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States were officially proclaimed by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

6. The unilateral statements of 1995 and the subsequent Security Council resolution are inseparable parts of the deal at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The efforts undermining multilateral achievement in the field of disarmament are still seriously eroding the very credibility of the Treaty.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should not imply political clout and the capability to shape and influence world events or change the decisions of sovereign States. Holding on to and expanding nuclear arsenals should be condemned rather than condoned or tolerated. Any increase in nuclear capability should equal a reduction in political credibility. As long as such weapons are in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States, no one on the Earth has any security. It is therefore imperative to move on with a concerted and firm resolve to stop and reverse this fast-paced drive. Certain nuclear-weapon States have tried to create smokescreens in the international forums, including the Treaty review process, to deflect attention from their abysmal record and policies.

8. Pending the total elimination of these inhuman weapons, as stipulated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996, the Review Conference should announce unequivocally that to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons is illegal. At the same time, efforts for the conclusion of a universal,
unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be pursued as a matter of priority by the international community.

9. Therefore, we propose that the 2015 Review Conference establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft of a legally binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons and providing unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and to submit its draft to the Review Conference for consideration and adoption. As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and negative security assurances, we continue to believe that the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty shall be prohibited.

10. We strongly urge the upcoming Review Conference to move a step forward and to make a concrete decision on negative security assurances in order to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, on a non-discriminatory and unconditional basis, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.