STATEMENT

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Block of issues II (non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards)

Geneva, April 2013
Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

Efficient functioning of the non-proliferation regime is a solid foundation for achieving the common goal of making the world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives set forth in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in line with Article III of the Treaty by the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT, with the only purpose of verifying if they fulfill their obligations under the Treaty, is an important element of securing this regime. Their application is also an important prerequisite for international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and is a tool which helps build up confidence among States.

Since its creation, the system of the IAEA safeguards has been continuously improved on the basis of scientific and technological innovation in the sphere of measuring nuclear materials and data processing. The model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the additional protocols to the agreements on comprehensive safeguards signed with the NPT Member States and based on it has given the IAEA an opportunity to verify whether the nuclear activity reports made by a State are complete and to detect signs of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Without its application such verification is impossible. We recognize that the conclusion of the Additional Protocol remains purely voluntary for an IAEA Member State, which is why we are calling upon those States that have not signed or ratified this instrument yet to do so as soon as possible. The Russian Federation ratified the Additional Protocol in 2007 (Federal Law No. 227-FZ of 2 October, 2007).

Bearing in mind the importance of the Additional Protocol from the point of view of the safeguards against any nuclear materials and related activities being used for military purposes, the Russian Federation regards the participation of a State in this document as one of the necessary requirements for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment.
According to the 2012 Safeguards Implementation Report, the IAEA was conducting inspections of over 800 facilities or other locations. Over 1000 inspections had been carried out. The total cost of the application of the safeguards, both budgetary and extrabudgetary, amounted to over 130 million euro. Taking into account the forecast for the future of the development of peaceful nuclear energy and various practical uses of nuclear materials, we find the work of the IAEA Secretariat aimed at increasing the technological and financial efficiency of safeguards very important. We believe that the system of the IAEA safeguards must be based on the latest technological achievements, be technically reliable, unbiased and transparent for the Member States. Thus, we are of the view that we must first of all implement the approach of the so called 'integrated safeguards' for the States who have an Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements in force and concerning which the Agency has decided that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

We are aware of the fact that the Secretariat of the Agency not only works actively on increasing the technological effectiveness and economic efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and its improvement, but also takes certain practical steps in this direction. We believe that this work should be conducted in a transparent manner and in close cooperation with the IAEA Member States. The legitimacy of the system of safeguards should come from its non-political, unbiased nature, consideration of solely objective and, primarily technical factors while assessing the States’ nuclear programs.

We hope that the report, which has been requested by the IAEA General Conference, regarding the concept on the application of safeguards on the national level being elaborated by the Secretariat of the Agency will be ready in time and will clear up the role of specific technical goals and factors in the planning of the application of safeguards for States in general, its execution and assessment.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

The Russian Federation actively cooperates with the Agency on strengthening the safeguards system by providing financial and technical support
through the implementation of the national program of scientific and technical support of safeguards. In over 30 years of its existence, a lot has been done in order to strengthen the technical foundation of the work of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, to equip it with new methods of measuring, new material and source specimens, and to train its staff.

In the framework of this program the Russian Federation provides support to the IAEA in examining in Russian laboratories environment specimens collected by the Agency during inspections; new technologies of detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities are being developed. Particular attention is paid to the training of the IAEA inspectors and this does not only concern traditional spheres of the implementation of non-destructive methods of control of nuclear materials but also inspections at the facilities used for isotopic enrichment of uranium. The training of the IAEA Secretariat and the IAEA Member States staff on the accounting and control of nuclear materials on the basis of Russian specialized institutions continues.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

When considering the operation of the NPT, Russia attaches great importance to the implementation of provisions of paragraph 2, Article III of the Treaty. In this context we positively assess the work of the NSG and Zangger Committee that have proven in practice the possibility of establishing the coordinated control over nuclear exports on a non-discriminative basis and feasibility of drawing-up lists of controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technologies as well as principles of their transfer to non-nuclear countries. We would consider it important for the other countries to build up, as Russia does, their national export controls based on the rules of export and control lists, as well as goods listed therein pursuant to the principles of the GNS and Zangger Committee.

