Statement by H.E. Ambassador Paul van den IJssel

Head of delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 2nd Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference

General Debate

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General Debate

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me to join others in congratulating you on your election as chair of this second PrepCom and to assure you of our full support.

The Netherlands fully associates itself with the statement on behalf of the European Union as well as with the statements and papers of the NPDI and the Vienna Group of Ten.

Mr. Chairman,

Disarmament

The Netherlands fully subscribes to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The NPT is the essential instrument to achieve that goal. The discussion on humanitarian consequences in Oslo recently reminded us again about the devastating effects of these weapons and hence the importance of making progress towards that objective.

In 2010 NPT Member States agreed by consensus on an Action Plan. We are here, to discuss the implementation of that Action Plan in an open and constructive way. Let us take stock of what has been done so far and let us identify what we still have to do or have to do better and where we should be in 2015. While doing that let us not forget that the Action Plan is not about one or two topics that happen to be particularly dear to us but that it is a package, a comprehensive plan on all aspects of the NPT.

To make progress on the journey towards a world free of nuclear weapons, disarmament and nonproliferation are equally important and mutually reinforcing. They are very much the two sides of the same coin. Making progress on disarmament will help making progress on non-proliferation, and vice-versa. However, lack of progress on one should not be an excuse for lack of effort to realise the other. Disarmament and non-proliferation are not opposing approaches but should go hand in hand.

The Netherlands has always been an active and constructive supporter of efforts to further both disarmament and nonproliferation and will remain to be so. We believe that the best way to make progress on disarmament is a step by step
approach and by taking practical and concrete steps. Steps can be of a multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral nature. Let me dwell on a number of these steps.

**FMCT**

For The Netherlands a treaty that stops the production of Fissile material for military purposes and a CTBT entered into force are essential elements on the road towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World.

We deeply regret that it has not been possible to start negotiations on an FMCT.

Our disappointment on the lack of any progress in the Conference on Disarmament over the last 15 years is well known. However the continuing stalemate in the CD should not prevent any of us to take further steps in the implementation of actions 16, 17 and 18 of the 2010 Action Plan, related to fissile material. Last year the Netherlands together with Germany organised two expert side events on FMCT, here in Geneva. We will again in the margins of this PrepCom meet with interested delegations and representatives of civil society on this issue during the launch of the report of the International Panel on Fissile Material on Wednesday.

The Netherlands welcomes the establishment by the 67th UNGA of a Group of Government Experts on a FMCT (67/53). The Netherlands actively supported the resolution to this effect. We are looking forward to the work of this Group of Government Experts and will contribute constructively to its success in any way we can. We will submit our views to the UNSG on this issue shortly.

In this respect we also support and welcome the establishment by the UNGA of the Open Ended Working Group on ways to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons (67/56). The Netherlands will be an active and constructive participant in the deliberation of the Working Group. It is our firm belief that the work of the Open Ended Working Group is not a distraction from the NPT process and should be focused on ways to further and reinforce the implementation of the NPT Action plan.

**CTBT**

The Netherlands remains -consistent with action 13- fully committed to the universalization of the Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty and to promoting its early entry-into-force. The recent testing by North Korea only underscores the importance of this Treaty and of its earliest possible entry into force. With the Group of Friends of the CTBT, the Netherlands organized the sixth ministerial conference in New York in September last year to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty. The joint ministerial statement that was issued at the meeting was endorsed by a record 101 States, including all five nuclear weapon states. We welcome the latest ratifications by Brunei Darussalam and Chad and urge other states -especially the eight remaining States listed in Annex II of the Treaty- to follow suit without delay.
Bilateral steps

Mr Chairman,

As I have stated before we need more than multilateral steps alone. The Netherlands appreciates the ongoing implementation of the new Start Treaty as an important contribution to Nuclear Disarmament. We believe that in the next round of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals between the US and the Russian Federation all types of nuclear weapons should be included in the negotiations, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. Mutual reductions that take into account the different starting positions are the next logical step, in our view. We hope that NATO and the Russian Federation can start discussing enhanced transparency regarding non-strategic weapons shortly.

Practical steps

The Netherlands is convinced that it is very important to take, where ever possible, concrete and practical steps to achieve progress and to help us move forward on disarmament and nonproliferation. In our view, those kinds of steps can be taken on relatively short term and do not require long and complicated negotiations.

