Mr. Chair,

A credible and robust non-proliferation regime is a pre-condition for a world free of nuclear weapons. All state parties to the NPT have a responsibility to contribute to this end.

The outcome document of 2010 was an important achievement in our efforts to secure a credible non-proliferation architecture. Hence, the primary objective for the whole community must be to ensure its full implementation.

However, in spite of the 2010 Review Conference, it is fair to say that the NPT is under strain due to challenges posed by countries inside and outside of its provisions.

The international community has not succeeded in resolving pressing proliferation concerns, represented by the Islamic republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Norway urges these countries to heed the calls by the international community, expressed through the UN Security Council and the IAEA.

Mr Chair,
We must put safeguards at the centre of our efforts in the pursuit of an efficient non-proliferation architecture. Safeguards are essential to ensure that all nuclear activities are devoted to peaceful activities only. Norway reaffirms that the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification norm.

We are pleased that 115 countries now have in force the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. But it is quite unsatisfactory that as many as 14 countries do not even have in place a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Norway remains convinced that it is in the interest of every country to conclude the necessary safeguards arrangements, and thus be better positioned to take part in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Indeed, it is high time that we fully universalise the Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. In doing so, we must empower the IAEA, politically and financially, to carry out its crucial verification task.
We would also use this opportunity to express our support to the evolution of safeguards implementation to a State level concept. This concept should be applicable to all States in an objective manner, based on the consideration of all credible information about a State that is relevant to safeguards. In our view, this would ensure effective and efficient safeguards in the face of the ever-increasing quantities of nuclear material that needs to be safeguarded.

Mr Chair,
Norway has for some years advocated that minimising the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector will further strengthen our overall non-proliferation efforts, and not least in preventing non-state actors from acquiring material which may be used in a crude nuclear device.

Together with Austria, Norway has submitted a Working Paper which reflects the findings of the second International Symposium on the Minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium that was held here in Vienna from 23 to 25 January, 2012. The Symposium was co-hosted by Austria, Norway and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and in cooperation with the IAEA.

We are convinced that it is possible from both a technological and financial perspective to convert most of existing civilian nuclear installations to use low enriched uranium. On this background, it is encouraging to observe that a growing number of civilian research reactors are in fact being converted from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as fuel.

We must utilize this momentum. Norway remains convinced that we need to look more actively into nuclear fuel cycle approaches with a view to finding solutions which accommodates our non-proliferation concerns, while at the same time facilitates peaceful uses. Enhanced multilateral cooperation in fuel cycle approaches would serve all pillars of the NPT and the time is ripe to finalize international cooperation on nuclear fuel cycles.

Mr Chair,
Export control is an additional and important element to sustain a credible global non-proliferation norm. That is the intention of the NSG and the Zangger Committee. Norway urges all states parties to adopt and enforce adequate national export control legislation, as called for by the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Additionally, we should intensify our efforts to sustain existing regional nuclear weapons free zones, and strive to create new ones. We should aim to move much closer to such a zone for the Middle East in the years to come.

Likewise, it is essential to make real progress in securing an entry into force of the CTBT, a very important non-proliferation measure. We would again urge all annex II states to ratify the CTBT without delay.

I would also use this opportunity to inform you that Norway is in the process of ratifying the Convention to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and urges other countries to follow suit.

Mr Chair,
Finally, a credible non-proliferation architecture is dependent on the health of the NPT and all its pillars. This is only achievable with the full commitment and ownership from all states parties, an IAEA equipped and able to play its key role, and an efficient partnership with academia and the nuclear industry. We are ready to work with all relevant parties on this basis.