In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh
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to the IAEA and other International Organizations in Vienna
at the Second Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee
Cluster I - on Nuclear Disarmament
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Mr. Chairman,
I would like to associate my delegation with the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on this cluster.

Nuclear disarmament is a fundamental pillar of the NPT which has the highest priority in the NPT review cycle. Many countries including the NAM members have consistently requested the realization of nuclear disarmament in a phased program and within a specified framework of time. However, despite the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference as well as their commitment made at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising and do not indicate compliance with disarmament obligations.

The lack of effective and systematic progress towards implementing nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT is disturbing and deplorable. I am aware that over the past half-century, thousands of nuclear warheads have been disassembled, but many of them have been recycled as warheads of a different type or even re-manufactured. Nuclear warheads undergo a vicious life cycle that includes manufacture, storage, deployment, and then storage again, followed by disassembly and re-manufacture or transfer into weapon-grade fissile material stockpiles to be ready for future use. Therefore the mere reduction in the number of warheads cannot be regarded as fulfilling nuclear disarmament undertakings.
Limited reductions of nuclear weapons mostly do not go beyond mere decommissioning. They, therefore, do not abide by the principle of "irreversibility", which was agreed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Action 2 of the 2010 Review Conference's Action Plan.

The 13 practical steps in the 2000 NPT Review Conference for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty has become instrumental towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. These steps, in particular the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty" is part of the implementation of disarmament pillar of the Treaty that have not been realized due to the lack of faithful commitment of the NWS to this undertaking. As reaffirmed in the agreed Action Plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

In Actions 3 and 5 of the 2010 Review Conference's Action Plan, the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed their commitment to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process. In spite of that commitment, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. The upcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty should consider national reports of the nuclear-weapon States to be furnished, in accordance with the Actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 Review Conference's Action Plan, with respect to their obligations to implement Article VI of the Treaty, including measures adopted by them to implement 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament is an obligation and to fulfill this obligation the adoption and applying of the following 8 measures and principles as a package are required. None of these measures or principles solely and by itself is a panacea for nuclear disarmament problems but all of them together as a composite whole can contribute a lot to the realization of nuclear disarmament:

1- **Transparency**: The threat of the nuclear arsenal is a common threat to all human beings. The elimination of this threat should be done in a transparent
manner. During the cold war nuclear secrecy was a deception tool for preserving the supremacy in the nuclear rivalries. It is long time that we have past that era and its presumptions. Now is the right time for NWS to convince their military establishments, as the major impediment in this regard, that transparency can enhance national security rather than weaken it. If NWS are honest in fulfilling their obligations and they do not intend to divert their nuclear warheads again, this intention should be demonstrated by an international system of materials protection, control and accounting. The international community should be aware of all stocks of nuclear warheads, the targeted warheads, the inventory and full information about the means of delivery of the nuclear arsenals, full information about weapon-grade nuclear materials and their facilities to monitor their reduction and destruction as transparency measures. In this connection, we ask all the nuclear-weapon states to start their reporting in this regard based on standard reporting form as called for in the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be in a transparent manner. Needless to say, such reduction in nuclear weapons can never be a substitute for the main obligation of the nuclear-weapon States, namely the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

2- **Irreversibility:** The reduction in the arsenal should not be limited to decommissioning of the nuclear warheads. It should be in a manner that prevents any reloading of the material, therefore the principle of Irreversibility is of utmost important in realization of the nuclear disarmament.

3- **Verifiability:** Disarmament should provide for adequate measures of verification in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all international community. Therefore the principle of verifiability is vital in realization of the nuclear disarmament. The form and modalities of the verification should be determined based on the purposes, scope and nature of the activities involved by international community. The verification system should provide for application of a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures. Moreover, in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached regarding the fulfillment of nuclear disarmament obligations, the NPT Review
Conference should establish a standing Committee to ensure implementation of the commitments made with regard to Article VI obligations.

4- **Ban on use:** Removing the threat of use of nuclear weapon deliberately or accidentally is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with the most serious threat ever perceived. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, providing the necessary assurances in a legally binding instrument for non use of nuclear weapons and effective arrangements, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons is imperative. As a first step to address the issue of illegality of use or threat of use, Iran believes that, the Review Conference should adopt a decision by which the Conference "decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty shall be prohibited". We have no other choice either we proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. The US New Posture Review policy and The UK's notion of the legitimate use of nuclear weapons add to the already grave concerns of the international community regarding the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the risk of their use.

5- **Time frame:** The international community cannot wait forever to witness the total elimination of nuclear weapons. A clear time frame with a target date for the full implementation of Article VI, namely 2025 as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement is an urgent need.

6- **Budget Reduction on nuclear weapons:** It is time to realize the long overdue goal of SSOD1 to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament. The economic and social consequences of the continued existence and the modernization of nuclear weapons are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously destroying the international economic order. In a world of limited resources, economic crisis and tough austerity measures there is a close relationship between expenditure on nuclear weapons and economic and social development. It is unfortunate that the military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels and in dramatic contrast to the poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live, hundreds of billions of dollar spent by one nuclear weapon state annually on qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

7- **Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures:** these are two sides of one coin and are both important for halting the arms race and nuclear war. As
the world remains over-involved in efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, or horizontal proliferation, some nuclear weapons states have a free hand in vertical proliferation and qualitative improvement of their arsenal unabatedly. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Contrary to the declaratory policy of the US and the UK regarding its commitment to its nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT, By replacing and modernizing their nuclear arsenals under NPR and the Trident nuclear weapons system which have an estimated cost of 100 billion Euros and dollars the They are launching a nuclear rearmament rather than nuclear disarmament. This will equip them with more destructive nuclear weapons for killing and destruction of thousands of people. This is in contravention of their international obligations.

8- **Nuclear doctrines:** In this regard, the nuclear weapon states should promptly adopt necessary measures for unequivocal and absolute diminishing role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. A real change is needed regarding the removal of the emphasis on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. A review of the nuclear policy of certain nuclear-weapon States, especially the US shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis of Nuclear Posture Review of the United States on maintaining nuclear weapons and the deterrence policy, the plan to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the modernization of the nuclear arsenals, constructing new facility for production of new nuclear weapons, no movement towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and raising new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Posture Review, are clear indications of the continued policy of that State to evade its nuclear disarmament obligation. More worrisome are announcements by France. It has deployed a new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenal. The President of that country was quoted as saying, "French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe's security". This indicates that France, in defiance of its international obligations, is seeking new roles for its nuclear forces in order to justify their continued retention. In so doing, it even resorts to irresponsible methods such as manipulation of intelligence and frightening its own people to promote programmes that its people would otherwise not support. Another serious concern is the continuation and expansion of nuclear sharing among the nuclear-weapon States or with non-nuclear weapon States under military
alliances. A regrettable example in this regard is the agreement signed by France and UK. It is an open secret that France is the only NPT State party that has categorically rejected the legal obligations for nuclear disarmament both in word and action, and has tried to invent a new concept of conditional disarmament.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, Taking into account the abovementioned measures and principles and also the fact that government support for a convention eliminating nuclear weapons has grown significantly in recent years, I believe it is high time to start negotiation on a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the CD as a matter of top priority. Such a convention must legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons by any country and provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons. In this context, the IAEA should fulfill its responsibility in nuclear disarmament as stipulated in its Statute. Pending the conclusion of the nuclear weapon convention, The Preparatory Committee and the 2015 NPT Review Conference have the task of addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and alleviating these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and in foreign countries. The NPT review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and the Action Plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

I thank you.