Military Doctrines

The end of the Cold War is more than 20 years behind us. For many people the Cold War is something they have only heard of or read about. Today we are facing a completely different and new security environment in which notions like 'asymmetric warfare' and 'cyber' are some of its key elements. The new circumstances and ongoing developments which have taken place over the last twenty years have lessened the role of nuclear weapons. This means the position nuclear weapons have in defence doctrines can and should be adjusted. We call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to take concrete and practical steps in that regard, that reflect the realities of the security environment of the 21st century and the changed role of nuclear weapons therein.

Transparency

Transparency is another area where more can and should be done, also without lengthy preparations or discussions. Transparency creates a clearer picture and builds trust. Transparency also builds a solid foundation upon which further reductions and sustainable and verifiable disarmament efforts can be based. Together with our NPDI Partners, we have made proposals to the Nuclear Weapon States to enhance transparency - pursuant to action 21 of the Action plan. We look forward to continue a constructive dialogue with the NWS on this subject.

Education

As a last practical step and one that may not produce immediate results but that will contribute to the sustainability of our efforts in the future, I would like to mention nonproliferation & disarmament education (action 22). The Netherlands is
convinced that the continued involvement of a broad well-informed civil and academic society is essential to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, spur arms control efforts and enable long term disarmament commitments. In addition to acknowledging the importance of raising the overall awareness and knowledge of the general public, we have invested in training the next generation of non-proliferation and disarmament experts. We have included -again- in our delegation a PHD student, who by his presence at this conference gets a firsthand impression of our work here in Geneva and of the NPT Review Cycle. I am hopeful his research will add building blocks to the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation architecture in the future.

**Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Actions 23 to 46)**

The Netherlands stresses that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the gravest threats to international peace and stability. I am thinking in particular of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran, but let’s not forget outstanding issues concerning Syria as mentioned by the EU.

**Compliance (Actions 26 and 27)**

In relation to Iran’s nuclear programme, the Netherlands is seriously concerned about Iran’s continuing production of enriched uranium, the expansion of its enrichment capacity and the continuing heavy-water related activities as reported by the IAEA. The Netherlands condemns Iran for these activities as they are in blatant breach of Iran’s international obligations. UN Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) clearly demands that Iran ‘suspend[s] all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development’.

The Netherlands strongly urges Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA in resolving the outstanding issues including those concerning the Possible Military Dimension of its nuclear programme.

Lastly, the Netherlands fully supports the diplomatic efforts, led by the E3+3 to seek a comprehensive, negotiated, long term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

The Netherlands strongly condemns the missile launch of December 2012 and the recent nuclear test of February 12th, by the DPRK. These are serious violations of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2087, and constitute grave challenges to the NPT regime. We welcome the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2094 on March 7th and strongly urge the DPRK to fully comply with all its international obligations, including all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the NPT and its IAEA Safeguards agreement. We strongly urge the DPRK -especially in the light of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula- to refrain from any further escalatory actions and provocations, including the launching of a missile, a new nuclear test or the threat of use of a nuclear weapon.
Verification and safeguards (actions 28 and 29)

For years the Netherlands has been advocating the universalization of the Additional Protocol. For the Netherlands the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, supplemented by the Additional Protocol represents the international standard for verification. Verification by this standard provides trust and the confidence that nuclear materials are exclusively used for peaceful means. This is conducive to an environment in which international cooperation, on all nuclear issues, including nuclear disarmament, can flourish. The Netherlands applies the most stringent safeguards measures in its nuclear installations and we call upon all States that have not concluded an Additional Protocol yet, to do so without delay. We see the continuous development of an ever more effective verification mechanism as an important task in the field of nonproliferation. We therefore must not shy away from improvements and new technical capabilities that can aid us in this. The Netherlands welcomes these new developments, and is in favour of a verification concept that incorporates this, such as the State-level concept.

The Netherlands is actively promoting the universalization of the AP in concrete ways. Not only by means of the ongoing extra-budgetary grant to the IAEA in order to assist the Agency in its efforts in this regard, but we also stand ready to assist to those Member States interested, to share our experiences and best practices. This also applies to providing practical or legal assistance.

