Thank you Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your election as Chair and assure you of my delegation's full support.

Canada welcomes your proposal that we use this PrepCom to take stock of our efforts to implement the 2010 Action Plan thus far. In this vein, I would like to emphasize Canada's key priorities and outline some of the work it has undertaken since 2010 to implement our commitments. I would also call the attention of all delegations to the two national reports submitted to this PrepCom by Canada, first, on its implementation of the NPT, the 13 practical steps from 2000 and the 2010 Action Plan and, second, on its implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

Canada is a member of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a group formed with the express goal of advancing the implementation of our NPT obligations. Through the NPDI as well as with our partners in the G8, Canada has sought to advance the universalization of the Additional Protocol. We believe that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and an Additional Protocol that is fully in force represent the current safeguards standard to which all NPT States Parties should adhere. Furthermore, they should become the international community's condition for new supply of nuclear materials. Through our Global Partnership Program, Canada made a voluntary contribution of C$1 million over the 2010/2011 fiscal year toward the purchase of equipment and security improvements at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, with the goal of strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's safeguards.

Dealing with existing and new cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments is vital for the integrity and authority of the NPT. Canada is deeply concerned about the risk of destabilization brought on by the continued non-compliance by Iran to its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. Iran's continued illegal enrichment of nuclear material, failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA, and activities that can only be understood in the context of a nuclear weapons development effort contradict its claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful
purposes. We urge Iran to comply with its international obligations under the NPT, its IAEA safeguards agreement and UN Security Council resolutions.

Iran’s defiance of the international community is unfortunately matched by that of North Korea, most recently demonstrated by its failed ballistic missile test in contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated its complete disregard for nuclear non-proliferation measures by announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in 2002 and conducting nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009. Such provocative actions continue to threaten international security and stability.

Canada also calls on Syria to return to full compliance with its NPT obligations.

Canada has taken action to advance priorities under the 2010 Action Plan, particularly on FMCT negotiations and achieving entry into force of the CTBT which both have strong non-proliferation dimensions as well.

At the sixty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly, Canada sponsored a resolution entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices” that, inter alia, called for the CD to agree on and implement early in its 2012 session a Program of Work that included FMCT negotiations. We regret that consensus proved unachievable on the proposal made by the Egyptian CD President that would have allowed for progress on all four CD core issues, including on an FMCT. We continue to believe, strongly, that a verifiable multilateral agreement to halt the production of weapons-usable fissile material will benefit the security interests of all countries. With the continued failure of the CD to agree on a Program of Work, we are assessing our next steps, in light of the commitment of the UN General Assembly to consider at its 2012 session, if necessary, options to advance negotiations. For too long, the CD has stood moribund, failing to provide direction and leadership due mainly to the abuse of its consensus rule. This rule was intended to ensure national interests are respected in negotiations, not to prevent negotiations from being initiated.

Canada welcomed the ratification of the CTBT by Annex 2 state Indonesia in February 2012, which brought it one step closer to achieving entry into force. We also welcome the ratifications by non-Annex 2 states since the last Review Conference, including the Central African Republic, Ghana, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago. The signature of the Treaty by Niue on April 9, 2012, is also a positive development as it reduces to 13 to number of states that have yet to sign the Treaty.

Canada is also continuing to work with our NPDI partners to engage constructively with the P5 on their commitment to be more transparent on their nuclear arsenals. We continue to believe that increased transparency of nuclear-weapons-related information is an important element for making progress in nuclear disarmament, building security and confidence and fulfilling NPT commitments. We welcome the P5’s unprecedented collaboration to follow up on the 2010 RevCon outcome through their 2011 Paris and other meetings.

Canada is actively contributing to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada fully supports the legitimate right of all States Parties to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. However, the right to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy comes with obligations. All NPT States Parties must fulfill their nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation obligations.

In our view, nuclear security and safety should be promoted along with non-proliferation within the NPT as a way to strengthen the basis for nuclear cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A key requirement of Canada's nuclear cooperation policy is the establishment of robust bilateral agreements designed to ensure that Canadian materials and technology are supplied for and remain in peaceful applications. Canada has undertaken a number of measures nationally to strengthen the security of our nuclear material, including strengthening our nuclear regulations, physical protection of nuclear facilities, and nuclear detection capabilities at our borders.

Canada continues to promote international efforts to ensure that nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials do not spread to states of proliferation concern or non-state actors including terrorist organizations. Since the last NPT meeting in May 2010, Canada spent over C$110 million to secure nuclear and other high activity radiological materials through its activities under the 24-member Global Partnership Program against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. And we will continue this work. In March 2012, Prime Minister Harper announced the renewal of Canada's Global Partnership Program for an additional five years (2013-2018) with C$367 million in new financial resources. The Prime Minister also announced a $5 million voluntary contribution to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. In cooperation with the US Department of Energy, Canada is also working to enhance security of vulnerable high activity radioactive sources, many of which are Canadian-origin. Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the G8 working groups on non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security and the Global Partnership. To contribute to GICNT activities and exercises, Canada will host in Toronto in May 2012 a table-top exercise to demonstrate its emergency management capabilities in the event of a radiological terrorist attack.

As you are aware, during the review cycles in 2005 and 2010, Canada has called for steps to strengthen the NPT's review process to make it more responsive to the needs of States Parties. However, despite cross-regional support, our proposals have not been adopted as actionable items. Canada continues to believe that more can be done to strengthen the principle of "permanence with accountability" that underpinned the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. We intend to consult widely with delegations during this PrepCom and those that follow to seek views about how best to strengthen governance and accountability in the NPT.

To ensure a successful outcome in 2015, we must not rest on our laurels from the successful outcome of 2010. Rather, we must undertake a dedicated and determined effort, and display the political will and flexibility necessary to arrive at a strong and balanced outcome that will strengthen this Treaty and advance its implementation. There continues to be an opportunity to fulfill the optimism of recent years and maintain the momentum toward the goals the NPT was designed to achieve. Let us seize that opportunity.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.