Mr. Chairman,

Canada has always taken an engaged and collaborative approach to addressing the issues of non-proliferation and safeguards.

Full compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations are a treaty obligation under Article III. Canada is understandably concerned, therefore, with the cases of non-compliance by Iran, North Korea and Syria.

Iran is required by resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and other obligations. Canada reiterates that it is essential for Iran to provide full access, information, and cooperation to the IAEA to address outstanding issues of non-compliance, especially with respect to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear activities. Canada notes with concern that, in the absence of full cooperation from Iran, the IAEA remains unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

The security and stability of Northeast Asia continues to be threatened by the nuclear activities of North Korea. Other provocative actions such as the failed ballistic missile test on April 13 further exacerbate the situation. Canada continues to urge North Korea to return at an early date to the Treaty, to adhere to its IAEA safeguards agreement and to fully implement all relevant non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The IAEA has an essential role to play in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and Canada appreciates the Agency’s readiness to monitor the nuclear activities in North Korea despite being unable to implement any safeguards measures there since its inspectors were expelled in 2009. It is deeply regrettable that a country unable to feed its own people continues to expend so much on these military programs.

Syria’s construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor remains a troubling and unwelcome development. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to fully cooperate with the IAEA to resolve related outstanding issues so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Syria’s nuclear program.
The efficacy and importance of the NPT is predicated on its integrity. Cases of non-compliance that are not addressed with timely and meaningful action negatively affect the underpinnings of the Treaty. States Parties must consider these cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations and determine how the 2015 RevCon will address them.

The IAEA occupies a unique role within the NPT through its verification of States' compliance with their obligations under Article III. Canada views the IAEA’s principal objectives as ensuring both the universal implementation of safeguards agreements, and the universal compliance by States Parties to those agreements. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) represents the backbone of the verification effort and should be in place in all states. While the vast majority of States Parties have a CSA in force, we note that fourteen States Parties have yet to implement a CSA. NPT States Parties must continue to urge those who have not implemented a CSA to do so as quickly as possible.

As the verification regime has evolved over the past decades it has become clear that while a CSA is a fundamental and necessary state undertaking, a CSA alone is not sufficient to provide the needed safeguards assurances. For these reasons the Additional Protocol (AP) was introduced by the IAEA to provide the credible verification needed for assurance that a State is in compliance with its peaceful use commitments under the Treaty. Canada believes that a CSA and an AP represent the new safeguards standard to which all states must aspire. 115 State Parties currently have an AP in force. We must continue to strongly advocate for the universal adoption of the AP.

Effective national export controls are critical to the successful implementation of State Party obligations under Article III and Canada continues to advocate and support the national export controls mandated by UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1673, 1810, and 1887. Effective and transparent export controls are also central in facilitating trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This PrepCom should focus on means to encourage States Parties to continue to develop and improve their national export control systems and for States Parties that have effective systems in place to provide assistance to those that require it. In this vein, multilaterally agreed guidance on what constitutes effective export control measures is the basis for national systems for many States Parties. Canada urges all States Parties to adopt the Understandings of the Zangger Committee as a means of meeting their obligations under the Treaty. Similarly, Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines play an important and useful role in developing national export policies and Canada encourages all States to apply these Guidelines.

The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is another integral element of a successful non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, Canada highlights the importance of maintaining effective physical protection measures on such material and facilities. In this regard, we welcome the second Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Seoul, South Korea and the subsequent concrete national and international measures endorsed by participating countries to enhance nuclear security. Pursuant to the commitments made at the Summit, on March 28 Canada introduced legislation in its Parliament to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We urge all States Parties to ratify these multilateral agreements. Furthermore, States Parties should support the work of the IAEA in assisting efforts to enhance nuclear security and prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, by underscoring the importance of continued support for the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and participating in the Global Partnership Program.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.