The Netherlands further attaches great importance to the universal adherence to other key non-proliferation instruments. Very much in the same vein as our commitment to the AP, The Netherlands actively advocates universal adherence to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), offering assistance to interested countries and also granted the IAEA extra-budgetary means for its work on this Convention.

Export Controls (Actions 35, 36 and 37)

Nuclear export controls are a legitimate and crucial means of implementing States' Party obligations under Article III, and an important enabling factor for States' Parties to exercise the rights under article IV of the Treaty. The Netherlands is committed to uphold the highest standards of export controls and committed to full transparency in this field. A good international export control mechanism should be adhered to by all countries in order to maintain appropriate and effective international controls for nuclear and related dual use goods and technologies, including as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Nuclear Security (Actions 40, 41, 42, 44 and 45)

Nuclear terrorism is a real threat with grave consequences of unfathomable dimensions. Each individual State must do everything within its power to make sure terrorists never get their hands on nuclear material. This is a fundamental objective of Dutch foreign policy. International cooperation in this is vital.
The Netherlands is fully committed to the implementation of the Communiqués and Work Plan and of the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits. These gave impetus to the actions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We are honoured to host the next Summit in the Netherlands in 2014.

In the NSS context, we are working on several deliverables. Among them, reduction of use and better security of HEU, the entry into force of the CPPNM (we still need 33 ratifications), an increased use of the IPPAS advisory missions of IAEA, better security of radioactive sources, better cooperation between government and industry in order to promote a security culture and better implementation. And last but not least, the introduction of elements of mutual confidence by countries. This can be done by effective implementation of the existing legally binding and voluntary measures to enhance nuclear security, as well as possible new elements such as voluntary peer reviews.

The NL hosts 3 major side events as well. One is table top exercise, called @tomic, in February 2014 in decision making on nuclear security. The second one is a Nuclear Industry Summit and the third one a nuclear knowledge summit. Preventing nuclear terrorism by continuously improving the security of nuclear materials is a matter that deserves global attention. We therefore warmly welcome the invitation by the IAEA to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security in July 2013 and we encourage all States to support this important conference. The IAEA has a central and essential role to play with regards to nuclear security and we are fully supportive of that.

Returning to the 2010 Action Plan, we can report that we are implementing Action 61 by halting the use of HEU-targets in the production of medical isotopes. The use of HEU fuel had already been stopped some time ago, and at the last Nuclear Security Summit we pledged to stop using HEU for targets in 2015.

**Peaceful Uses**

Last but not least, Mr Chairman I would like to make some remarks about the third pillar of the NPT: peaceful uses.

I would like to reiterate the Netherlands full recognition of the right of all Member States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as articulated in article IV, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. As elaborated in the paper by the Vienna Group of 10 –submitted to this PrepCom- the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence that is a precondition for those uses. By ensuring that nuclear material and facilities do not contribute to nuclear proliferation, the Treaty creates the necessary basis for technological transfer and cooperation.

Responsible **Export control** regimes play an essential role in guarding against proliferation and are an important tool for States to implement their responsibilities under art. III of the Treaty. They do not restrict free technology transfer, as some States parties allege, but rather create an environment under
which art. IV can be exercised. Export controls do not hinder technological transfer and cooperation, they enable it.

The Netherlands believes the IAEA has a central role in facilitating States parties’ peaceful use of nuclear energy and we continue to support its efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. We also continue to pay our full share to the Technical Cooperation Fund. In addition, we contribute through the EU and by providing training in the Netherlands, including at the Reactor Institute in Delft, which DG Amano visited only last week.

Mr. Chairman,

I am not the first speaker to state that rights come with responsibilities. The peaceful use of nuclear energy needs to be accompanied by the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the fuel cycle. Although the responsibility for this lies primarily with the State, we welcome efforts in the framework of the IAEA to continuously improve these levels and their implementation.

Mr. Chairman,

Nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control have always been and will remain cornerstones of Dutch foreign policy, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty as its foundation and the Action Plan as our roadmap. This is an essential part of our commitment to strengthen international law and security.

The Netherlands will continue to make innovative, practical proposals to implement the 2010 Action Plan and stands ready to constructively engage with all other State parties to work on the common goals of a world free of nuclear weapons.