Mr. Chairman,

I would like to associate my delegation with the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on this cluster. The history of nuclear proliferation began when the development, testing and use of nuclear weapons by the United States during the World War II led to a chain reaction of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the course of the Cold War. As a result, today the existence of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and the risk to use them constitute the greatest threat to the human civilisation and the peace and security of all. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is always a risk for their use and vertical or horizontal proliferation. Given such threats and risks, nothing can justify the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of States.

The Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapon State is strongly committed to the objective of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons under its NPT obligations. In our view, the NPT, if fully implemented, plays an essential role in international peace and security. But the objectives of the treaty have not been pursued in a balanced manner.
The compliance by non-nuclear-weapon States with their commitment to non-proliferation has greatly enabled the NPT to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty as long as they are under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pose no proliferation risks.

One of the major challenges facing the NPT is the cases of non-compliance by certain nuclear-weapon States particularly some European Member States with their Treaty obligations including the non-proliferation provisions. While there is an established mechanism to verify and enforce the obligations under Articles II and III of the Treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon States, no similar mechanism has been designed to internationally verify and address the non-compliances by the nuclear-weapon States with their obligations under Articles I, III (2), IV (2) and VI of the NPT. A main task of the NPT Review Conference is to identify such cases and to find ways and means to fully address them and thus to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty.

Under the terms of the article I of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States are committed not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon technology and materials to others. Accordingly, the nuclear-weapon States should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States Parties and those not parties to the Treaty.

By transferring hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear-weapon States under the NATO umbrella in the EU territories, the US, for a long time, has been in non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty, which provides in its Article I "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons." The deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the EU countries are extremely integrated into the military infrastructure of the hosting countries, the fighter bomber pilots of the hosting countries have been trained to handle and deliver the United States nuclear bombs against the nuclear as well as the non-nuclear-weapon States. It constitutes clear non-compliance with the Treaty not only by sending country but also by the hosting States namely some members of the European Union. We call upon the US and the EU to come back into compliance with their Treaty obligations and abandoned double-standard and discriminatory policies.

Joint research on nuclear warheads between two nuclear-weapon States is a matter of grave concern for non-nuclear-weapon States and represents serious non-compliance with Article I of the Treaty. A regrettable example in this regard is the agreement signed by France and UK, both members of the EU.

By transfer of nuclear technologies and materials to non-parties to the Treaty including the Zionist regime of Israel, France, US and UK have greatly contributed to the emergence of new nuclear weapons possessors. This is a clear breach of non-proliferation obligation under article I of the Treaty, particularly by France as the founder of Israeli secret nuclear program.

The unprecedented decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an exclusive and non-transparent club that claims to have been established so as to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, has already damaged the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a decision, by facilitating the
transfer of nuclear material to a non-party that has an active nuclear-weapons programme, is a clear violation of article III (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that cooperation by each State party to the Treaty in providing equipment or material for peaceful purposes is not permitted unless the source or special fissionable material is subjected to the safeguards required under the Treaty. The NSG decision, which was made under pressure exerted by US and supported by the EU members, is also a violation of the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States under the decision on principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference for promoting universalization of the Treaty. When a country outside the Treaty easily and unconditionally enjoys nuclear assistance from NSG members, it will never have incentives to accede to the Treaty. Thus, the NSG decision is a flagrant breach of the obligations on the promotion of the universality of the Treaty. Such a decision is another manifestation of double standards and discrimination in implementing the provisions of the Treaty. The Review Conference should make a decision on the prohibition of any nuclear assistance to non-parties to the Treaty.

Furthermore, it seems that in the view of a few nuclear weapon States and the EU members, clandestine development of nuclear weapons by those outside the Treaty is justifiable, and that such a nuclear programme can be supported through cooperation and transferring nuclear technology, material and equipment. It is a matter of great concern that such an approach has been applied by the United States and the EU to the underground nuclear weapons programme of the Israeli regime. Permitting such a regime to continue to produce nuclear weapons with impunity will bring about grave consequences for regional and international peace and security.

Full materialization of non-proliferation objective requires the implementation of article I of the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, the Review Conference should establish a strong mechanism to verify the implementation of article I by the nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, the failure to comply with the nuclear disarmament obligations increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States reliance on nuclear weapons encourages other states to acquire them. Thus, the Review Conference should also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to fully implement their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

To this effect, the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference, based on the full implementation of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States on non-proliferation, should be designed in a way to cover several key issues which we elaborated in our working paper (NPT/Conf.2015/PC.I/WP. 33)

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that IAEA, as the sole competent authority in verifying nuclear programmes of the States parties, has an important and sensitive role in dealing with the nuclear activities of the member States. In this regard, IAEA should act within its mandate, the IAEA Statute and the relevant safeguards agreements of the States parties. The Agency should also strengthen its confidentiality policies in order to prevent any leakage of sensitive and confidential information of member States. Leakage of confidential information of the IAEA is a matter of serious concern since such information is directly related to information received during the performance of Agency’s verification and inspection in member States; the
release of such confidential information shall jeopardize the national security of member states and that of individual working with inspectors. Therefore, it has direct impact on the mutual trust between member states and the Secretariat and thus, on verification activities of the IAEA.

One of the main concerns of the States parties to the Treaty is the increase of baseless allegations against the peaceful nuclear activities of other States parties through forging documents and disseminating false information including those unfounded allegations made in the statements of the EU. These allegations have significant consequences, in particular political and economic damages to the relevant State party. In this context, the Agency must be very vigilant in dealing with open source information, baseless allegations and the authenticity of the documents presented. The IAEA must not build its verification activities on unreliable and fake evidence. In this context, based on article III of the Treaty, which stipulates that implementation of safeguards shall be in a manner to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States parties, the Islamic Republic of Iran proposes the establishment of a legal mechanism for the arrangements to rectify the damages inflicted on the relevant States parties and provide a framework for compensation.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.