Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Acceding Country Croatia, the Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, San Marino and Andorra associate themselves with this statement.

Mr. Chairman,

2. The EU believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, are essential for global peace and security. The EU also believes in the right of access by the Parties to the Treaty to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and in compliance with their overall international non-proliferation obligations. We therefore strongly support the objective of strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

3. In that regard, we welcome the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2010 and the adoption by consensus of the forward looking Action Plan as set out in the final document. The implementation of the Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all States Parties. We call on all States Parties to working to implement the conclusions and recommendations designed to strengthen the three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and we will also continue to work on relevant issues that are absent or inadequately reflected in the Action Plan, such as universal adherence and implementation of Article X of the NPT.

* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process
** Iceland remains an EFTA country and member of the European Economic Area
4. The 2010 NPT Review Conference also emphasised the importance of a process leading to full implementation of its 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. To that end, the Conference endorsed practical steps, including consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution. Building on that and with strong support from the international community, we organised a seminar in Brussels, last 6-7 July, to ‘promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East’. The EU welcomes the appointment of Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava as Facilitator and Finland as the designated host Government for the 2012 Conference. In the run-up to the 2012 Conference, and beyond, the EU looks forward to working together with the Facilitator and all concerned and interested parties, including by follow-up initiatives to the July 2011 seminar.

Mr. Chairman,

5. In accordance with Actions 24 to 34, the European Union fully supports the IAEA’s system of safeguards as a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and one that is indispensable for the implementation of the NPT. The EU stresses constantly that the measures contained in the Additional Protocol form an integral part of the IAEA Safeguards system and that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with Additional Protocols, constitute the current IAEA verification standard.

6. In accordance with Action 26, the European Union is actively addressing the major proliferation and non-compliance challenges. The EU believes these have to be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. Iran’s nuclear programme, in particular the possible military dimensions, Syria’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA and the continuous violations of UNSC and IAEA Board resolutions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are of deep concern.

7. The latest report of the Director General of the IAEA confirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran, in violation of its obligations, continues to expand its enrichment activities, including by increasing its capacity to enrich to 20%. In addition, the EU is deeply worried that, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects and is not cooperating with the IAEA to resolve questions and concerns relating to the possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

8. The EU urges Iran to implement the Resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Board of Governors. Iran must suspend its enrichment activities and heavy water related projects, including research and development, implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement. These are not matters which UN or IAEA Member States can unilaterally decide upon. Therefore the EU cannot accept that compliance with international obligations freely accepted by Iran previously can be later unilaterally revoked. Bringing into force its Additional Protocol is also a requirement under UNSC
resolutions. Iran must fully cooperate with the Agency in order to clarify all outstanding issues, in particular those which give rise to deep concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

9. Our objective remains to reach a comprehensive long-term settlement, which would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, ensuring that all obligations under the NPT are met by Iran, while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The most recent meeting of representatives from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, led by the EU High Representative, with Iran on 14 April 2012 in Istanbul is a clear example of our determination to work towards achieving a diplomatic solution involving the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. We hope that by launching a sustained process of serious dialogue with Iran, we will be able to achieve concrete results at an early stage. Iran has to engage into meaningful discussions on practical confidence-building steps in order to address the international community’s concerns on its nuclear programme. We call on all UN Member States to support these efforts by fully implementing relevant Security Council Resolutions.

10. With regard to the DPRK, the EU would like to stress that the DPRK continues to be bound by its international obligations, as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 and 1874, and by its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT, and we therefore once again urge the DPRK to comply with them fully, unconditionally and without delay. We strongly condemn the North-Korean launch conducted on April 13th, which constitutes a serious violation of the mentioned UN Security Council Resolutions. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We call on the DPRK to return to full compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, and provide the IAEA with the requested access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities. The EU continues to support the ultimate objective of the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and is ready to continue working with its international partners and with the DPRK in pursuit of lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

