Mr Chairman,

Over the past year, Australia has continued its efforts to build on its long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament. While we recognise the collective challenges ahead, making progress on nuclear disarmament is not an abstract goal; the 2010 Action Plan lays out real, concrete steps we can all take to move further towards a world without nuclear weapons.

We urge all States parties to work collectively and cooperatively to implement the Action Plan and to show their commitment to working towards the total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr Chairman,

Through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), the ten-nation cross-regional grouping established to support and encourage the implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan across all three pillars, Australia has continued to urge nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith.

Australia welcomes US President Barack Obama’s announcement during this year’s State of the Union Address of the United States’ intention to work with Russia on further reductions in nuclear arsenals. We look forward to developments in this regard.

But further efforts are required from all nuclear-weapon States – and indeed from all other States possessing nuclear weapons. Expectations are growing, particularly as we approach the 2014 PrepCom.

Australia encourages the nuclear-weapon States to make progress on a standard nuclear disarmament reporting form, consistent with Action 21 and in support of Action 5 and Action 20 commitments. The draft form developed by the NPDI in 2011
is intended to aid nuclear-weapon States discussions in this regard. Greater transparency from the nuclear-weapon States will help create conditions more conducive to further progress in disarmament.

Australia, together with fellow NPDI members, reiterates the importance of further reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military doctrine. Australia calls on the nuclear-weapon States to work proactively in delegitimising the use of nuclear weapons by making declaratory policies in line with Action 5.

Australia, with its fellow NDPI members, also urges the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in any future nuclear disarmament processes, with a view to their elimination, and a cessation of the development and production of new nuclear weapons.

Mr Chairman,

All States – the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and the States outside the NPT – have a shared responsibility to make progress on disarmament.

In this regard, Australia continues to be deeply disappointed by the failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to do the work assigned to it, including by the NPT membership under Actions 6, 7 and 15. The failure to commence negotiations on the long-overdue Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty – which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices – is particularly notable. An FMCT is an essential step for the elimination of nuclear weapons and remains a key Australian priority. Pending negotiations, all States possessing nuclear weapons should declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Australia and many other CD Member States have continued to engage constructively with successive CD Presidents in seeking to break the CD’s impasse. The CD’s failure continues to call into question its role and threatens its very future as a forum for negotiation. At its 67th session in 2012, the General Assembly made its concerns clear by adopting two key resolutions: resolution 67/53, establishing a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on possible aspects of a FMCT; and resolution 67/56, establishing an open-ended working group on taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Australia supported both resolutions and intends to participate in the open-ended working group, along with the preparatory work for the group of governmental experts with a view to helping take the 2010 RevCon agenda forward and bring fresh impetus to the work the CD should be doing and can still do.

Mr Chairman,
Australia remains deeply disappointed that the world is still awaiting the entry into force of the CTBT. The CTBT is intrinsically linked to the goals and objectives of the NPT and CTBT entry into force is a major Australian priority. The 12 February nuclear test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which Australia has strongly condemned as both a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2087 and a grave challenge to the NPT, once again underscores the importance of the ratification and entry into force of the CTBT.

Australia, together with the other NPDI member states, again urges all remaining Annex 2 States – including those outside the NPT – to ratify the treaty without delay. They should not wait for other States to ratify the Treaty.

In the last year, Australia has continued its efforts, consistent with Action 13, to strengthen the CTBT pending its entry into force. Australian Foreign Minister Carr co-chaired the “Friends of the CTBT” ministerial meeting in New York last September. Australia, with Mexico and New Zealand, also again led the annual First Committee resolution underlining the urgency of the CTBT’s entry into force and the importance of upholding and maintaining moratoria. Among the over one hundred co-sponsors to this resolution, all Annex 2 States that have ratified the CTBT, as well as the other two nuclear-weapons States, co-sponsored. This is a clear and timely signal that the CTBT needs to enter into force and that nuclear tests must end.

In preparation for entry into force, Australia has also been giving additional support to the verification capacity of the CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS), again consistent with Action 13. Twenty of the 21 IMS facilities planned for Australia are now operational. In 2012, Australia and New Zealand signed a bilateral cooperation agreement that provides for collaboration between experts in our two countries on analysing events detected by the CTBT’s IMS that might be indicative of a nuclear explosion. We hope frameworks of this kind will help to promote a robust and scientific peer review of such analyses, and thus to maintain the credibility of the CTBT’s verification mechanism.

Mr Chairman,

Australia acknowledges South Africa’s contribution to this meeting through its statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. As we noted in our general debate statement, the discussions at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo this year, in which Australia participated, illustrated once more the devastating immediate and long-term humanitarian effects of a nuclear weapon detonation. This is why we strive to realise the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, including through implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.
In this context, Australia agrees that it is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulfilling the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality.

Australia welcomes the offer of fellow NPDI member Mexico to convene a follow-up conference on this issue.

Mr Chairman,

Disarmament and non-proliferation efforts are mutually reinforcing. The adherence to disarmament commitments will allow us to reach our goal of a world without nuclear weapons; adherence to the non-proliferation regime will do the same, and in the long term, allow us to maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

Working towards the fulfilment of the 2010 Action Plan is the way to ensure progress across all three pillars of the NPT and to continue down the path of making the world free of nuclear weapons and thus a safer place for all.

I thank you, Mr Chairman.