We believe it is useful to further enhance the universality of achievements of the GNS and Zangger Committee as well as their control lists while carrying out nuclear exports or implementing the projects related to peaceful nuclear
cooperation. At the same time it is necessary to continue working with other countries, including non-NPT members in order to engage them into the efforts aimed at strengthening the export control regimes.

In this context Russia also stands for consistent implementation by all the countries of the provisions of the UN SC Resolution 1540 that are aimed at counteracting the WMD "black" markets, preventing the diversion of such weapons and their associated materials, technologies and means of their delivery to non-State actors, and primarily, terrorist organizations. We actively participate in the work of the UN SC Committee established with the view of effective implementation of provisions of the UN SC Resolution 1540.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

Speaking about the efficiency of the NPT and enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, one cannot forget about relevant measures taken by the world community and aimed at improving safety of nuclear materials and facilities. In this context, we attach great importance to enhancing the universality of international legal instruments in the field of nuclear safety and security and counteraction to nuclear terrorism, i.e. the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Terrorism and its Amendments.

We believe that the IAEA should take the central role in the cooperation in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. We take note of the issuance by the Agency of the latest edition of the Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). We support the IAEA efforts aimed at developing relevant guidelines. Russian experts take an active part in this work.

Russia also provides corresponding assistance to the IAEA Member States that have started or are planning to start using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The IAEA training courses on nuclear safety and security take place regularly at the Obninsk Interdepartmental Special Training Centre in Russia.
Since 2001, over 500 foreign experts have been trained in the area of accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials.

The joint work with the U.S. and IAEA on the return from the third countries of new and spent highly-enriched uranium fuel (HEU-fuel) from research reactors of Russian and American design to the country of origin is considered by us as an important direction of multilateral cooperation. All in all, about 2,000 kg of nuclear fuel - that would be enough to produce about 80 nuclear munitions - have been returned to the Russian Federation under the program. The implementation of this program makes a substantive contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

It should be noted that in the beginning of April due to the joint efforts of Russia, the U.S. and Czech Republic in cooperation with the IAEA the highly-enriched radiated nuclear fuel from the research reactor of the Institute of Nuclear Research was withdrawn to the town of Rzhvesk, Russia. During the last decade six shipments of HEU totaling to over 180kg of HEU - that is enough to produce about 7 nuclear explosive devices - have been successfully transported from the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation. As a result, all HEU was taken back from the territory of the Czech Republic.

Russia assists the Agency’s program aimed at gradual reduction in the enrichment of nuclear fuel on research reactors to the level below 20%. Over the previous years the program achieved certain results, and many reactors have been converted from highly-enriched (HEU-fuel) to low-enriched (LEU-fuel) uranium fuel.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

All regional non-proliferation challenges may and should be addressed only by political methods and in accordance with the NPT provisions.

In this context it is necessary to achieve the earliest non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula, resumption of the full-fledged membership of the DPRK in the NPT as well as application of the IAEA safeguards in its territory. We stand for the continuous diplomatic efforts aimed at looking up for mutually acceptable
outcomes and ways of moving forward towards settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula by means of the earliest resumption of the six-party talks.

We emphasize once again that there is no other reasonable alternative to a politico-diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue based on the principles of mutual respect, reciprocity and a step-by-step approach.

We support the continuation and intensification of the negotiation process between the E3+3 group of international mediators and Iran to normalize the situation with the Iranian nuclear profile. The purpose of these negotiations is to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program that will lead to withdrawing the above profile from the UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors agenda, lifting of all sanctions and ensuring the full implementation of Iran’s rights under the NPT, including its right to enrichment after all Iranian nuclear activities are set under reliable and comprehensive control of the IAEA.

We believe that while accelerating the dynamics of the ongoing negotiation process it would be absolutely untimely and counterproductive to increase any further political and sanction pressure on Iran. Such steps create an unfavorable background for the diplomatic process that indeed has prospects. Any threats of military actions are absolutely unacceptable.

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

We remain convinced that only a systematic approach to the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and enhancement of the NPT in general will allow to fulfill the task of preventing the emergence of new nuclear weapon countries on the planet. In this context, the role of the IAEA as a unique international organization that ensures the necessary balance between the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy and the compliance with nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime becomes even more crucial.

Thank you, distinguished Mr. Chairman.