11. With regard to Syria, the EU fully supported the adoption of the resolution of the Board of Governors of 9 June 2011 which reported Syria to the UN Security Council and to the UN General Assembly due to Syria’s non-compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement. This resolution was based on the conclusion of the Agency in the DG’s June 2011 report to the Board of Governors ‘that the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site was very likely a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of its Safeguards Agreement and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements thereto’. The EU deeply regrets that, despite the resolution and the Syrian pledge of 26 May 2011 to the Director General to respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s request to resolve all outstanding questions, Syria still has to provide the necessary cooperation.
Mr. Chairman,

12. It is our conviction that reinforcing State and regional systems of accountancy for, and control of, nuclear materials is essential for an effective and credible safeguards system. In implementing Action 33, the EU's regional system for Accountancy and control, EURATOM Safeguards, together with the IAEA have continued to develop their partnership arrangements in order to promote transparency and mutual confidence. The EU actively supports the IAEA's safeguards system including the Additional Protocol through inter alia the European Commission's Safeguards Support Programme. The European Union contributed € 5 million towards modernizing the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), with further EU contributions envisaged, complemented by individual contributions of EU Member States.

13. Through the IAEA Member State Support Programmes (MSSP), the European Union provides the Agency with technology and expertise from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and its Institutes at Ispra-Italy, Geel-Belgium and Karlsruhe-Germany in many technical areas related to the effective implementation of safeguards verification measures.

14. The European Union fully supports the activities of the international export control regimes, mainly the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the MTCR. With regard to the implementation of Action 36, the European Union welcomed the strengthening of the NSG's Guidelines agreed at the last Plenary Meeting, and emphasised the need that accession to the Additional Protocol become, within the NSG, a condition for nuclear supply. The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continue to be important fora to share experience and work effectively towards efficient export controls, thus contributing concretely to fighting proliferation, and we call on all States to draw on their work when drafting and implementing their respective export control legislation.

15. In line with Actions 40 – 45, the EU continuously stresses the need to do everything possible to prevent WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. The illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology is a matter of serious concern for all. Therefore, we urge States to implement fully UNSCR 1540. In this regard, the European Union has supported, up to almost € 700.00 by 2012, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), and has called for improved nuclear security for high radioactive sources. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is fundamental to the development of effective mechanisms to prevent proliferation to non-State actors of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

16. Resolution 1540 requires that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including controls over related materials. To this end, the States shall also establish transit and brokering controls. The European Union dual-use export control regime continued to be strengthened
through the revised Council Regulation setting up a Community regime that now covers the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items. The European Union has provided, and will continue to provide, significant support to third countries to ensure the full implementation of UNSCR 1540. The European Union has been assisting several countries in complying with their obligations under UNSCR 1540, including through several regional outreach activities. The European Union is currently in the process of elaborating a new Council Decision that would continue to provide support to the 1540 Committee in promoting the full implementation of the resolution.

17. The European Union also participates in and supports other international mechanisms and relevant initiatives such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The European Union is one of the main contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund through its own contributions and through the contributions of individual European Union Member States, with a level of funding around €30 million since 2004. So far more than 50 countries have benefited from assistance funded through European Union Joint Actions and Council Decisions and the number continues to grow. Under the European Union Instrument for Stability (IfS), nearly €300 million is being dedicated during the period 2007 – 2013 to CBRN risk mitigation, out of which about one third will be dedicated to the European Union Initiative called Regional CBRN Centres of Excellence. Its objective is to strengthen the institutional capacity to counter the CBRN risk worldwide.

Mr. Chairman,

18. The European Union stresses the need to do everything possible to prevent the risks of weapons of mass destruction falling into hands of terrorists, in particular the risk of nuclear terrorism. In this context, we stress the need for compliance with obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), and call for improved nuclear security for high radioactive sources. Consistent with the longstanding and significant support provided by the EU to global nuclear security efforts, we have actively contributed to the outcome of both the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits. This platform, which will reconvene in 2014 in the Netherlands, continues to be, together with other initiatives, a proof of the need for international cooperation in the field of nuclear security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.