Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. Action 3 of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states: “In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.”

2. To this end, strategic nuclear weapons have been the object of a phased reduction process (e.g. through the new START Treaty). Intermediate-range ground-based nuclear weapons have been eliminated altogether from the arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation by means of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Unilateral commitments, such as the presidential nuclear initiatives made by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation in 1991 and 1992, have led to the decommissioning and (partial) abolition of certain types of non-strategic nuclear weapons and a significant reduction of such weapons.

3. However, there are nuclear weapons — especially those that can be considered non-strategic nuclear weapons — that have not been covered by any arms control agreements. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is of the opinion that the further reduction of the numbers and types of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be placed higher on the international agenda if the overall reduction process of nuclear weapons is to continue towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the status of implementation of some commitments already made has not been subject to any accountability or verification. Although transparency is lacking, we know that important numbers of these weapons remain in arsenals. And the fact that these weapons are typically smaller and more easily transported poses the additional risk of nuclear terrorism if security precautions are insufficient. Thus, the need for strengthening nuclear security has also made
addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons an imperative for inclusion in the disarmament process.

4. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their mutual efforts to enhance transparency, further reduce their numbers of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and as such improve strategic stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

5. In this context, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative takes note of the decision of NATO, agreed at its 2012 Chicago summit, that NATO allies aim to continue developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of the non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe of NATO and the Russian Federation. Members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also call upon the other nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons to start reducing or further reduce their strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, in a verifiable and irreversible manner, with a view to eliminating all nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

6. Addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons may also highlight possible inconsistencies between declaratory policies and deployment postures, particularly with respect to negative security assurances. We therefore call for a fresh look at the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. A lack of transparency further complicates this matter, which demonstrates the importance of the reporting form called for in actions 5 and 21 of the action plan.

We therefore:

7. Urge the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in any future nuclear disarmament processes, with a view to their elimination, and a cessation of the development and production of new nuclear weapons.

8. Call upon all nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to review promptly their deployment posture of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of their declaratory policies.

9. Call upon nuclear-weapon States to provide information as agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, using a standard reporting form to be agreed under action 21 of the action plan.

10. Call for, as a first step on the way to the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, transparency with respect to the current status of the implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives and possible verification of such implementation.

11. Welcome progress in the dialogue on non-strategic nuclear weapons proposed by NATO at its Chicago summit, as a contribution towards including non-strategic nuclear weapons in post-new-START reduction processes.