Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to action 20 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with action 20 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deals with measures that have been taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement article VI of the Treaty; paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament, provides an essential element to ascertain the status of implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran holds the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through adoption of a format that properly defines the categories of information required within the review process.

3. One of the important elements of action 20 which needs to be taken into account in reporting is the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice. As the Court stipulated in that advisory opinion, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law and there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes the importance and validity of the advisory opinion as a universal disarmament obligation of States parties to the Treaty and, accordingly, believes that, while reporting on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty is important, it shall not substitute for the fulfilment of the obligation for nuclear disarmament under article...
VI. It is disappointing that, more than 40 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the obligations under article VI have yet to be fulfilled. More than 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the long-lasting threat to human survival from nuclear weapons continues to be the greatest one to humanity. The international community is gravely concerned about the lack of progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, long after the end of the cold war, more than 20,000 nuclear weapons still exist, many on high-alert status and ready to use.

Approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed and ratified the Treaty in 1969 and 1970 respectively. In June 1973, in accordance with article III (1) of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ratification of the Treaty before its entry into force and early conclusion of the safeguards agreement clearly demonstrate the long-standing support and commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapons State to this fundamental instrument.

5. In 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the first country in the Middle East region to initiate the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was followed vigourously by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all the provisions of the Treaty with the aim of helping the integrity and universality of the Treaty regime and achieving its fundamental objectives. The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to renounce the nuclear option as a matter of principle and to place its peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards is a clear manifestation of its commitment to the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the acquiring, development and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. Nuclear weapons have no place in the defence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of our commitment to our treaty obligations under the Treaty. Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that nuclear weapons do not increase its security.

7. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, all the provisions of the Treaty are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the rights and obligations enshrined in the Treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages its universality and full implementation. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the current selective, discriminatory and non-balanced approach towards the Treaty, reflected in particular in the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group on nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the Treaty, the instrumental use of the Security Council by some veto-holders and the adoption of the legally flawed Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), has seriously jeopardized the basis of the Treaty.

8. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. As agreed in the 2000 Review Conference and action plan on nuclear disarmament and adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty should be vigorously pursued by nuclear-weapon States. In this context, no action shall be made by nuclear-weapon States in contravention of those obligations.
Regrettably, and despite the pledges on nuclear disarmament made by the current Administration of the United States of America, a review of the existing United States nuclear policy shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis by the United States Nuclear Posture Review on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy; the plan to spend $700 billion on the modernization of the United States nuclear arsenal and construction of a new nuclear weapon production facility; no movement towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the raising of new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review, are clear indications of the continued policy of the United States to evade its obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the Trident project of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to build a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines and the announced policy of France to modernize all branches of its nuclear forces, including producing new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, by spending more than 350 billion euros until 2020, are all flagrant violations of international law, namely obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

9. Another negative development in the framework of joint research on nuclear warheads between two nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom and the United States, is of grave concern for non-nuclear-weapon States parties and demonstrates serious non-compliance with article I of the Treaty. According to the data published on 9 February 2009, the United States military has been using an atomic weapons facility in the United Kingdom to carry out research into its own warhead programme. In this regard, the United States defence officials have declared that “very valuable” warhead research has been taking place at the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, United Kingdom, as part of an ongoing and secretive deal between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. Such events clearly demonstrate the non-compliance of both countries and their reluctance in discharging their legal obligations under the Treaty provisions.

10. The States parties to the Treaty are also concerned about the efforts of some nuclear-weapon States to reinterpret article VI of the Treaty and to make their obligations conditional, including the statements by the representatives of the United States to the First Committee of the General Assembly at its sixty-second session, and that of the United Kingdom Secretary for Defence in February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament. In response to such positions, it should be indicated that the International Court of Justice has provided an authoritative interpretation of article VI of the Treaty, holding that it requires the nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, as reflected in the consensual Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty, has already clarified the meaning of article VI of the Treaty.

11. In addition, the United States has continuously refrained from giving a positive response to the repeated demand of the international community to start negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention and a treaty on unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Instead, the United States is increasingly devoting billions of dollars to programmes of vertical
proliferation of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, by continuing to deploy hundreds of nuclear weapons and global missile defence systems in other countries and training the air forces of those countries to deliver nuclear weapons in the framework of military alliances, transferring nuclear technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty whose nuclear facilities operate outside of IAEA full-scope safeguards monitoring, the United States is in non-compliance with article I of the Treaty, which stipulates that each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever. Such actions also constitute non-compliance with article VI of the Treaty and the measures agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

12. It should be highlighted that, in accordance with step 5 of the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Review Conference and action 2 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be made in an internationally verifiable and irreversible manner. Needless to say that a reduction in nuclear weapons can never substitute the main obligation of nuclear-weapon States, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Since there is no mechanism to internationally verify the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations or agreements regarding the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, the Review Conference should establish a standing committee for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty.

Measures taken to implement article VI of the Treaty

13. The Islamic Republic of Iran has actively participated in international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored General Assembly resolution 66/28 on the follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty. By adopting this resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, called for all the nuclear-weapon States to take the following practical steps, which would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

   (a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

   (b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

   (c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

   (d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

   (e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

14. During the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Islamic Republic of Iran has supported and voted in favour of the resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament, including: 66/23, on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; 66/25, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; 66/26, on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; 66/40, on measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitment; 66/43, on the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); 66/46, on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; 66/48, on reducing nuclear danger; 66/51, on nuclear disarmament; 66/57, on the convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; 66/61, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; and 66/64, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

15. In order to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has held two international conferences on disarmament and non-proliferation, which took place in Tehran on 17 and 18 April 2010 and 12 and 13 June 2011, and at which, inter alia, the current challenges towards the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments were examined and mechanisms to realize the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world were sought.

16. In line with the other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has in various forums, including the International Court of Justice, made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and is therefore illegal. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the resolution adopted annually since 1999, on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

17. The Islamic Republic of Iran fully supports the early establishment of a subsidiary body by the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including through a nuclear weapons convention, as a concrete step for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we reiterate our call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament by the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all, of the possession, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhuman weapons by 2025, as proposed by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. Until the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and refrain from:

• Any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons
• Any threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States
• Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities
• Deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries
• Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation

18. Owing to the significant role that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 1974, initiated the resolution for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980, this resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the General Assembly. However, the Zionist regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States through its persistent rejection of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the main obstacle to the establishment of such a zone.