Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament, a fundamental pillar of the NPT, has the highest priority in the NPT review cycle. With the adoption of the practical steps in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in particular the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty", hopes for the implementation of disarmament pillar of the Treaty were renewed. The implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty has become instrumental towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. As reaffirmed in the agreed Action Plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. In its Action Plan, the 2010 Review Conference emphasized on the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement practical steps to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

The upcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty should consider national reports of the nuclear-weapon States to be furnished, in accordance with the Actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 Review Conference's Action Plan, with respect to their obligations to implement Article VI of the Treaty, including measures adopted by them to implement 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995
decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Despite the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by the 
nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and their unequivocal 
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal adopted at the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference as well as their commitment made at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate 
progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, developments in the area of nuclear 
disarmament have not been promising and do not indicate compliance with disarmament obligations. 
Limited reductions of nuclear weapons mostly do not go beyond mere decommissioning. They, 
therefore, do not abide by the principle of “irreversibility”, which was agreed by the nuclear-weapon 
States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Action 2 of the 2010 Review 
Conference’s Action Plan.

During the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States 
committed themselves to “the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral 
initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process”. In Actions 3 and 5 
of the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan, the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed their 
commitment to this end. In spite of that commitment, no practical steps have been taken to reduce 
tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether 
strategic or non-strategic, should be in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable 
manner. Needless to say, such reduction in nuclear weapons can never be a substitute for the main 
obligation of the nuclear-weapon States, namely the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached regarding the fulfilment of nuclear 
disarmament obligations, and in order to assure the international community of the real and 
irreversible reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the NPT Review Conference should 
establish a standing Committee to ensure implementation of the commitments made with regard to 
Article VI obligations.

A real change is needed regarding for the removal of the emphasis on the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence. A review of the nuclear policy of certain nuclear-weapon States shows a reverse trend. 
The continued emphasis of Nuclear Posture Review of a certain nuclear weapon State on maintaining 
nuclear weapons and the deterrence policy, the plan to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the 
modernization of the nuclear arsenals, constructing new facility for production of new nuclear 
weapons, no movement towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and 
raising new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Posture Review, are clear 
indications of the continued policy of that State to evade its nuclear disarmament obligation.

The Contrary to the declaratory policy of the UK regarding its commitment to its nuclear 
disarmament obligations under the NPT, By replacing and modernizing the Trident nuclear weapons 
system which has an estimated cost of 100 billion Euros the UK is launching a nuclear rearmament 
rather than nuclear disarmament. This will equip the UK with more destructive nuclear weapons for 
killing and destruction of thousands of people. This is in contravention of the UK’s international 
obligations. The UK’s notion of the legitimate use of nuclear weapons adds to the already grave 
concerns of the international community regarding the continued existence of nuclear weapons and
the risk of their use. I remind the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

More worrisome are announcements by France. It has deployed a new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenal. The President of that country was quoted as saying, "French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe’s security". This indicates that France, in defiance of its international obligations, is seeking new roles for its nuclear forces in order to justify their continued retention. In so doing, it even resorts to irresponsible methods such as manipulation of intelligence and frightening its own people to promote programmes that its people would otherwise not support.

Another serious concern is the continuation and expansion of nuclear sharing among the nuclear-weapon States or with non-nuclear weapon States under military alliances. A regrettable example in this regard is the agreement signed by France and UK. It is an open secret that France is the only NPT State party that has categorically rejected the legal obligations for nuclear disarmament both in word and action, and has tried to invent a new concept of conditional disarmament. French officials have also tried to divert the attention of international community from their non-compliance with the NPT by raising baseless allegations against the peaceful nuclear program of the others without presenting substantiated evidence.

Continued lack of transparency regarding the nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States is a matter of serious concern to the States Parties to the Treaty.

The Preparatory Committee and the 2015 NPT Review Conference have the task of addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and alleviating these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries.

While issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation and the possible role of the terrorist groups in proliferation should duly be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused by certain nuclear-weapon-States on one hand, as pretexts to preserve their nuclear weapons and on the other hand justify imposing more restrictions and constraints against some members of the Treaty.

The NPT review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and the Action Plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should engage in good faith in substantive work of the Review Conference for the prompt and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty, including Article VI, and the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty.

The international community cannot wait forever to witness the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To this end, the 2015 NPT Review Conference should adopt a clear time frame with a
target date for the full implementation of Article VI, namely 2025 as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement.

In this context, Iran is of the firm belief that early negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention shall be started in the Conference on Disarmament within a comprehensive and balanced program of work which should deal equally with four core issues. In this regard, Iran reiterates its call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. Such negotiations must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all, of the possession, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons. In this context, the IAEA should fulfill its responsibility in nuclear disarmament as stipulated in its Statute.

Until the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfill their obligations under the NPT and refrain from:

- Any kind of development of and research on nuclear weapons;
- Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;
- Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities; and
- Deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries.

As a first step to address the issue of illegality of use or threat of use, Iran believes that, the Review Conference should adopt a decision by which the Conference “decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty shall be prohibited”.

It is worth mentioning that once again the General Assembly, at its sixty-sixth Session, adopted resolution (66/28) entitled “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the NPT”, in which it called, inter alia, for practical steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all. These required measures by international community could be considered as a basis for the Review Conference for further elaboration.

In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that maintaining the established delicate balance between three pillars of the NPT is vital to preserve the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.