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STATEMENT
Cluster II: Non-Proliferation

by

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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INTERVENTION
Deuxième groupe de questions : Non-prolifération

de

Mr. Shawn Caza
Conseiller et représentant permanent suppléant
Mission permanente du Canada auprès des organisations internationales à Vienne

Réunion du Comité préparatoire (2013) de la Conférence
d’examen du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires

Genève, le 29 avril 2013
Mr Chairman,

States Parties’ full compliance with their NPT Safeguards Agreement obligations, as administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is a treaty obligation under Article III. Canada urges States Parties to consider how we can collectively ensure the return to NPT Article III compliance by Iran and North Korea.

IAEA Director General Amano’s latest quarterly report on Iran illustrates yet again Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA and a flagrant disregard for its safeguards obligations. There have been ten consecutive years of IAEA Board of Governors meetings in which Iran’s non-compliance has been on the agenda. That a decade has passed with virtually no progress is unacceptable to Canada, and should be equally unacceptable to all NPT States Parties. Despite ten years of concerted effort by the IAEA to engage Iran in good faith, Iran continues to obfuscate and refuses to answer critical questions about its nuclear program.

Furthermore, it has been six years since the Agency and Iran began direct talks to address Iran’s non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. Yet again, despite the ample window provided, there is no evidence that Iran has engaged or intends to engage in good faith. Iranian inferences that an agreement with the Agency is close and that they are willing to cooperate belie the absence of any substantive progress.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird have repeatedly asserted that Iran remains the biggest threat to international peace and security.

Mr Chairman,

Canada is fully confident that, after nine rounds of talks, the IAEA has made every reasonable effort to conclude a structured approach with Iran to investigate nuclear weapons related research and development activities in Iran. The implication of the Agency’s decision in February to suspend talks and take “time to reflect” is clear: Iran is unwilling to accept the “effective verification measures” that are necessary. Iran’s unanswered questions about the credible evidence that it undertook, and continues to undertake, nuclear weapons-related research and development is a clear violation of Article III. NPT States Parties need real answers, through the IAEA as the safeguards verification body under the Treaty, to the grave concerns posed by Iran’s nuclear program.

The IAEA Director General continues to report that, contrary to its Safeguards Agreement, Iran is not implementing the provisions of modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements. The fact that Iran is not implementing modified Code 3.1 – the only NPT State Party that does not – prevents the Agency from providing the international community with assurances about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Supplying early nuclear facility design information to the IAEA allows for the implementation of appropriate verification measures and gives the international community confidence that a state’s nuclear activities are peaceful in nature.

While recognizing the rights of NPT States Parties, Canada has serious concerns over Iran’s increasing uranium enrichment capacities – specifically Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, which consumes 90% of the effort necessary to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. The January 2013 notification to the IAEA that Iran would begin installing IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz is yet another violation of UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program.
The IAEA Director General continues to report ongoing sanitization efforts at Parchin and Iran's continuing refusal to allow the Agency access to the site. The Parchin site is meaningful due to the nuclear weapons-related testing alleged to have taken place there.

Mr Chairman,

Iran often claims that IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions brought against it stem from a desire to prevent Iran from having access to nuclear energy or to undermine NPT Article IV. This claim is proven to be patently false, however, by the numerous resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council explicitly permitting the development of a nuclear power program in Iran, including the international project to build and operate the Bushehr reactor. To be clear, resolutions brought against Iran stem from its undeclared nuclear fuel cycle, its failure to cooperate with the Agency, its failure to comply with its Safeguards Agreement, its failure to actively comply with investigations by the Agency into activities such as those underway at Parchin, and its failure to account for past and ongoing actions.

Iran is required by binding resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and other related obligations, including implementation of an Additional Protocol. It has failed to do so. The crisis over Iran's nuclear program has persisted for ten years and the international community simply cannot allow this impasse to continue. States Parties cannot allow a third NPT Review Conference to come and go without addressing Iran's ongoing nuclear non-compliance. We believe that such inaction would seriously undermine the global non-proliferation regime.

Mr Chairman,

The security and stability of Northeast Asia continue to be threatened by the irresponsible nuclear activities and proliferation by North Korea. Two ballistic missile tests in 2012 and North Korea's third nuclear test of February 12, 2013 have further and greatly exacerbated the threat it poses to the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Canada condemned each of these violations by North Korea of its non-proliferation obligations in the strongest possible terms. In this regard, Canada co-sponsored the latest UN Security Council Resolution expanding sanctions against North Korea and pledging further significant action in the event of a further missile launch or nuclear test. Canada already has in place sanctions that go above and beyond those of the UN Security Council.

In order to bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula, we strongly urge North Korea to re-engage in the NPT review cycle, to adhere to its Safeguards Agreement and to fully implement all relevant non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The IAEA has an essential role to play in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and Canada appreciates the Agency's readiness to monitor nuclear activities in North Korea including uranium enrichment, despite being unable to implement any safeguards measures there since its inspectors were expelled in 2009. North Korea recently reminded the international community of the essential role the IAEA has to play when it announced plans to restart the Yongbyon nuclear complex for its nuclear program. It is deeply regrettable that a country unable to feed its own people continues to expend so much of its limited resources on these military programs. North Korea must refrain from further provocative acts, including its unrepentantly belligerent threats and rhetoric. It must re-join the international non-proliferation community by renouncing its nuclear weapons aspirations, and by immediately disarming.
Finally Mr Chairman,

As pointed out by High Representative Angela Kane in her statement to this forum, the increase in production and the proliferation of fissile material in South Asia, especially Pakistan, is of concern. We call on states of the region to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Mr Chairman,

The efficacy and durability of the NPT is predicated on its integrity. Cases of non-compliance that are not addressed with timely and meaningful action negatively affect the fabric of the Treaty. States Parties must consider these cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations and determine how the 2015 RevCon will address them.

Thank you.